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INTRODUCTION
In Anglo-American jurisprudence, the law is shaped by a series of
fact patterns.' As Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote, "[t]he life of the law
has not been logic: it has been experience. Thus, where a party
seeks to change or clarify existing law, the importance of proceeding
with a favorable set of facts cannot be overstated! Proceeding with
an agreeable fact pattern is all the more important when bringing a
case before the United States Supreme Court, since the holding aris-
ing from that one fact pattern will yield the law of the land.
This Comment argues that the Clinton Administration (the
1. SeeVillage of Euclid v. Ambler Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926) (stating that the Supreme
Court follows "a gradual approach to the general by a systematically guarded application and
extension of constitutional principles to particular cases as they arise, rather than by out of
hand attempts to establish general rules to which future cases must be fitted"); cf Webster v.
Reproductive Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 550 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part) (1989) (stating that"careful distinctions reflect the process of constitutional adjudication
itself which is often highly fact specific"); BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THEJUDICIAL
PROCESS 68 (1960) (quoting favorably the words of the English Judge Sir James Parke: "'Our
common law system consists in applying to new combinations of circumstances those rules of
law which we derive from legal principles and judicial precedents.'"); Louis FISHER, CON-
STrrtTIONAL DIALOGUES 13 (1988) (commenting that "the Supreme Court moves with a series
of half steps, disposing of the particular issue at hand while preparing for the next case").
2. THE COMMON LAw 1 (52d ed. 1923).
3. See, e.g.,Jack Ratiff, Offensive Collateral Estoppel and the Option Effect, 67 TEx. L. REV. 63,
89 n.165 (1988) (emphasizing the consideration of "selecting a case with 'good facts'" in order
to change the law through appellate litigation); William S. Geimer, In the Interest of Children:
Advocacy, Law Reform, and Public Policy By Robert H. Mnookin, 35 CATH. U. L. REv. 663, 664 (1986)
(book review) (stating that when using litigation as a tool for reform "good facts" are vital).
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"Administration") made a grave error in constructing its defense of
the Line Item Veto Act (the "Act").4 The Administration would have
been much better served by restricting any exercise of the Act's can-
6cellation 5 power to statutory provisions within the realm of national
4. Line Item Veto Act, Pub. L. No. 104-130, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 1200 (1996) (to
be codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 691-692). The Act was signed into law on April 9, 1996, and
amended Title X of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. See
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act, Pub. L. No. 93-344, tit. X, 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. (88 Stat.) 326 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 681-688 (1974)). The Act's
legislative history can be found in several House and Senate reports. See H.R. CONF. REP. No.
104-491 (1996); H.R. REP. No. 104-11, pt. 1-2 (1995);S. REP. No. 104-9 (1995); S. REP. No. 104-
13 (1995).
In public discourse, the term "line item veto" has been spelled both with a hyphen and with-
out. The author has followed the language of the bill and omitted the hyphen. Any hyphen-
ated spelling by an original author has, of course, been left unchanged. It should be noted that
the terms "line item veto" and "enhanced rescission" or "cancellation power" are not inter-
changeable. See infra note 35 and accompanying text (describing differences between true line
item veto power and enhanced rescission).
The use of the term "line item veto" apparently began during the Civil War when Confeder-
ate President Jefferson Davis was granted line item veto power. The term itself, however, did
not appear in the text of the Confederate Constitution:
The President may approve any appropriation and disapprove any other appropria-
tion in the same bill. In such case he shall, in signing the bill, designate the appro-
priations disapproved; and shall return a copy of such appropriations, with his objec-
tions, to the House in which the bill shall have originated; and the same proceedings
shall then be had as in case of other bills disapproved by the President.
CONFEDERATE CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
The power was granted to the Confederate President for similar reasons as it was granted to
the U.S. President in 1996. In urging ratification of the Confederate Constitution, Robert H.
Smith, the author of the Confederate veto provision, supported the measure by arguing-
There is hardly a more flagrant abuse of it's [sic] power, by the Congress of the
United States than the habitual practice of loading bills which are necessary for Gov-
ernmental operations with reprehensible, not to say venal dispositions of the public
money, and which only obtain favor by a system of combinations among members in-
terested in similar abuses upon the treasury.
Ralph S. Abascal &John R. Kramer, Presidential Impoundment Part I: Historical Genesis and Consti-
tutionalFramework, 62 GEO. L.J. 1549, 1562 & n.53 (1974).
Line item veto power is not unique to this country. The first actual implementation of line
item veto authority apparently occurred not in the United States but in Argentina. Article 66 of
the 1853 Argentine Constitution granted that nation's President such power. SeeJonathan M.
Miller, The Authority of a Foreign Talisman: A Study of U.S. Constitutional Practice as Authority in
Nineteenth Century Argentina and the Argentine Elite's Leap of Faith, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1483, 1511
n.194 (1997). In France, the 1958 Constitution granted the President not only line item veto
power, but also the ability to initiate legislation involving increases in taxation and expendi-
tures. See Ara J. Balikian, Note, The New Russian Federation Constitution: A Legal Framework
Adopted and Implemented in a Post-Soviet Era, 18 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 237, 251 (1995).
5. The terminology involved with the Act is of no small importance. The Act uses the
term "cancel," which it defines as the power "to rescind" any dollar amount of discretionary
budget authority or to prevent items of new direct spending or limited tax benefits from having
"legal force or effect." See Line Item Veto Act § 1026(4).
The word "veto" purposely was not used in the Act. This was due in part to the argument
raised by Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger. He cautioned the Senate against using
the term "veto" on the theory that such language would more likely violate the Presentment
Clause by implying that the President was vetoing a bill after it had already become law. See
Brief for Appellee at 9, Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312 (1997) (No. 96-1671),available in 1997
WL 251423.
6. The term "provision" is used in this Comment to refer to what the Line Item Veto Act
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security7 because that is where the President's constitutional authority
is greatest." In so doing, the Administration would have ensured that
the inevitable constitutional challenge would have been brought on
the terms most favorable to the Executive branch. Instead, the Ad-
ministration ceded the initiative to the injured parties. As expected,9
a number of parties challenged the Act in court, but no challenges
were brought by those injured by national security-related cancella-
tions.'0 Instead, the latter parties wisely (or fortuitously) allowed oth-
ers to challenge the Act. Thus, on June 25, 1998, the Supreme
Court, in Clinton v. City of New York," struck down the Line Item Veto
Act, ruling that the Act's provisions violated the proper constitutional
lawmaking procedure as outlined in the Presentment Clause of Arti-
cle 1.12
allows the President to cancel. Thus, in addition to statutory language, "provision" includes
relevant legislative history. See Line Item Veto Act §§ 1021(b) (1), 1026(7). "Provision" is used
instead of "item" because the federal budget does not contain line items, see Louis Fisher &
Neal Devins, How Successfully Can the States' Item Veto be Transferred to the President, 75 GEO. L.J.
159, 159 (1986), and because the term "item" is used in the Act only with respect to new direct
spending. See Line Item Veto Act § 1021 (a) (2) (stating that President may cancel"any item of
new direct spending").
7. By "national security," the author is referring to the President's military prerogatives as
Commander in Chief and his foreign affairs powers as Chief Diplomat. Therefore, this Com-
ment maintains that the President's constitutional national security prerogatives, coupled with
the congressional delegation from the Line Item Veto Act, would have allowed the President to
cancel provisions within the Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Ap-
propriations Act, Military Construction Appropriations Act, Department of Defense Appropria-
tions Act, and the Department of State provisions within the Departments of Commerce, Jus-
tice and State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies Appropriations Act. See infra note 411
(providing sample provisions that the President could have canceled to achieve a favorable test
case).
8. See generally infra Part IV.A.2.a (discussing the difference between domestic and na-
tional security lawmaking and the President's greater authority in the latter area).
9. See, e.g., Helen Dewar, President Keeps Line-Item Veto: Ruling Leaves Door Open to Future
Constitutional Challenge, WASH. POST, June 27, 1997, at Al ("Lawmakers... predicted that,
shortly after the veto is used, the court will be faced with a challenge that will lead to a ruling
on the law's constitutionality.").
10. Throughout this Comment the term, "national security-related" refers to actions taken
within the President's constitutional national security power which consist of his powers as
Commander in Chief and Chief Diplomat. See supra note 7 (describing bills subject to such
power). For a definition of "National Security Rescission," see infra note 14 and accompanying
text.
11. Seell8S. Ct. 2091 (1998).
12. See id. at 2095. There are actually two Presentment Clauses in the U.S. Constitution.
The first lies in Article I, Section 7, Clause 2, and the second in clause 3. Clause 2 refers spe-
cifically to bills, while Clause 3, termed the "Residual" or "Orders" Presentment Clause, refers
to orders, resolutions or votes. For convenience and to comport with standard usage, the two
Clauses, with the exception of this footnote, will be referred to in the singular as the Present-
ment Clause. The first Presentment Clause states:
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall,
before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he ap-
prove he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in
which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on theirJournal,
and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House
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shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other
House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that
House, it shall become a Law. But in all Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be de-
termined by Yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the
Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be
returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been
presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, un-
less the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not
be a Law,
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
The "Residual" or "Orders" Presentment Clause states:
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House
of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be
presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect,
shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two
thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limita-
tions prescribed in the Case of a Bill.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.
The "Residual" or "Orders" Presentment Clause was added so that Congress could not evade
presentment by calling a bill by another name. SeeJAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 408-09 (Gaillard Hunt & James Brown Scott eds., 1920)
(describing Madison's advocacy and the subsequent adoption of the Orders Presentment
Clause). The specificity of the Presentment Clause is striking compared to other constitutional
provisions. Hence, the absence of specific line item veto authority would seem to reflect that
the Framers did not consider such authority within their conception of veto power. See Charles
J. Cooper, The Line-Item Veto: The Framers' Intentions, in NATIONAL LEGAL CENTER FOR THE
PUBLIC INTEREST, PORK BARRELS AND PRINCIPLES: THE POLITICS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL VETO 31
(1988) [hereinafter PORK BARRELS AND PRINCIPLES].
The veto power first appeared in the constitution of the early Roman Republic. See RICHARD
A. WATSON, PRESIDENTIAL.VETOES & PUBLIC POLICY 2 (1993) (dating the prerogative from 509
B.C.). The word "veto" in fact comes from the Latin term "vetare" meaning "to forbid or pro-
hibit." See OXFORD LATIN DICTIONARY 2050-51 (1983). Thus, "veto" means "I forbid." Id. The
Roman Constitution provided that the Executive consist of two men of the patrician class called
consuls. See WATSON, sup-a, at 2. Each official was granted a veto (or "intercessio") over the
acts of the other consul. Seeid. In time, the plebeian class also gained a measure of representa-
tion in the form of tribunes. See id. at 3. The tribunes, who also fulfilled executive functions,
were also granted veto power over the actions of the consuls. See id. The Roman veto thus in-
volved executive officials blocking the actions of other executive officials and not measures
passed by a legislature. See id. Such a development would not occur until the early sixteenth-
century. See id. at 4-5.
In England, the veto evolved out of the conflict between the King and Parliament over the
lawmaking prerogative. See id. at 4. Throughout the medieval period, both branches possessed
positive lawmaking powers. See id. During this period, the sovereign could both make and
unmake laws irrespective of the consent of Parliament. See EDWARD C. MASON, THE VETO
POWER 13 (1967).
During the reign of Henry VI (1422-61 and 1470-71), however, the ability of the King to ef-
fect unilateral changes in the law began to erode. See id. at 15 n.1. Eventually, the monarch
was forced to accept or reject the whole of a petition of the House of Commons. See id. By the
beginning of the sixteenth century, this custom had become entrenched, virtually stripping the
King of his positive lawmaking powers. See id. Nonetheless, the King's veto power was absolute
in that it could not be overturned by a vote of Parliament. See ROBERT J. SPITZER, THE
PRESIDENTIAL VETO: TOUCHSTONE OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 4 (1988).
Although the frequency of the monarch's veto varied over the next century and a half, with
the establishment of the supremacy of the Commons after the 1688-89 Glorious Revolution,
the use of the royal veto was called into serious question. See id. at 15-17. Nearly two decades
later in 1707, Queen Anne withheld her assent from a Scottish militia bill, an action which
would prove to be the last veto issued by a British monarch. SeeWATSON, supra, at 5.
The veto was imported to the New World by English colonists. While under English rule, the
governor in each colony could veto bills passed by the legislature. See MASON, supra, at 17.
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This Comment argues that by putting its "best foot forward"-by
canceling provisions solely within the national security realm-the
Moreover, in all but three colonies, the King could also prevent a bill from becoming law even
though it had the governor's assent. See id. at 17. See generally SPITZER, supra, at 1-24 (providing
a history of the veto in Europe and its adoption in the United States). SeealsoWATSON, supra, at
25-70 (describing the development of presidential veto power in America).
The use of the royal veto over colonial laws drew the ire of the American Colonists. The
Declaration of Independence condemned King George III for his alleged abuse of that pre-
rogative:
He has refused his Assent to Laws, the most wholesome and necessary for the public
good. He has forbidden his Governors to pass Laws of immediate and pressing im-
portance, unless suspended in their operation till his Assent should be obtained; and
when so suspended, he has utterly neglected to attend to them.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, paras. 3, 4 (U.S. 1776).
The Articles of Confederation did not provide for an independent executive branch, so no
veto provision existed in the nation's initial federal governing document. See ART. OF
CONFEDERATION.
The term "veto" was eschewed by the Framers due to the monarchical connotations of the
word at the time. See TERRY EASTLAND, ENERGY IN THE EXECUTIVE: THE CASE FOR THE STRONG
PRESIDENCY 65 (1992). Instead, euphemistic terms such as "negative," "qualified negative,"
"revisionary check," and "revisionary power" were used during the period to describe the
power. SeeJ. Gregory Sidak & Thomas A. Smith, Four Faes of the Item Veto, 84 Nw. U. L. REV.
437, 441 (1990). Such terms were at the heart of the scholarly debate over the intent of the
Framers and if line item power inhered under Article I, Sections 7 and 8. See infra note 17
(providing a list of articles and discussion of arguments in favor of inherent line item veto
power).
Compared to issues such as the structure of the legislative and executive branches, the veto
power elicited comparatively little debate during the Ratification Debate over the Constitution.
The concept itself appears only four times in the Federalist Papers. SeeTHE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at
263 (James Madison), Nos. 66, at 335 (Alexander Hamilton), 69, at 349 (Hamilton), 73, at 372-
76 (Hamilton) (Garry Wills ed., 1982). Likewise, veto power is hardly discussed during the de-
bates over ratification of the Constitution. See 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONsTITUTION 99, 109,
196, 198, 635, 825 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1990) (providing the limited examples of discussion of
veto power during the Ratif zation Debate); 2 THE DEBATE ON THECONSTITUTION 165 (Bernard
Bailyn ed., 1990) (same).
The discussion of the President's veto power took place on June 4,June 6,July 21, August 15,
and September 12, 1787. See PHILIP B. KURLAND & RALPH LERNER, THE FOUNDERS' CON-
STITUTION 389-97 (1966). Debate focused on whether the Executive veto should be qualified
or absolute. Executive action of this sort could not be overturned by the legislature. Although
defended ably by Alexander Hamilton and James Wilson, this proposal was quickly disre-
garded. See I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 98-104 (Max Fatrand ed.,
1937). The Framers, therefore, agreed upon a qualified veto without much dissent. See id.
The only subsequent debate was over what fraction of the legislature should be able to override
the veto. See id.
The veto power remained fairly static throughout the various constitutional drafts. See THE
VIRGINIA PLAN § 8 (May 29, 1787), in CLINTON ROSSrFER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 362
(1987) (proposing a council of revision consisting of Executive and member of the National
Judiciary to examine every act of the National Legislature before it became law);THE REPORT
OF THE COMM. OF THE WHOLE § 10 (June 13, 1787), in ROSSITER, supra, at 364, 365 (proposing
that the Executive could negative any act unless two-thirds of each branch voted to overturn it);
THE NEWJERSEY PLAN (June 15, 1787), in ROSSITER, supra, at 367-69 (making no provision for
executive negative); RESOLUTIONS REFERRED TO THE COMM. OF DETAIL T 16 (July 26, 1787), in
ROSSITER, supra, at 372 (granting Executive power to negative an act unless two thirds of each
branch later overturn veto); THE CONST. AS REPORTED BY THE COMM. OF DETAIL, art. VI, § 13
(Aug. 6, 1787), in ROSSrER, supra, at 377-78 (granting Executive power to negative any act
pending reconsideration of bill by the National Legislature and a two thirds vote in each
house).
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Clinton administration would have set the stage for a favorable test
case.'3 Such a test case would likely have acknowledged the existence
of "National Security Rescission":14 a narrow statutory construction
limiting the area of presidential cancellation power to within the
field of national security. Such a result would have been the best
possible outcome for the Administration and would have assured that
the President maintained cancellation authority over a sixth of the
federal budget.'5
I. BACKGROUND
The constitutionality of a federal line item veto, with its many pos-
sible manifestations,'6 has not suffered from inattention in academic
13. Test cases are often pursued because the Supreme Court does not render Advisory
Opinions. See Letter from theJustices to President Washington (Aug. 8, 1793), in RICHARD H.
FALLON, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 92-93 (4th ed. 1996) (providing the
letter which established the basis for the prohibition against advisory opinions).
14. The term "National Security Rescission" is the author's own.
15. See Robert C. Byrd, The Control of the Purse and the Line Item Veto Act, 35 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 297, 315 (1998) (stating that the defense budget alone accounts for approximately one
sixth of the annual federal budget).
16. These include "separate enrollment," "expedited rescission," the "partial item veto,"
and the "amendatory veto." Separate enrollment is the version of the Act that was initially
passed by the Senate. This measure would have required each appropriation and entitlement
bill to be unbundled and separately enrolled as hundreds or thousands of new bills, which the
President could then sign or veto individually. See 141 CONG. REC. S4,075-76 (daily ed. Mar. 16,
1995) (statement of Sen. McCain) (describing the procedure involved with separate enroll-
ment). In the wake of the City of New York decision, this proposal has been resuscitated by ad-
vocates of the line item veto. See infra note 419 (detailing efforts in both the House and the
Senate to pass different versions of line item veto legislation).
During the 104th Congress, the other main alternative to enhanced rescission was
"expedited rescission." S. 14 in the 104th Congren. is an example of this. See S. REP. NO. 104-9,
supra note 4, at 6. This measure would have treat- the President's actions as recommenda-
tions, assuring a prompt congressional vote on the proposals. See id. The district court in Byrd
v. Raines stated in dictum that such a mechanism might be a constitutional alternative to en-
hanced rescission: "The expedited rescission model favored by many Members of the 104th
Congress would retain the President's role as a recommender of rescissions...." 956 F. Supp.
25,38 (D.D.C. 1997), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 2312 (1997).
Another plan is the "partial item veto" or "reduction only veto," which grants the Executive
the most power. Here, the Executive not only has the option of eliminating spending com-
pletely, but he can reduce the appropriation to whatever level he wishes. SeeAbascal & Kramer,
supra note 4, at 1564 (discussing the mechanics of the "partial item veto"). Eleven governors
have this power. See Diane-Michele Krasnow, The Imbalance of Power and the Presidential Veto: A
Casefor the Item Veto, 14 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y583, 613 n.101 (1991).
With the Line Item Veto Act, the President had only the power to cancel entire measures.
For example, if Congress wished to appropriate funds for 16 airplanes and the President only
wished 12, he could not have vetoed four of them. See William M. Welch, Power of the Pen Taken
to Another Level, USA TODAY, Jan. 3, 1997, at 6A. In this limited sense, the President's cancella-
tion power is still an "all-or-nothing" proposition.
Yet another form of line item veto is the "amendatory veto." This power allows governors to
condition approval of enacted bills on the legislature adopting their suggested changes. Be-
ginning with Alabama in 1901, seven states have adopted this form of line item veto power. See
Fisher & Devins, supra note 6, at 166.
For additional proposals, see Walter F. Brown, Jr., Comment, Where's the Pork? Restoring Bal-
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circles. 7 Thus, this Comment will not retread upon this well-worn
ance with a Line-Item Veto, 1 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 259, 280-84 (1985) (drawing
upon state experience and proposing a line item veto amendment); Nancy J. Townsend,
Comment, Single Subject Restrictions as an Alternative to the Line-Item Veto, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 227, 230-31 (1985) (arguing for a single subject amendment in place of
line item veto amendment); see alsoJ. Gregory Sidak, The Line-Item Veto Amendment, 80 CORNELL
L. REV. 1498, 1498 (1995) (arguing in favor of a line item veto amendment); Sidak & Smith,
supra note 12, at 437, 445-60 (discussing four possible variations of line item veto). See generally
AMERICAN ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH, PROPOSALS FOR LINE-ITEM VETO AUTHORITY
(1984) (providing line item veto proposals).
17. This Comment will avoid rehashing arguments concerning the Act itself or the line
item veto as an abstract policy proposal.
There are a host of articles that address the Act. For the most thorough treatment of the
constitutionality of the Act, see Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Future of the Item Veto, 83 IOwA L.
REV. 79, 85 (1997) (arguing that the Act violates the Presentment Clause and that the underly-
ing policy rationales are unpersuasive); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Bottom Line on the Line-Item Veto
Act of 1996, 6 CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y 233, 237-42 (1997) (arguing that the Line Item Veto
Act is unconstitutional on Presentment and nondelegation grounds and also that the Act en-
cumbers the President's veto power); see also Catherine M. Lee, Note, The Constitutionality of the
Line Item Veto Act of 1996: Three Potential Sources for Presidential Line Item Veto Power, 25 HASTINGS
CONsT. L.Q. 119, 157 (1997) (arguing that the Act violates separation of powers either through
the nondelegation doctrine or a violation of Article I). Two authors argued that the Act would
be upheld. See Gordon T. Butler, The Line Item Veto and the Tax Legislative Process: A Futile Effort
at Deficit Reduction, But a Step Toward Tax Integrity, 49 HASTINGS LJ. 1, 103-04 (1997) (predicting
that the Act will be upheld and that it will have a positive effect on the perceived fairness of the
tax system); Michael G. Locklar, Comment, Is the 1996 Line-Item Veto Constitutional?, 34 Hous. L.
REV. 1161, 1163 (1997) (arguing that the Act satisfies bicameralism, Presentment, does not vio-
late separation of powers, and will be upheld by the Supreme Court).
A host of other articles focus on narrower constitutional issues surrounding the Act. See Mi-
chael B. Rappaport, Veto Burdens and the Line Item Veto Act, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 771, 773 (1997)
(arguing that the "veto burden" in the Act renders it unconstitutional); Robert Destro, Wom do
you Trust? Judicial Independence, the Power of the Purse & the Line Item Veto, 44 FED. LAW. 26, 28
(1997) (expressing concern that the Act will threaten the independence of the Judiciary).
Other articles have focused more on the policy ramifications of the Act. See Byrd, supra note
15, at 299-300 (contending that the Act is ineffective in reducing the deficit and gives away too
much power to the President); Matthew C. Bernstein, The Emperor Has No Clothes: The Line Item
Veto Act of 1996 Exposed, 16 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 85, 89 (1996) (contending that the Act will
not affect the balance of political power and will do little to facilitate deficit reduction); Neal E.
Devins, In Search of the Lost Chord: Reflections on the 1996 Item Veto Act, 47 CASE W. REs. L. REV.
1605, 1608 (1997) (arguing that the Act will not result in deficit savings and only marginally
affect the political balance of power); Lawrence Lessig, Lessons from a Line Item Veto Law, 47
CASEW. RES. L. REV. 1659, 1659 (1997) (arguing that the Act will not be upheld and that an
amendment involving both line item veto and balanced budget provisions should be adopted
instead).
The line item veto as a concept has been approached from a number of different angles, in-
cluding discussion regarding the intent of the Framers, the existence of an inherent line item
veto, the practical and policy ramifications of a line item veto, and the experience of the states
with the line item veto.
For the intent of the Framers, see generally PORK BARRELS AND PRINCIPLES, supra note 12
(assembling a distinguished array of scholars who primarily discuss the intent of the Framers);
Sidak & Smith, supra note 12, at 441-45 (arguing that ambiguity of Framers' words indicates
there are four line item veto possibilities). But cf Paul R. Q. Wolfson, Note, Is a Presidential Item
Veto Constitutional?, 96 YALE L.J. 838, 839 (1987) (contending that colonial experience with rid-
ers and nongermane amendments on money bills indicates that the Framers were familiar with
such practices and purposely decided not to provide for line item veto power).
For a discussion on the existence of an inherent line item veto, see L. Gordon Crovitz, The
Line-Item Veto: The Best Response When Congress Passes One Spending "Bill" a Year, 18 PEPP. L. REV.
43, 43-44 (1990) (asserting that due to rampant abuse of Presentment by Congress, inherent
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line item veto is the constitutionally appropriate response); Krasnow, supra note 16, at 583
(arguing that inherent line item veto exists in Constitution); cf. Michael D. Schagemann, Note,
The Implicitly Constitutional Item Veto, 19 OKIA. CITYU. L. REV. 161, 161-62 (1994) (arguing that
implicit line item veto test case is worthwhile); Sidak & Smith, supra note 12, at 59 (asserting
that President Bush should have established test case for inherent line item veto). But see
EASTLAND, supra note 12, at 76 (denying existence of inherent line item veto);JOSEPH E.
KALLENBACH, THE AMERICAN CHIEF EXECUTIVE: THE PRESIDENCY AND THE GOVERNORSHIP 356
(1966) (concluding that in exercising veto power a President "must go all the way in one direc-
tion or the other"); LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 266 (2d ed. 1988)
(concluding that "the constitutionality of a line-item veto is dubious"); Michael B. Rappaport,
The President's Veto and the Constitution, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 735, 738 (1993) (contending that
President does not have a selective veto nor the ability to approve bills without intent to en-
force them) [hereinafter, Rappaport, President's Veto]; RobertJ. Spitzer, The Constitutionality of
the Presidential Line-Item Veto, 112 POL. SCI. Q. 261, 280-83 (1997) (arguing against inherent line
item power).
Generally, advocates of inherent line item veto power contend that use of this implicit power
would have restored equilibrium between the branches. They contend that omnibus bills with
riders and nongermane amendments have distorted the Framers conception of a "bill." See
Sidak & Smith, supra note 12, at 467-68. But see Doe v. Mathews, 420 F. Supp. 865, 868 (D.NJ.
1976) (opining that "[t]he Constitution of the United States does not require the Congress to
limit each Bill to one object, or to state that object in its tide"); Krasnow,supra note 16, at 606
(stating that practice of attaching riders to bills began in 1667 in England and was familiar to
Framers); Rappaport, President's Veto, supra, at 744 n.23 (quoting English Lord Chancellor
Finch in 1678, as stating that "tacking... takes away the Kings negative voice in a manner, and
forces him to take all or none; when sometimes one part of the Bill may be as dangerous for
the kingdom, as the other is necessary"). Others contend that because line item veto power
was exercised at the time of the Framers, the Framers included the prerogative in the veto
power. See Forrest McDonald, The Framers' Conception of the Veto, in PORK BARRELS AND PRIN-
CIPLES, supra note 12, at 1-7.
Even before City of New York, almost all arguments in favor of inherent line item veto power
were deeply flawed, usually for one of five reasons. First, they dwelt on the Framers' intent to
the complete exclusion of the case law. In particular, they failed to address I.N.S. v. Chadha.
See 462 U.S. 919, 954 (1983) (holding that repeal as well as enactment must strictly follow the
requirements of Presentment).
Second, advocates of inherent line item veto power overlooked adverse material from the
time of the Framers. For example, Blackstone's view of veto power does not comport with what
today would be considered inherent line item veto power. Blackstone stated that the King's
role in legislation
consists in the power of reecting, rathar [sic] than resolving, this being sufficient to an-
swer the end proposed. For we may apply to the royal negative.., what Cicero ob-
serves of the negative of the Roman tribunes, that the crown has not any power of do-
ingwrong, but merely ofpreventingwrong from being done. The crown cannot begin
of itself any alterations in the present established law; but it may approve or disap-
prove of the alterations suggested and consented to by the two houses.
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *150 (1765); see also 2 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 473 (Jonathan Elliott ed.,
1836), cited in Brief for Appellee at 31, Clinton v. City of NewYork, 118 S. Ct. 2091 (1998) (No.
97-1374), available in 1998 WL 263830 (quoting FramerJames Wilson as stating that "[ilf [the
President] approve[s] the bill, when it is sent, he shall sign it, but if not, he shall return it").
Third, proponents of this power failed to overcome the fact that no President has ever
claimed such a power, let alone used it. Two presidents have flatly denied the existence of in-
herent line item veto power and both men command unique deference. President Washing-
ton believed that the President's veto power did not include the ability to excise certain por-
tions of a bill: "From the nature of the Constitution, I must approve all the parts of a Bill, or
reject it in toto." 33 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 96 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1940).
Washington's opinion, both as the first President and especially as a Framer, carries special
weight. See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 621 (1842) (concluding that
.contemporaneous exposition of the [Constitution], by those who were its immediate framers"
bolsters long acquiescence in construction).
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President Taft also argued against the existence of inherent line item veto power. "[The
President] has no power to veto parts of the bill and allow the rest to become a law. He must
accept it or reject it...." WILLIAM HOWARD TAFr, THE PRESIDENCY: ITS DUTIES, ITS POWERS,
ITS OPPORTUNITIES AND ITS LIMITATIONS 11 (1916). In light of his later position as ChiefJustice,
President Taft's opinion also demands particular respect. Cf. Cooper, in PORK BARRELS AND
PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, at 44-45 (discussing President Hayes' vetoing of five different appro-
priations bills because they had the same rider in them).
Moreover, despite the urging of many commentators, neither Presidents Reagan, Bush nor
Clinton (all line item veto advocates) ever attempted to exercise the purported power of in-
herent line item veto authority. SeeJ. Gregory Sidak & Thomas A. Smith, Why Did President Bush
Repudiate the Inherent Line Item Veto?, 9J.L. & POL'Y 39, 59 (1992); cf Executive Impoundment of
Appropriated Funds: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 92d Cong. 236 (1971) (testimony of William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice) [hereinafter 1971 Hearings] (discussing
existence of inherent line item veto: "Certainly, if [the President] had an item veto power, I
suspect impoundment would not be the issue that it is").
Fourth, the argument in favor of inherent line item veto power suffers from logical inconsis-
tencies. See Rappaport, President's Veto, supra, at 742 (arguing that if the President has inherent
line item veto, then both houses of Congress should logically possess the power as well).
Finally, proponents of inherent line item veto power fail to recognize that most state courts
have not accepted inherent line item veto authority for governors. See Krasnow, supra note 16,
at 613 n.102.
Other scholars have focused on the practical application or policy ramifications of the line
item veto. For a discussion of the implementation or policy ramifications of the line item veto,
see LOUIS FISHER, THE CONSTITUTION BETWEEN FRIENDS 94-95 (1978) (providing policy argu-
ments against line item veto); Calvin Bellamy, Item Veto: Shield Against Deficits or Weapon of Presi-
dential Power?, 22 VAL. U. L. REV. 557, 591 (1988) (drawing upon the state experience and argu-
ing that results from federal line item veto are not likely to reduce spending and concluding
that political leadership is the solution); Alan J. Dixon, The Case for the Line-Item Veto, 1 NOTRE
DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 207, 208 (1985) (arguing in favor of a line item veto amend-
ment with a majority override provision); Mickey Edwards, The Case Against the Line-Item Veto, 1
NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 191, 191 (1985) (arguing against line item veto); John
H. Robinson, Ethics and the Line-Item Veto, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 157, 157
(1985) (examining the ethical issues raised by the line item veto); L. Peter Schultz,An Item Veto:
A Constitutional and Political Irrelevancy, 1 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 177, 190 (1985)
(arguing in favor of limited use of impoundment); V.L.W., The Item Veto in the American Constitu-
tional System, 25 GEO. L.J. 106, 107 (1936) (discussing legislative history of line item veto princi-
pal and its potential pros and cons); Brown, supra note 16 (drawing upon state experience and
proposing line item veto amendment). See generally Glen 0. Robinson, Public Choice Speculations
on the Item Veto, 74 VA. L. REV. 403, 407 (1988) (examining the political dynamics of the line
item veto); Maxwell L. Steams, The Public Choice Case Against the Item Veto, 49 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 385, 436 (1992) (contending through use of"public choice" theory that the line item veto
is apt to provide President with greater legislative power than control wasteful spending);
Aaron Wildavsky, Item Veto Without a Global Spending Limit: Locking the Treasury After the Dollars
Have Fled, 1 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 165, 165-66 (1985) (arguing that a line item
veto is inadequate to reduce deficit spending and that a global limit is needed instead); Com-
ment, Separation of Powers: Congressional Riders and the Veto Power, 6 MICH. J.L. REFORM 735, 758
(1973) (arguing that an increase in veto power is unnecessary); Townsend, supra note 16
(arguing for a single subject amendment in place of a line item veto amendment).
Still others have focused on the states' experience with the line item veto. See Jeffrey G.
Knowles, Note, Enforcing the One-Subject Rule: The Case for a Subject Veto, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 563,
564 (1987) (considering the experience of the states with the one-subject rule and proposing
its application to the Federal Government); Anthony R. Petrilla, Note, The Role of the Line-Item
Veto in the Federal Balance of Power, 31 HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 469, 494 (1994) (concluding from state
experience that "reduction only" veto is the measure that best respects the national balance of
power); cf Glenn Abney & Thomas Lauth, The Line-Item in the States: An Instrument for Fscal Re-
straint or an Instrument for Partisanship?, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 372, 375-77 (1985) (arguing that
line item veto is used more for political reasons than for fiscal ones). But cf. Richard Briffault,
The Item Veto: A Problem in State Separation of Powers, 2 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 85, 86
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path. Issues such as standing and ripeness,'8 and the Act's political
and policy ramifications 9 have been addressed elsewhere and are
outside the scope of this piece. Instead, this Comment concentrates
on the legitimacy of presidential cancellations within the sphere of
national security, and as such, charts a different course by arguing
that such presidential action was on firmer constitutional footing
than other presidential cancellations.2 ' This Comment further con-
(1989) [hereinafter Briffault, State Separation of Powers] (detailing difficult legal problems
stemming from line item veto at state level); Richard Briffault, The Item Veto in State Courts, 66
TEMPLE L. REV. 1171, 1175 (1993) (discussing the difficulties encountered by state courts in
defining "item" and "appropriation"); Fisher & Devins, supra note 6, at 159-62 (discussing diffi-
culties of applying state line item veto models to Federal Government).
There are also numerous articles discussing the experience of individual states with the line
item veto. See, e.g., Brent . Appel, Item Veto Litigation in Iowa: Marking the Boundaries Between
Legislative and Executive Power, 41 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 34 (1992) (arguing that state supreme court
has struck down the most sweeping executive interpretations of the veto and has allowed legis-
lature leeway to add conditions to spending provisions); Daniel S. Strouse, The Structure of Ap-
propriations Legislation and the Governor's Item Veto Power: The Arizona Experience, 36 ARIZ. L. REV.
113, 116 (1994) (arguing that governors have misapplied and courts have misinterpreted item
veto power to the benefit of the executive branch); Mary E. Burke, Comment, The Wisconsin
Partial Veto: Past, Present and Future, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 1395, 1398 (arguing that the partial veto
power approved by the state supreme court conflicts with separation of powers concerns and
that such a power should be better defined); Stephen Masciocchi, Comment, The Item Veto
Power in Washington, 64 WASH. L. REV. 891, 891 (1989) (examining history of item veto power in
Washington and proposing reforms to the power).
For a further list of line item veto articles, see LARRY D. BENSON, THE PRESIDENTIAL LINE-
ITEM VETO: A BIBLIOGRAPHY (1989) (providing comprehensive, if dated, bibliography on the
subject).
18. The first two challenges brought against the Line Item Veto Act were dismissed for
lack of standing. See Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312, 2322 (1997) (holding that the appellees'
alleged injuries were "insufficiently personal and concrete to be granted standing" and "the
institutional injury they allege is wholly abstract and widely dispersed"); National Treasury Em-
ployees Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1425 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that union's al-
leged injury was "neither sufficiently concrete nor imminent to create a justiciable contro-
versy").
19. See supra note 17 for articles discussing policy and political aspects of the Act. During
its year and a half in existence, enhanced rescission authority had yet to become the political
stuff of Caesars as predicted by many of the Act's opponents. See Neil A. Lewis, Byrd's Eloquent
Voice Continues to Fight to Honor Tradition in the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1997, at Al ("We
handed to the President just as the Roman Senate handed to Caesar and to Sulla the control
over the purse."). Even with enhanced rescission power, however, two of the President's highly
publicized appointees, Bill Weld for Ambassador of Mexico and Bill Lann Lee for Assistant At-
torney General for Civil Rights, were not confirmed. SeeWalter Shapiro, "Acting" is Now All the
Confirmation Process Can Muster, USA TODAY, Dec. 17, 1997, at 8A (describing President Clin-
ton's failure to get his appointees approved). Moreover, enhanced rescission may have worked
to the President's detriment in lobbying for Fast Track trade authority. For example, Repre-
sentative Tillie Fowler commented upon Clinton's priority of fast-track legislation: "I was lean-
ing for it, now I'm leaning against it. I support fast-track, but I would not want to give it to this
President, based on how he's using his [enhanced rescission] authority." Julie Eilperin, Life
with the Line-Item: Orton Prepares Legal Challenge as Clinton Strikes Again, ROLL CALL, Oct. 9, 1997,
at 11.
20. By the same token, it has also been argued that allowing the President to cancel tax
provisions would have been on the weakest constitutional footing. Senator McCain stated: "I
would not veto the tax portions of the bill because those are constitutionally the weakest aspect
of the line-item veto authority." Peter Baker, Clinton Checks Tax Plan for Possible Use of Line-tem
Veto, WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 1997, at Al. The decision in Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., how-
1998] THE LINE ITEM VETO ACT 1285
tends that a new act, a National Security Line Item Veto Act, if
passed, might still pass constitutional muster. In a broader sense, this
Comment strives to contribute to existing scholarship on the law of
presidential power by discussing and providing a model demonstrat-
ing the difference between the President's constitutional powers in
the national security realm and those in domestic affairs.2 '
Although White House Press Secretary Michael McCurrys and
SenatorJohn McCainzs have suggested in general terms that national
security-related cancellations might have been less vulnerable to con-
stitutional challenge, their contentions were never advanced in any
detail. This Comment fleshes out the particulars behind these vague
assertions of presidential power.
As such, this piece consists of six parts. While the remainder of the
current section provides background information on the Act's provi-
sions, Part II discusses the prior case law on the Presentment Clause.
Part III discusses the recent City of New York decision. The section
concludes that the City of New York case was correctly decided and that
no one in the Administration should have been surprised by the
case's outcome. Part IV discusses the case law concerning the Presi-
dent's constitutional authority in national security through both his
ever, would tend to refute Senator McCain's contention. 490 U.S. 212, 223 (1989) (holding
that tax provisions are "subject to no constitutional scrutiny greater than that [the Court] ha[s]
applied to other nondelegation challenges").
In reality, cancellations of provisions in the legislative branch, or Judiciary appropriations
bills, would likely have been the worst set of facts for the Act's defense. A cancellation of the
latter would almost certainly have violated the Compensation Clause. See U.S. CONST., art. III, §
1, cI. 1 ("Judges... shall.., receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be di-
minished during their Continuance in Office."). See Destro, supra note 17, at 28 (discussing
need for independence of the Judiciary). Concerning the Legislative Branch Appropriations
Bill, Separation of Powers questions would have arisen because the President would have been
threatening the other branches' inherent functions. Perhaps recognizing such obstacles,
President Clinton chose not to cancel provisions in either bill. See infra note 96 (discussing the
four bills that were left untouched by enhanced rescission).
21. See Figure No. 1, infrap. 1316.
22. Mr. McCurry stated:
There are some that suggest that even if you restricted the use of the line-item veto to
something like the military construction [appropriations] bill, in which the President
is also acting in his capacity as commander-in-chief, the grounds upon which the
courts might consider the issue then would be narrowed, that the resulting opinion
might narrow the use of the authority.
Paul Bedard, Five Tax Breaks Targeted for Veto; Republicans Split on Powers Fast Test, WASH. TmES,
Aug. 8, 1997, atAl.
This Comment contends that because the deck was stacked against the Line Item Veto Act,
and that a "narrow" holding was as much as the White House could have expected.
23. Senator McCain (R-Ariz.) recommended that the President focus his attention on the
defense appropriations bill. "My recommendation would be to select pork-barrel spending so
he would be not only acting against wasteful and non-essential items but he would be doing so
as commander-in-chief for national security reasons." Baker, supra note 20, at Al.
24. Although four opinions were authored in the case, this Comment will focus on the
majority opinion.
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role as Commander in Chiefd5 and as Chief Diplomat.21 Part IV con-
cludes that the President's authority in national security affairs is sig-
nificantly greater than in domestic affairs and that it includes the uni-
lateral power to repeal national security law. When the President's
powers are bolstered by Congress' broad delegation powers in the
national security arena, and further augmented by the venerable cus-
tom of national security-related impoundment, 7 his powers are virtu-
ally insuperable. The breadth of this combination of presidential
and congressional power would have permitted the President to can-
cel national security-related provisions through the Line Item Veto
Act, in effect, granting the President National Security Rescission
power. Part V counters potential arguments against recognition of
National Security Rescission, including the potential constitutional
dilemma posed by legitimization of such a power. This section advo-
cates a balancing test to weigh the competing constitutional re-
quirements of the Presentment Clause on one hand, and the consti-
tutional clauses involving the President's national security power and
Congress' ability to delegate on the other. Part V concludes that the
President should indeed retain cancellation authority in this area
primarily due to the deference granted national security considera-
tions. Finally, Part VI provides recommendations regarding statutory
construction. The Comment concludes with suggestions for future
legislative proposals and suggests the possibility of a National Security
Line Item Veto Act.
A. The Line Item Veto Act
1. Background
Upon signing into law the Line Item Veto Act, President Clinton
became the beneficiary of a prerogative his predecessors in the Oval
Office had long coveted but never before enjoyed .2  The Act granted
25. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (granting the President"Commander in Chief' pow-
ers).
26. See CLINTON ROSSITER, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 25-28 (2d ed. 1960) (describing the
President's foreign affairs power as making him the nation's "Chief Diplomat").
27. The term "national security-related impoundment" refers to impoundments which
generally occurred before the ICA and that were justified on national security grounds. See in-
fra Part IV.B.2 (discussing impoundment based on President's authority in national security
realm).
28. Before the adoption of the Line Item Veto Act, presidents had tried for over 120 years
to acquire this discretionary power over individual spending provisions. Since the Civil War,
eleven presidents had publicly stated their support for the line item veto. They include Presi-
dents Grant, Hayes, Arthur, Franklin Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Nixon, Ford, Reagan,
Bush and Clinton. SeeS. REP. No. 104-9, at 5 (1995). Two modern presidents have not favored
line item veto power: Presidents Taft and Carter. See Gerhardt, supra note 17, at 233, 235
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the President the power to cancel what he deemed to be wasteful and
parochial tax and spending provisions2 within legislation. The
(1997).
The movement in favor of the line item veto began after the Civil War. Incorporated into
the Confederate Constitution, the line item veto was never used by President Jefferson Davis.
See Briffault, State Separation of Powers, supra note 17, at 86 n.8. States such as Georgia and
Texas, however, quickly adopted the idea following the Civil War. See id. By 1916, three quar-
ters of the 48 states had granted their governors line item veto authority. See id. at 87 n.9. To-
day, 43 states have the line item veto. See Bellamy, supra note 17, at 559 (providing chart dis-
playing types of line item veto power at the state level). The only states without such power are
Indiana, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Vermont.
North Carolina does not provide its governor with any form of veto. Only one state has been
accepted into the union since the Civil War without granting its governor line item veto power,
see Krasnow, supra note 16, at 613 n.101, and no state has ever repealed such a provision. See
Briffault, State Separation of Powers, supra note 17, at 87. Congress has also legislated line item
veto power for the governors of past and present American territories including the Philip-
pines, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. See Thirteenth Guam Legislature v.
Bordallo, 430 F. Supp. 405, 410 (D. Guam 1977), affd, 588 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1978).
At the federal level, President Grant, in 1873, suggested that Congress propose a line item
veto amendment to the Constitution. The amendment would have"authorize [d] the executive
branch to approve of so much of any measure passing the two Houses of Congress as his judg-
ment may dictate, without approving the whole, the disapproved portion or portions to be sub-
jected to the same rules as now." See Cooper, in PORK BARRELS AND PRINCIPLES, supra note 12,
at 29, 44 (quoting M.ESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 242 (James V. Richardson ed.,
1898)).
In the next century following President Grant's proposed amendment, 157 legislative pro-
posals were formally introduced to endow the President with line item veto power. SeeAbascal
& Kramer, supra note 4, at 1549, 1566. The first was introduced in the House of Representa-
tives in 1876, see H.R. REP. NO. 104-11, pt. 1, at 4 (1995), by Representative Charles James
Faulkner of West Virginia. SeeROBERT C. BYRD, THESENATE OFTHE ROMAN REPUBLIC 15 (1995)
(describing Representative Faulkner's role as first federal legislator to introduce line item veto
legislation).
The more recent debate on the line item veto was sparked by President Reagan, who had en-
joyed line item veto power as Governor of California. On January 25, 1984, in his third State of
the Union Address, President Reagan called for a constitutional amendment granting the Ex-
ecutive that same power. In May of that year, the Senate came within a single vote of adding a
line-item veto to the fiscal deficit-reduction plan. See SPITZER, supra note 12, at 121-42
(providing a thorough treatment of the 1980's line item veto debate).
By the early 1980's, mounting concern over the size of the federal budget deficit fueled the
push for the line item veto. It was included in both the Republican and Democratic platforms
in 1988. See Ernest B. Hueter, Preface to PORK BARRELS AND PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, at i.
Granting the President line item veto power also became a plank in the House Republican's
"Contract with America" in 1994. Andrew Taylor, History of Line-Item Veto Effort, CONG. Q.
WEEKLY. R, Apr. 12, 1997, at 834. After achieving majorities in both houses in the 104th Con-
gress, the Republicans were able to get a line item veto bill out of Congress and to the Presi-
dent. See id. On February 6, 1995, Ronald Reagan's 84th birthday, the House with relative ease,
passed a legislative line item veto bill as a tribute to the former President. Seeid.
Senate Republicans, on the other hand, had a more difficult time arriving at a solution. See
id. On March 23, 1995, the Senate passed a much different line item veto bill consisting of
.separate enrollment." See id. By the following spring, with the presidential race heating up,
Senator Bob Dole was able to goad Republican Senate conferees into relenting on separate
enrollment and agreeing to enhanced rescission power, thus giving the bill its present form.
See id. For a comprehensive history of the Act, see Amicus Brief for Henry Waxman at 2-17,
Clinton v. City of NewYork, 118 S. Ct. 2091 (No. 97-1374), available in 1998 WL 283208.
29. These tax and spending provisions are commonly termed "pork." The term has its
origins in the nineteenth century when pork was packaged in barrels and hungry farm hands
would reach into the barrel for slabs of salt pork. See MARTIN L. GROSS, THE GOVERNMENT
RACKET 179 (1992). Eventually the term was incorporated into the political lexicon to mean
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power, known as "enhanced rescission authority,"s° was a type of im-
poundment.3' As it is generally understood, impoundment occurs
"whenever the President spends less than Congress appropriates for a
given period. 3 2 By formally nullifying existing tax or spending provi-
patronage for local districts paid for by the taxpayers at large. Seeid.
30. The term "enhanced rescission authority" does not appear in the statute. See Line
Item Veto Act, Pub. L. No. 104-130, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 1200 (1996). Rather, it is the
term used in the legislative history to describe the power granted by the Act. See H.R. REP. No.
104-11, pt. 2, at 8 (1995).
31. This is illustrated by the fact that enhanced rescission is an amendment to the Im-
poundment Control Act. SeeLine Item Veto Act § 2.
For myriad of reasons, non-statutory impoundment prior to the ICA was a far more expan-
sive power than enhanced rescission. Whereas enhanced rescission had to take place within
five days of enactment, impoundment could occur any time giving the President more discre-
tion concerning when to use his power. Unlike enhanced rescission, which had a procedural
mechanism for override, impoundment was akin to an absolute veto-a proposition completely
at odds with the intent of the Framers. See 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note
12, at 98-104 (demonstrating from speeches the Framers' rejection of absolute veto). Moreo-
ver, enhanced rescission, once exercised, could not have been undone by the President unless
Congress passed a new act. This was not so with impoundment where a President could release
the funds whenever he pleased.
Presidents before 1974 also impounded funds on statutory bases. For example, Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 directed the President to withhold funds from entities practicing
unlawful discrimination. See Joint Hearings Before the Ad Hoc Subcomm. on Impoundment of Funds of
the Senate Comm. Government Operations and the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 368 (1973) [hereinafter 1973 Hearings]; see generally Robert
E. Goostree, The Power of the President to Impound Appropriated Funds: With Special Reference to
Grants-in-Aid to Segregated Activities, 11 AM. U. L. REV. 32, 34-37 (1962) (discussing limited statu-
tory authority up to that time for presidential impoundment).
32. See Louis Fisher, Funds Impounded by the President: the Constitutional Issue, 38 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 124, 124 (1969) [hereinafter Fisher, Funds Impounded by the President]. For the purposes
of this Comment, impoundment will be defined using Dr. Fisher's terminology. This defini-
tion has been adopted by other authorities in this field. See WILLIAM C. BANKS & PETER RAVEN-
HANSEN, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW AND THE POWER OF THE PURSE 79 (1994) (adopting Dr.
Fisher's definition).
Other authorities have defined impoundment in a similarly broad manner which would tend
to incorporate "enhanced rescission" within its definition. The U.S. General Accounting Office
defines impoundment as "an action or inaction by an officer or employee of the United States
that precludes the obligation or expenditure of budget authority provided by Congress." See
PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW 63 (2d 1991), quoted in BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN,
supra, at 212 n.109.
Deputy Attorney General Joseph Sneed defined it as "not spending money." 1973 Hearings,
supra note 31, at 98; see also Nile Stanton, History and Practice of Executive Impoundment of Appro-
priated Funds, 53 NEB. L. REV. 1, 3 n.14 (1974) (paraphrasing Sen. Ervin's definition of im-
poundment as referring to "reserving, withholding, delaying, freezing, or sequestering appro-
priations funds or deferring the allocation of funds"); cf. Byrd v. Raines, 956 F. Supp. at 36-37
("Cancellation under the [Line Item Veto] Act is simply not the same thing as impoundment,
or any other suspension of a statutory provision."). The district court further stated that
"[i]nstead, cancellation is equivalent to repeal .... [w]hereas delegated authority to impound
is exercised from time to time, in light of changed circumstances or shifting executive (or legis-
lative) priorities...." Id. Senator Roth raised another issue about categorizing enhanced re-
scission as impoundment. See 142 CONG. REC. S2968 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1996) ("My concern
with this legislation [the Line Item Veto Act] is that I have never heard of impounding a tax
cut.").
As can be seen from these varying definitions, impoundment remains an elusive term to de-
fine. See Note, The Likely Law of Executive Impoundment, 59 IOWA L. REV. 50, 60 n.72 (1973)
(providing a trenchant discussion of the difficulties in defining past impoundments). Due to
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sions," enhanced rescission effected deficit reduction.4
The title "Line Item Veto Act" was actually a misnomer. Enhanced
rescission authority did not constitute true line item veto power. 5 In-
stead, the Act constituted an enlargement of the statutory rescission
powers delegated to the President under the Congressional Budget
and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 ("ICA").6 The ICA effec-
tively limited the President's role in rescission to recommendations,
leaving the onus on Congress to act affirmatively to effect spending
reductions: Had the 1996 Act provided true line item veto power,
the problems involved with defining impoundment, it has been asserted that every president
from the time of Washington has impounded funds. See Stanton, supra, at 5. Dr. Louis Fisher,
the foremost authority in this field, wrote, "no one can say precisely what impoundment is."
Louis Fisher, Impoundment of Funds: Uses and Abuses, 23 BUFF. L. REV. 141, 144 (1973).
For more on impoundment, see Arthur S. Miller, Presidential Power to Impound Appropriated
Funds: An Exercise in Constitutional Decision-making, 43 N.C. L. REV. 502, 502-03 (1965)
(describing presidential control over appropriations against the backdrop of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act); Warren J. Archer, Comment, Presidential Impounding of Funds: theJudicial Response
40 U. CHI. L. REV. 328, 329 (1973) (discussing the constitutional and statutory authority for im-
poundment and the role of the courts in such action);J. Timothy Gratz, Note, Impoundment-
Separation of Powers, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 203, 206 (1975) (criticizing the court's reasoning in a
case involving an impoundment by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development); Com-
ment, Presidential Impoundment: Constitutional Theories and Political Realities, 61 GEO. L.J. 1295,
1295 (1973) (providing outline of contemporary impoundment debate); Note, Protecting the
Fisc: Executive Impoundment and CongressionalPower, 82 YALE L.J. 1636, 1637 (1973) (discussing
the extent of executive discretion to impound funds under the Constitution and relevant stat-
utes); see, e.g., FENTON S. MARTIN & ROBERT U. GOEHLERT, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY: A
BIBLIOGRAPHY 48 (1987) (providing an extensive bibliography on presidential impoundment).
33. See Line Item Veto Act § 1026(4).
34. See id. § 1024 (describing deficit reduction mechanism); see also S. REP. No. 104-13, at 8
(1995) (describing "lockbox" mechanism).
35. The Act is a misnomer for another reason. Unlike state budgets, the federal budget
does not have line items. See Fisher & Devins, supra note 6, at 185-88. The Line Item Veto Act
also allows the President to cancel provisions in the legislative history of spending bills. See
Line Item Veto Act § 1021(b) (1).
There are several other differences between the state and federal levels. State constitutions
are generally more partial toward executive power than the U.S. Constitution. See Fisher &
Devins, supra note 6, at 159. Consequently, governors have traditionally played a much more
active role in the state budget process than have Presidents at the federal level. See id. The mi-
nutiae in a state budget would be difficult to replicate at the federal level due to the daunting
size of the federal budget. See id. In addition, state governors have been granted line item veto
power by state constitutions not by statute. See Briffault, State Separation of Powers, supra note 17,
at 86-87.
36. See2 U.S.C. §§ 681-688 (1994).
37. See id. §§ 683-684. During its existence, the Line Item Veto Act reversed this burden,
forcing Congress to act affirmatively to have the funds spent or the tax measures reimple-
mented. SeeH.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-491, at 16.
The ICA placed limitations on presidential impoundment, allowing the President the powers
of rescission and deferral. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 683-684 (1994). Deferral is an action taken by the
President to withhold temporarily or delay the obligation or expenditure of budget authority.
See id. § 682(1). The President must report a deferral to Congress and the Comptroller Gen-
eral in a deferral message. The deferral may not extend beyond the end of the fiscal year in
which the message is transmitted to Congress. Seeid. § 684(a).
Rescission, on the other hand, is an action taken by the President and Congress that cancels
previously appropriated budget authority. See id. § 682(3). The Impoundment Control Act
required that the President propose a rescission by transmitting a special message to Congress,
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the President, upon Presentment,ss would have been able to cancel
any portion of a bill not to his liking and then sign the rest of the bill
into law. The canceled provisions would then have been returned to
Congress for reconsideration." Instead, as will be discussed in more
detail below,0 with enhanced rescission power, when the President
signed a bill into law, he then had five days (excluding Sundays)
within which to cancel any provisions and return them to Congress.'
42Thus, there was a temporal distinction between the two measures.
2. The provisions of the Line Item Veto Act
The Line Item Veto Act granted the President conditional author-
ity to cancel certain spending and revenue provisions within five days
following Presentment.4 ' These provisions, which included any dollar
amount of discretionary budget authority," any item of new direct
which the latter body had 45 days to act. Seeid. § 683(b).
The Line Item Veto Act is the latest in a long line of budget measures passed by Congress
which have affected, to varying degrees, the President's influence over the budget. See LOUIS
FISHER, PRESIDENTIALSPENDING POWER 9-58 (1975) (describing the waxing and waning of con-
gressionally authorized presidential spending discretion from 1789 to 1975).
38. Presentment refers to when the President is presented with a bill. See U.S. CONsT. art.
I, §§ 7, 8.
39. See, e.g., CONFEDERATE CONST., art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (stating that the disapproved appropria-
tions would then be returned to the House where the bill originated).
40. See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text (describing procedure followed in the
execution of enhanced rescission).
41. See Line Item Veto Act, Pub. L. No. 104-130, § 1021(a) (3) (B), 1996 U.S.C.C.N. (110
Stat.) 1200 (1996) (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 691(a) (3) (B)). Before the Line Item Veto Act,
the President had four options open to him upon receiving a bill: (1) sign the bill into law; (2)
veto it and return the entire measure to Congress; (3) allow the measure to become law with-
out signing it by failing to return it within ten working days; or (4) in the only way a President
may exercise an absolute veto, choose not to sign a bill when Congress is adjourned, thus pre-
venting the bill's return. SeeStearns, supra note 17, at 391 n.36.
42. The legal significance of this temporal distinction was much disputed. Advocates of
the Act maintained that this temporal distinction should have enabled it to pass constitutional
muster. See Brief for Appellant at 34-35, Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091 (No. 97-
1374) (1998), available in 1998 WL 263832. It was argued that the Act satisfied Presentment
because the President first had to sign the bill. The cancellations would then occur afterwards
and would be governed by the permissive nondelegation doctrine. See City of New York v. Clin-
ton, 118 S. Ct. 2091, 2115-16 (ScaliaJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Opponents
maintained that such a provision was merely cosmetic and had no bearing on the Act's consti-
tutional status. SeeBrief forAppellee at 28-31, Clinton v. City of NewYork, 118 S. Ct. 2091 (No.
97-1374), available in 1998 WL 263830; U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 831 (1995)
(stating that "the Framers spent significant time and energy in debating and crafting Clauses
that could be easily evaded"); id. at 829 (stating that a party may not do indirectly what the
Constitution prohibits from being done directly).
43. See Line Item Veto Act § 1021 (a) (3) (B).
44. See id. § 1022(b)(1)(A). Discretionary spending, in general, comprises budget outlays
controllable through the appropriations process. See id. § 1026(7) (defining dollar amount of
discretionary budget authority). Discretionary spending typically accounts for approximately
one third of the annual federal budget. See ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET 7 (1995).
Approximately half of this discretionary spending, or one sixth of the federal budget, is made
up of military expenditures. See Byrd, supra note 15, at 315. For purposes of the Act, discre-
tionary budget authority include dollar amounts provided in appropriations laws and any ancil-
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spending,45 and certain limited tax benefits, 6 were to have condi-
tional legal validity for five days following Presentment. 7 During this
period the President could cancel any of these provisions. By cancel-
ing discretionary budget authority, the President "rescind[ed]" the
provision." With respect to cancellations of new direct spending or
limited tax benefits, the President rendered them without "legal
force or effect." 9 The funds saved through the cancellations were
then channeled toward deficit reduction through what is known as a
"lockbox" procedure.o
To invoke enhance rescission, the President first needed to deter-
mine that such action would have lowered the federal budget defi-
cit," not hindered vital government functions,52 and not adversely af-
lary provisions found in tables, charts, or explanatory text in the committee reports. See Line
Item Veto Act § 1026(7)(A)(ii). Therefore, because the federal budget does not have line
items, legislative history, as well as the statutory provisions, were subject to the President's can-
cellation power. See id. §§ 1021 (b) (1), 1026(7).
45. See Line Item Veto Act § 1021(a)(2). In general, direct spending comprises entitle-
ment authority, the Food Stamp Program, and budget authority provided by laws other than
appropriations acts. See id. § 1026(5). For the purposes of the Act, new direct spending com-
prised entitlement payments to individuals or to state or local governments. Seeid.
46. See id. § 1021(a) (3). Limited tax benefits were provisions that effected a revenue loss
and which applied (1) if the benefit accrued to 100 or fewer beneficiaries in a fiscal year, or (2)
if they provided temporary or permanent transitional relief for 10 or fewer beneficiaries from a
change in the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. See id. § 1026(9). The determinations were
made by the Joint Committee on Taxation. The Committee was authorized to locate such
benefits in bills and joint resolutions. Both bills and joint resolutions, however, were allowed to
exempt provisions. See id. § 1027.
During this past session, lawmakers had already begun seeking ways to exempt spending
provisions from cancellation. See Guy Gugliotta & Eric Pianin, Line-Item Veto Tips Traditional
Balance of Power; Capital Hill Plots Strategy to Counter President's Pen, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 1997, at
Al (discussing implementation of legislative mechanism to immunize certain items); see also
Guy Gugliotta, Stuffing Pork in the Budget; Lawmakers Learn to Hide Pet Projects, NEWSDAY, Oct. 20,
1997, at A19 (discussing ambiguity in appropriations language protecting pet projects).
47. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-491, at 16 (1996).
48. See Line Item Veto Act § 1026(4) (A).
49. See id. § 1026(4) (B).
50. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-491, at 23 (1996) (describing the provision that ensured
that funds saved from cancellation go toward deficit reduction and not toward other pro-
grams). Much like the temporal distinction between true line item veto power and enhanced
rescission, proponents of the Act argued that the "lockbox" procedure was central to the Act's
constitutionality. SeeTranscript at 5, Clinton v. City of NewYork, 118 S. Ct. 2091 (No. 97-1374),
available in 1998 WL 210557, 10 (quoting the Solicitor General defending the Act in part
through the "lockbox" provision). Because the mechanism channels canceled funds toward
deficit reduction, it was argued that the canceled provisions were still legally valid, they had just
been redistributed at the discretion of the President. Essentially, this argument is a "shell
game." First, if the money were merely canceled and not thrown into the "lockbox," then the
funds would never have left the Treasury in the first place, the deficit would have been reduced
accordingly. Only if the President affirmatively reprogrammed such funds would they not have
gone toward deficit reduction. Second, statutory definitions such as "without legal effect" and
.rescind" are difficult to construe as meaning anything other than repeal. See Sargentich, supra
note 17, at 113 n.149 (quotingWEBSTER'STmIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1930 (1976)
which defines "'rescind'" as "'to do away with: take away'" or "'to take back: annul, cancel...
or to vacate or make void'" as in "'repeal'").
51. SeeLine Item Veto Act § 1021(a) (3) (A) (i).
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fected the national interest." Upon congressional receipt of a
"special message" from the President outlining these determinations,
the cancellations took effect.54  To restore the canceled funding,
Congress needed to pass a disapproval bill by a regular majority vote
within 30 days of receipt of the President's special message. 5 If he
wished, the President then had the option to veto the disapproval bill
56through conventional means. The President's veto was then subjectto congressional override by a two-thirds vote of both houses."'
II. CASE LAW ON THE PRESENTMENT CLAUSE
Given existing Presentment case law, the Administration should
have recognized that the government would face great difficulty in
defending any legal challenge to the Act.58 The I.N.S. v. Chadha9 and
Byrd v. Rained' decisions involving the lawmaking clause were both
sweeping and unyielding in their nature. Having the benefit of both
decisions, the Administration should have recognized that the Act
52. Seeid.§ 1021(a)(3)(A)(ii).
53. Seeid.§ 1021(a)(3)(A)(iii).
54. See id. § 1023(a). The special message was required to contain, among other things,
the dollar amount of discretionary budget authority, the item of new direct spending or limited
tax benefit canceled, the reasons for cancellation, and a corresponding reference number for
each cancellation. See id. § 1022(b). The document was also required to be printed in the
Federal Register. Included in the message were determinations under section 1021 (a) and any
supporting material, the reasons for cancellation, the estimated fiscal, economic, and budget
effect of the cancellation, and all facts relating to the cancellation such as its effect on the pro-
gram in question. See id. § 1022(b).
Because the Constitution gives the President ten days to decide whether or not to veto a bill,
see U.S. CONST., art. I, § 7, cl. 2, and the Act provided the President with five days following his
signature to cancel provisions, see Line Item Veto Act § 1022(c), the President effectively had
fifteen days to decide if he wanted to cancel a bill's provisions.
55. See Line Item Veto Act § 1025(b) (1).
56. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2, 3 (providing requirements for conventional veto);
Line Item Veto Act § 1021(c) (exempting disapproval bills from enhanced rescission). Presi-
dent Clinton vetoed the first disapproval bill on November 14, 1997. See President's Message to
the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval Legislation to Override of a Line Item Veto, 33
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1801 (Nov. 14, 1997). The cancellations in this bill involved spend-
ing originally appropriated in the Military Construction bill. See id. The President veto was
overridden, however, by both houses. SeePub. L. No. 105-159, 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. (112 Stat.) 19
(1998).
No disapproval bill was passed for the two cancellations which prompted the constitutional
challenge. See generally S. 1157, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 2444, 105th Cong. (1997), S. 1144,
105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 2436, 105th Cong. (1997).
57. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2, 3. Three states have line item vetoes with a two-thirds
override provision. See Petrilla, supra note 17, at 508 n.46. Four states use a three-fifths major-
ity. See id.
58. SeeClinton v. City of NewYork, 118 S. Ct. 2091, 2110 (1998) (KennedyJ, concurring).
Justice Kennedy's concurrence hinted at the obvious problem involved in getting around the
Chadha Presentment Clause analysis: "The citizen has a vital interest in the regularity of the
exercise of governmental power. If this point was not clear before Chadha, it should have been
so afterwards." Id.
59. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
60. 956 F. Supp. 25 (D.D.C. 1997), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 2312 (1997).
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was constitutionally imperiled and should have set up a test case us-
ing its strongest fact pattern: a cancellation involving the President's
national security power.
A. I.N.S. v. Chadha
The preeminent case concerning the Presentment Clause is I.N.S.
v. Chadha6  Chadha involved an alien whose suspension of deporta-
tion was annulled by a legislative veto.62 The Supreme Court held
that the oft-used legislative veto violated the Presentment Clause.
The Court in sweeping language held that strict adherence to cor-
rect lawmaking procedure was essential to constitutional govern-
ance: "Art. I, § 1, [cl.] 7, represents the Framers' decision that the
legislative power of the Federal Government be exercised in accord
with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, proce-
dure."6 Central to proper lawmaking procedure is that both the bi-
cameralism and Presentment requirements must be satisfied: "[T]he
Constitution's prescription for legislative action [is] passage by a ma-
jority of both Houses and presentment to the President."' ' The
Court emphasized that "[t]he legislative steps outlined in Art. I are
not empty formalities; they were designed to assure that both Houses
of Congress and the President participate in the exercise of lawmak-
ing authority."67 More importantly for the future of the Line Item
Veto Act, the Court made clear that the requirements of Presentment
were not limited merely to a law's passage. The Court stated that
"repeal of statutes, no less than enactment, must conform with Art.
61. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). Other Supreme Court cases involving Presentment include
United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 225 n.29 (1980) (contending that when the President signs a
bill his signature marks the "precise time the statute became law"); La Abra Silver Mining Co. v.
United States, 175 U.S. 423, 454 (1899) (holding that once the President signs a bill, the bill be-
comes law from that moment); Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378, 379 (1798).
In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the Supreme Court addressed the lawmaking func-
tion, but not Presentment per se. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). In stark, if less than accurate, language,
the Supreme Court stated:
In the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see that the laws are
faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution lim-
its his functions in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise
and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither silent nor
equivocal about who shall make laws which the President is to execute.
Id. at 587; cf id. at 589 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (agreeing with Justice Black's majority
opinion but hinting at the its lack of subtlety). But see Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748,
758-59 (1996) (contending that Congress may grant the executive branch some of its lawmak-
ing power).
62. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 926-28.
63. See d. at 956-57.
64. See id. at 957.
65. Id. at 951.
66. Id. at 958.
67. Id. at 958 n.22.
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Therefore, with Chadha casting its broad shadow over any applica-
tion of enhanced rescission, the White House should have recog-
nized that any use of such power would have involved an uphill legal
battle.6
B. Byrd v. Raines
Immediately upon the Act taking effect, 70 a group of lawmakers led
by Senator Robert C. Byrd' mounted a legal challenge in a suit
brought against the Secretary of the Treasury7 and the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget.73 In the resulting case, Byrd v.
68. See id. at 954.
69. See City of New York, 118 S. Ct. at 2110 (quotingJustice Kennedy's dicta stating that the
citizen's interest in the regular exercise of government power should have been clear after
Chadha); cf Sargentich, supra note 17, at 101-02 (discussing and dismissing possible distinctions
between the Chadha case and application of the Line Item Veto Act).
70. The challenge was filed onJanuary 1, 1997, the effective date of the Act. See Line Item
Veto Act, Pub. L. No. 104-130, § 5(2), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 1200 (1996). The reason
for this delayed implementation was that Republicans were hesitant to give a Democratic Presi-
dent such power. Instead, hopeful of a Republican presidential victory in the general election,
Hill Republicans delayed implementation of the Line Item Veto Act until January 1, 1997. See
Andrew Taylor, Judge Voids Line-Item Veto Law; Backers Look to High Court, CONG. Q. WKLY. R.,
April 12, 1997, at 837. In fact, due to a compromise in the Senate, the Act was only a temporary
measure. See id. It would have sunset onJanuary 1, 2005. See Line Item Veto Act § 5(2).
71. Not for nothing has Senator Byrd been termed the "foremost opponent of the line
item veto." See Court Erases Line Item Veto, President Loses Broad Authority in 6-3 Decision, THE
COMMERCIAL APPEAL, June 26, 1998, at Al. He authored a book paralleling the abdication of
the power of the purse by the Roman Senate to the recent congressional attempts to provide
the President with some form of line item veto power. SeeBYRD, supra note 28, at 162-64.
In addition to Byrd, a Democrat from West Virginia, the other plaintiff-appellees were Sena-
tor Carl Levin (D-Mich.), Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.), and former Senator Mark
Hatfield (R-Or.). Senator Moynihan also joined the City of New York's suit challenging the
Act's constitutionality. See City of New York v. Clinton, No. 97-2393 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 16,
1997). Congressmen David Skaggs (D-Colo.) and Henry Waxman (D-Cal.) were also plaintiff-
appellees in the Byrd case.
The plaintiff-appellee action was opposed by the leadership of both houses. The House Bi-
partisan Legal Advisory Group, comprising the Speaker of the House, the Majority Leader, the
Minority Leader, the Majority Whip and the Minority Whip, and the Senate filed ajoint brief as
amici curiae with the Supreme Court. Both argued that the district court decision should be
overturned on the merits. See Amicus Brief for The House Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group,
Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312 (1997) (No. 96-1671), available in 1997 WL 251409.
The Act was also challenged by the National Treasury Employees Union on the day the Act
was signed into law. This case was dismissed for lack of standing. See National Treasury Em-
ployees Union v. United States, 929 F. Supp. 484, 485 (D.D.C.) (holding that union's alleged
injury was "neither sufficiently concrete nor imminent to create a justiciable controversy"),
af'd, 101 F. 3d 1423, 1425 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The organization filed another suit once the Act
was implemented but the case was settled on statutory grounds. See National Treasury Employ-
ees Union v. United States, Civ. No. 97-2399 (D.D.C. 1996).
72. Robert Rubin, the Secretary of the Treasury, was responsible for implementing the
cancellations of limited tax benefits. SeeByrd v. Raines, 956 F. Supp. 25, 27 (D.D.C. 1997).
73. Franklin D. Raines, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, was
charged with implementing the cancellations of discretionary budget authority and direct
spending. See id. at 27.
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Raines,7" the District Court for the District of Columbia overturned
the Act.7 The court held that the Act offended the Presentment
Clause76 and represented an unconstitutional delegation of legislative71
power. Scarcely two months later, however,7 the Supreme Court
vacated the lower court's decision, ruling the appellants lacked stand-
ing.79
The central issue in Byrd, the district court reasoned, was whether
the Act was simply a lawful enhancement of presidential discretion,
or a dramatic illegitimate transfer of legislative power to the execu-
tive branch.0 That is to say, the Act was either an expansion of the
Executive's historical impoundment powers," or a radical new pre-
rogative which enabled the President effectively to repeal statutory
law. 2 The district court held that the Act granted the latter and was
therefore unconstitutional.$' The court concluded that the Present-
ment's bicameral requirement was fundamentally altered by granting
the President powers outside of either approval or disapproval.84
Where the President signs a bill but then purports to cancel parts
of it, he exceeds his constitutional authority and prevents both
Houses of Congress from participating in the exercise of lawmaking
authority. The President's cancellation of an item unilaterally ef-
fects a repeal of statutory law such that the bill he signed is not the
law that will govern the Nation. That is precisely what the Pre-
sentment Clause was designed to prevent."'
Not surprisingly, the reasoning in Byrd on the Presentment question
remained faithful to Chadha.
Although not legally binding, the district court's decision main-
tained persuasive authority even after the Supreme Court vacated its
ruling." Moreover, it certainly called into question the future of en-
74. Id. at 25.
75. See id. at 25.
76. See id. at 35.
77. Spe id. at 36.
78. The Act provides for expedited review to the Supreme Court. See Line Item Veto Act
§ 3(b), Pub. L. No. 104-130, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 1200, 1211 (1996) (to be codified at
2 U.S.C. § 691).
79. See Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312, 2322 (1997). The opinion was authored by Chief
Justice William Rehnquist and joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Jus-
tice Souter wrote a concurring opinion that was joined by Justice Ginsburg; Justice Stevens
wrote a dissent that wasjoined byJustice Breyer.
80. See Byrd, 956 F. Supp. at 33.
81. For more information on the fluctuation of the President's discretionary power over
federal spending, see FISHER, supra note 37, at 9-58.
82. See Byrd, 956 F. Supp. at 33.
83. See id. at 37-38.
84. See id. at 35.
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 646 n.10 (1978) (stating that
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hanced rescission power. When coupled with Chadha,8 7 dicta from
other federal courts of appeals,s and a wide array of scholarly opin-
ion,s the constitutional survival of enhanced rescission appeared to
be questionable indeed. Thus, the Clinton Administration should
have been wary of making indiscriminate use of the cancellation
power. As such, it should have limited its actions to where the Presi-
dent enjoys his greatest constitutional authority: national security.9
III. CLINTONV. CITY OF NEW YORK
A. The Case's Origins
Before the President had even exercised his new authority, the
Line Item Veto Act had already withstood two constitutional chal-
lenges in its brief lifetime.91 Perhaps these minor victories, though
not on the merits, led to an unwarranted sense of confidence by the
White House.
Whatever the Administration's motivations, what remained clear
was that as soon as President Clinton exercised his new power an-
other challenge would be mounted.92 The Balanced Budget Act of
cases vacated for lack of standing retain persuasive authority within the jurisdiction until the
issue has been decided on the merits).
87. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
88. Before the Byrd case, several federal court opinions had discussed line item veto power
in dicta. Not one concluded that the President had such a power, and many implied that only
through an amendment could he be granted such authority. See Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Lehman,
842 F.2d 1102, 1124 (9th Cir.) (contending that art. I, § 7"does not empower the President to
employ a so-called 'line item veto' and excise or sever provisions of a bill with which he disa-
grees" and that "[t]he 'line item veto' does not exist in the federal Constitution"),reh'ggranted,
863 F.2d 693 (1988), dec. withdrawn on other grounds, No. 87-5670 (9th Cir.July 17, 1989); Atkins
v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1079 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (commenting that"[n]ot even the Presi-
dent has such an 'item veto'"); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166, 183 n.19 (2d Cir.
1967) (asserting that "[t]he lack of an item veto is well established as part of our constitutional
scheme . . . ."); Thirteenth Guam Legislature v. Bordallo, 430 F. Supp. 405, 410 (D. Guam
1977), ("The Constitution does not grant the President the power to veto parts of bills."),aff'd,
588 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1978); cf. Catano v. Local Bd. No. 94, Selective Serv. Sys., 298 F. Supp.
1183, 1188 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (voiding a regulation as inconsistent with the act by which it was
promulgated and adding that "[t]he President is not at liberty to repeal congressional enact-
ments").
89. See, e.g., Sargentich, supra note 17, at 85 (arguing that the Act is unconstitutional on
Presentment grounds); Gerhardt, supra note 17, at 237-42 (arguing that the Act is unconstitu-
tional on Presentment and nondelegation grounds and also that the Act encumbers the Presi-
dent's veto power).
90. See infra Part IV.A.2 (discussing extent of presidential power in the realm of national
security).
91. See Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312, 2322 (1997) (dismissing the case for lack of stand-
ing); National Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1425 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (same).
92. See, e.g., Dewar, supra note 9, at A19 (discussing inevitability of a legal challenge follow-
ing the Supreme Court's decision in Raines).
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1997,93 the Taxpayer Relief Act of 19979' and the thirteen annual ap-
propriations bills9 afforded President Clinton a host of opportunities
to exercise the new prerogative, which he seized with alacrity. All
told, President Clinton canceled eighty-two provisions 6 in the 1998
spending bills,97 saving the Federal Government an estimated $937
93. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 1997 U.S.C.CAN. (111 Stat.) 251.
94. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 1997 U.S.C.C.N. (111 Stat.) 788 (to
be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 1).
95. For each fiscal year, Congress passes 13 appropriations bills which comprise the Fed-
eral Government's discretionary spending. See SCHICK, supra note 44, at 45. Typically, Con-
gress will first authorize funds to be spent in a separate authorization bill before it appropriates
monies. See id. at 44. The authorization bills are considered by authorizing committees instead
of appropriations committees. See id. at 44-45. To use defense spending as an example, the
House Committee on National Security and the Senate Committee on Armed Services theo-
retically must first agree to an authorization bill that will be passed into law. Then the House
Appropriations Subcommittee on National Security and Military Construction and the Senate
Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense and on Military Construction will pass their appro-
priations bills.
96. On August 11, 1997, the President canceled three provisions in the 1997 Reconcilia-
tion Package, which comprised the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and the Taxpayer Relief Act
of 1997. One cancellation was made in the former bill and two in the latter. It was estimated at
the time that these cancellations would have saved the Federal government $615 million over
five years. See Cancellations Nos. 97-1 to 97-3, 62 Fed. Reg. 43,262-67 (1997). Cancellations 97-
2 and 97-3 were the two that prompted the successful constitutional challenge. See Snake River
Potato Growers v. Rubin, No. 97-2463, (D.D.C. filed Oct. 21, 1997); City of New York v. Clinton,
No. 97-2393 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 16, 1997).
The remaining 79 cancellations were made in nine appropriations bills. President Clinton
did not cancel a provision in four appropriation bills: Health, Education, Welfare and Labor,
see Pub. L. No. 105-78, 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. (111 Stat.) 1165; Legislative Branch,see Pub. L. No.
105-55, 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. (111 Stat.) 1177; Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, see Pub. L. No. 105-118, 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. (111 Stat.) 2386, and
the District of Columbia, see Pub. L. No. 105-100, 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. (111 Stat.) 2160.
On October 16, 1997, one provision in the Treasury and General Government bill was can-
celed, totaling at the time $854 million in estimated savings from Fiscal Year 1998 to 2002. See
Cancellation No. 97-56, 62 Fed. Reg. 54,338 (1997). The cancellation of this Treasury provi-
sion also triggered a second lawsuit brought by the National Treasury Employees Union. See
National Treasury Employees Union v. United States, No. 97-2399 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 16, 1997).
On that very same day, eight provisions in the Energy and Water Development bill were also
canceled. This cancellation would have saved at the time an estimated $19.3 million from Fis-
cal Year 1998 to 2002. See Cancellation Nos. 97-57 to 97-64, 62 Fed. Reg. 54,564-68 (1997).
On November 1, 1997, President Clinton canceled provisions in both the Departments of
Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropria-
tions Act, and the Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act. In
the former bill, President Clinton canceled seven provisions, totaling at the time an estimated
$13.9 million in savings from Fiscal Year 1998 to 2002. In the latter measure, he canceled three
provisions totaling at the time an estimated $6.2 million from Fiscal Year 1998 to 2002. See
Cancellation Nos. 97-65 to 97-74,62 Fed. Reg. 59,766-71 (1997).
On November 20, 1997, President Clinton canceled seven provisions in the Agriculture, Ru-
ral Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,
and the Department of Interior and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, totaling at the time
an estimated $9.5 million in savings from Fiscal Year 1998 to 2002. See Cancellation Nos. 97-75
to 97-81, 62 Fed. Reg. 62,682-86 (1997).
On December 2, 1997, President Clinton canceled one provision in the Departments of
Commerce,Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, totaling
at the time an estimated $5 million in savings. See Cancellation No. 97-82, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,130
(1997).
97. By "1998 spending bills," the author is referring in general terms to the reconciliation
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million from 1998 to 2002.98 Although thirty-eight cancellations were
package and the thirteen appropriation bills. See supra notes 93-95 (describing the bills).
98. See Line Item Veto After One Year. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Legislative and Budget
Process of the House Comm. on Rules, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement ofJune E. O'Neill, Director,
Congressional Budget Office), quoted in Byrd, supra note 15, at 322 n.95. The updated figures
represent reduced estimates of the Act's savings. See Line-Item Veto Scorecard: $1.9 Billion Over 5
Years, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 1997, at A21 (estimating savings from the Act amounting to $1.9
billion from 1998-2002). The revised amount saved from enhanced rescission constituted
1/100th of 1% of the $9 trillion the Federal Government was projected to spend over those five
years. See id. After taking into account the 38 cancellations that were passed over the Presi-
dent's veto, the amount of funds saved drops to $569 million over five years. Seeid. As a presi-
dential candidate, Governor Clinton asserted that a line item veto would allow him to reduce
federal spending by $9.8 billion over four years. SeeS. REP. No. 104-9, at 5 (1995). It remains
unclear what impact the City of New York decision will have on the other canceled provisions.
See, e.g., Stephen Barr, Fingers Crossed, 2 Localities Hope Decision Unties Funds, WASH. POT.,June
26, 1998, at A19 (discussing the uncertainty surrounding other canceled projects after the City
of New York decision).
The cancellations by President Clinton aroused a variety of responses. Congressmen from
affected districts criticized the President for politicizing the use of the line item veto and for
canceling worthwhile projects. House Appropriations Committee Chairman Bob Livingstone
sent a letter to President Clinton terming the President's use of the veto power"a raw exercise
of power" intended to "threaten, intimidate or exert revenge on wayward legislators." See Eric
Pianin, Line-Item Veto Doesn't Cut Tensions; Hill Republicans, Democrats Warn Clinton of Reprisals for
Deletions, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 1997, at A1O.
In fact, once members of Congress felt the sting of enhanced rescission power, many former
supporters of enhanced rescission authority began to have second thoughts. House Appropria-
tions Committee member Representative Jose E. Serrano (D-N.Y.), who himself opposed the
measure, stated, "I've never seen a vote taken where more people wanted their vote back." See
Gugliotta & Pianin, supra note 46, at Al. Senator Bennett was upfront about his volte-face. "I
was a proponent. I campaigned for it vigorously. But when I saw the way President Clinton
abused the line-item veto, I ate crow publicly." Lyle Denniston &Jonathan Weisman, Line-item
Veto Voided by Justices, BALT. SUN,June 26, 1998, at Al.
There were even calls by some congressmen to repeal the measure entirely. See Eric Pianin
& Bradley Graham, Clinton Line-Item Vetoes Marred-He Got Some Bad Info, WASH. POST, Oct. 10,
1997, at A7. Other lawmakers simply expressed relief that so little was canceled. Representa-
tive C.W. Bill Young (R-Fla.), Chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Na-
tional Security, announced, "[w]hile we supported funding for those items he did veto, I'm
pleased that there were so few items which the President has chosen to single out." Eric Pianin
& Bradley Graham, Clinton Tempers Line-Item Approach; $144 Million Worth of Programs Cut From
$248 billion Defense Bil4 WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1997, at A4 [hereinafter Pianin & Graham, Clinton
Tempers].
The actual implementation of the Line Item Veto Act was also roundly criticized. The five
day deadline made it difficult for the White House to receive accurate information on prospec-
tive cancellations. As a result, the exercise of enhanced rescission power caused no small em-
barrassment to the President. See Eric Pianin, Line-Item Veto Snags Olympic Village Plan, WASH.
POST, Oct. 8, 1997, at A19 [hereinafter Pianin, Snags]; see also Eric Pianin & Bradley Graham,
Pentagon Data Faulty on Some Vetoed Projects, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 1997, at Al (discussing incor-
rect information relayed to the White House by Defense Department).
At the same time, the President was criticized by Republican "deficit hawks" and other com-
mentators for not cutting spending drastically enough. The largest domestic spending meas-
ure-the $80 billion health, education, welfare and labor appropriations bill-was left un-
touched by President Clinton. One of the chief proponents of the Line Item Veto Act, Senator
McCain stated, "I'd like to see far more items line-item vetoed." Line-Item Veto Scorecard, WASH.
POST, Dec. 4, 1997, A21; see also Pianin & Graham, Clinton Tempers, supra, at A4 (commenting
on Clinton's mild use of enhanced rescission on the defense bill).
Other lawmakers appeared simply resigned to the fact that the President would use the
power as he saw fit. House Majority Leader Richard K. Armey (R-Tex.) stated, "[w]e gave it
[line item veto power] to him. We expected him to use it." Pianin, Snags, supra, at A19.
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made in the Military Construction Appropriations Bill" and fourteen
in the Department of Defense Appropriations Bill,'0° more than a
third of the cancellations were not national security-related.
As expected, the execution of the President's new power immedi-
ately prompted new suits challenging the legitimacy of the Act. The
resulting Clinton v. City of New York case involved two consolidated
challenges to the Act: one by several parties led by the City of New
York and two hospital associations, and the other by Snake River Po-
tato Growers, Inc.' °1 The City of New York's challenge concerned the
cancellation of a favorable provision whereby the city received a
waiver of funds it owed the Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices.02 The Snake River Potato Growers brought suit concerning
cancellation of a tax benefit involving the sale of a sugar beet proc-
essing plant.'
1. The district court decision
The Act's second appearance before the district court proved no
more successful than its first. Almost a year after the district court's
decision in Byrd, the court, in City of New York v. Clinton,0 4 struck
down the Line Item Veto Act on largely similar grounds. As before,
the court held that the Act violated the Presentment Clause. 5 Un-
like the Byrd decision, however, the court did not discuss the non-
delegation doctrine. Instead, the court held that the Act upset the
During its brief existence, the Line Item Veto Act indeed changed the way Washington
worked, although perhaps not in the manner its proponents had anticipated. See Richard S.
Dunham, Power to the President-Courtesy of the GOP, Bus. WK., Oct. 20, 1997, at 51 (quoting a
Hill budget veteran as saying, "[y]ou can't cut your deals with the departments anymore and
expect it to be a done deal"); David E. Rosenbaum, A New Kind of Veto Brings a New Way of Doing
Business, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1997, at A20 (describing new lobbying techniques which began to
include petitioning the White House as well as Congress).
99. On October 6, 1997, 38 provisions were canceled from the $9.2 billion Military Con-
struction Appropriations Act. It was estimated these cancellations would have saved $287 mil-
lion from Fiscal Year 1998 to 2002. See Cancellation Nos. 97-4 to 97-41, 62 Fed. Reg. 52,452-69
(1997). Congress did not, however, humbly submit to the President's actions. See supra note 56
(discussing congressional passage of disapproval bill and its subsequent override of President
Clinton's veto of the bill).
100. On October 14, 1997, 14 provisions were canceled from the $248 billion bill, saving
$144 million from Fiscal Year 1998 to 2002. See Cancellation Nos. 97-42 to 56, 62 Fed. Reg.
53,704-10 (1997).
101. 118 S. Ct. 2091, 2097 (1998). Another challenge was settled on statutory grounds. See
National Treasury Employees Union v. United States, Civ. No. 97-2399 (D.D.C. 1996).
102. See Cancellation No. 97-3, 62 Fed. Reg. at 43,263-64 (discussing canceled item in de-
tail).
103. See Cancellation No. 97-2, 62 Fed. Reg. at 43,264-67 (discussing canceled item in de-
tail).
104. See985 F. Supp. 168 (D.D.C.), affd, 118 S. Ct. 2091, 2095 (1998).
105. See id. at 169.
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doctrine of separation of powers. ' ' Despite the two ominous hold-
106. See id. The structure of the U.S. Constitution is premised upon the theory of Separa-
tion of Powers. Although the term itself is not used in the Constitution, the explicit grants of
power in the first three articles undergird the structure of the Federal Government. See Buck-
ley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124 (1976) (stating that Separation of Powers"was not simply an ab-
stract generalization in the minds of the Framers: it was woven into the document that they
drafted"); MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 101 (1995)
(arguing that Separation of Powers is textually explicit from grants of power in first three arti-
cles); cf. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3.5, at 129 (4th ed.
1991) (stating that early state constitutions such as Massachusetts explicitly used the term
"Separation of Powers").
Separation of Powers jurisprudence reflects the fluidity of the doctrine as a governing princi-
ple. SeeYoungstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson,J., concur-
ring) ("While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates
that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon
its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity."). This fluidity in
part reflects the difficulty inherent in determining to what degree of intrusion into another
branch's prerogatives is allowable. James Madison asserted that the doctrine of Separation of
Powers
does not require that the legislative, executive and judiciary departments should be
wholly unconnected .... It is [however] agreed on all sides, that the powers properly
belonging to one of the departments, ought not to be directly and compleatly [sic]
administered by either of the other departments.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 250 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed., 1982).
There is also the difficulty of delineating which functions fall into which branch's purview.
See Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 209 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(contending that "[t ] he great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide [into]
fields of black and white"); Wayman v. Southhard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 46 (1825) (holding
that "[t ] he maker of the law may commit something to the discretion of the other departments,
and the precise boundary of this power is a subject of delicate and difficult inquiry, into which
a court will not enter unnecessarily"); cf Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926)
(Brandeis,J., dissenting) (providing another perspective on separation of powers theory).
The doctrine of Separation of Powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787 not to
promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was,
not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribu-
tion of the governmental powers among three departments, to save the people from
autocracy.
Id.; cf. EDWARD S. CORWIN & LOUIS W. KOENIG, THE PRESIDENCY TODAY 8 (1956) (describing
Separation of Powers as: "First that the three functions of government are reciprocally limiting;
secondly, that each department should be able to defend its characteristic function from intru-
sion by either of the other departments; thirdly, that none of the departments may abdicate its
powers to either of the others"); RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIALPOWER AND THE MODERN
PRESIDENTS 29 (1990) (contending that the Convention "created a government of separated
institutions sharing powers").
Separation of Powers theory stems from the ancient notion of mixed government. Although
mixed government was class-based, with each class having representation, its primary object-
the prevention of tyranny-was the same as Separation of Powers. It was not, however, until the
English Civil War that the idea of separate government structures began to emerge. Inchoate
Separation of Powers theory can be seen in the works of Marchamont Nedham, George Law-
son, and John Locke. See REDISH, supra, at 102-05 (discussing the origin of Separation of Pow-
ers). It was not until Montesquieu, however, that the concept of a separate judicial branch truly
emerged, thus bringing the doctrine into modern, recognizable form. See BARON DE
MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 156-57, 162, 164-67 (Anne Cohler et al. eds., Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 1994) (1748) (outlining modern framework for political division of powers:
three branches of government not hermetically separate, but overlapping); cf. THE FEDERALIST
NO. 51, supra note 12, at 262-63 (Madison) (illustrating Framers reliance upon Montesquieu
and Separation of Powers).
For a thorough treatment of the history of Separation of Powers theory, see MJ.C. VILE,
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ings at the district court level, the Administration chose to press on,
appealing the decision to the Supreme Court.
B. The Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision,'17 upheld the district court's
decision that the Act was unconstitutional. 8 Justice Stevens' majority
opinion, however, was more restrained than the two prior district
court opinions. Whereas the Byrd decision had struck down the Act
on both Presentment and nondelegation grounds," and the City of
New York district court case had decided the matter on Presentment
and Separation of Powers grounds,"' Justice Stevens' opinion ruled
only on the issue of the Presentment Clause."' The Court's opinion
discussed neither the nondelegation nor separation of powers ques-
tions." 2
1. The Line Item Veto Act's Violation of the Presentment Clause
The Court held that "the cancellation procedures set forth in the
Act violate the Presentment Clause, Art. I, § 7, cl. 2, of the Constitu-
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 21-97 (1967). For further discussion on
Separation of Powers, see THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT 774-79 (Kermit L.
Hall ed., 1992) (providing further background and critiquing Separation of Powers as a frame-
work for government); REDISH, supra, at 102 (discussing different schools of thought concern-
ing Separation of Powers).
107. Joining Justice Stevens in the majority were Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy
who wrote a concurrence, Justice SouterJustice Thomas, andJustice Ginsburg. Justice Scalia,
whQ was joined by Justice O'Connor, wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion, and Justice
Breyer authored a separate dissent, though joining in part with Justice Scalia's opinion.
108. SeeClinton v. City of NewYork, 118 S. Ct. 2091, 2095 (1998).
109. See Byrd v. Raines, 956 F. Supp. 25, 34-35 (D.D.C.),vacated, Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct.
2312, 2322 (1997).
110. SeeCity ofNewYork v. Clinton, 985 F. Supp. 168, 169 (D.D.C. 1998).
111. See City of New York v. Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2107-08.
112. See id. The Court made clear its intention to rule only on the Presentment issue:
[Allthough appellees challenge the validity of the Act on alternative grounds, the only
issue we address concerns the "finely wrought" procedure commanded by the Consti-
tution.... [W]e [therefore] find it unnecessary to consider the District Court's alter-
native holding that the Act "impermissibly disrupts the balance of powers among the
three branches of government."
Id.
Other arguments not discussed in the district court had been advanced against the Act by
amici curiae. These contentions were not discussed in the Supreme Court opinion either. See
Amicus Brief for Association of the Bar of the City of New York at 2, Clinton v. City of New
York, 118 S. Ct. 2091 (No. 97-1374), available in 1998 WL 283210 (arguing that the Act violated
the Rules Clause); see id. at 8 (contending that Presentment Clause violated by impermissibly
extending the time period for presidential consideration of a bill and by not having the Presi-
dent's objections published in the journal of the house originating the bill but instead having
his objections published in the Federal Register). Another argument could have been made
that the Presentment Clause was violated by allowing the President to cancel non-legislative
measures such as legislative history. See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191-92 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring) ("Committee reports... are frail substitutes forbicameral vote upon
the text of a law and its presentment to the President.").
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tion.'' 3 Relying on Chadha the Court reasoned that because cancel-
lations pursuant to the Act prevented the targeted provisions from
"having legal force or effect,"' . then "[i]n both legal and practical ef-
fect, the President has amended two Acts of Congress by repealing a
portion of each.""
5
In so deciding, the Court noted three distinctions between the
President's veto power and the Act's cancellation power. First, the
Court noted the temporal distinction between the cancellation and
veto."6 Second, the Court noted that whereas the veto involved rejec-
tion of an entire bill, cancellation involved rejection of only part of a
bill."17 Third, the Court noted that while the Constitution explicitly
authorizes the President to play a role in the legislative process, it is
silent as to the President unilaterally repealing or amending stat-
utes."8 The Court elaborated on the final point by concluding that
this constitutional silence regarding cancellation power should not
have been interpreted in the President's favor."9 Citing Chadha, the
Court stated that "[fiamiliar historical materials provide abundant
support for the conclusion that the power to enact statutes may only
'be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively
considered, procedure.",1
20
The Court also dismissed the Government's argument that the
cancellations did not "repeal" the canceled provisions because of the
"lockbox" provisions of the Act. 2' The Government argued that
through this mechanism, canceled provisions "retain real, legal
budgetary effect" insofar as the "lockbox" prevented the two political
branches from spending the savings effected by the cancellation'22
The court dismissed this legerdemain, reasoning that while the provi-
sion may still retain its "budgetary effect," the provisions are still
113. See City of New York, 118 S. Ct. at 2095.
114. See Line Item Veto Act, Pub. L. No. 104-130, § 1026(4), 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat.)
1200, 1207 (1996).
115. See City of New York, 118 S. Ct. at 2103.
116. See id. See supra note 42 (discussing the significance of the temporal distinction).
117. See City of New York, 118 S. Ct. at 2103.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. Id. at 2103-04 (citations omitted).
121. The "lockbox" mechanism ensured that savings stemming from cancellations were
used to reduce the deficit and not to offset deficit increases resulting from other laws. See Line
Item Veto Act § 1024, Pub. L. No. 104-130, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 1202 (1996) (to be
codified at 2 U.S.C. § 691) (describing the mechanism); seealso H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-491, at
23-24 (1996) (terming the provision as a "Iockbox" and describing its function). For a critique
of the government "lockbox" argument, seesupra note 50.
122. See City of New York, 118 S. Ct. at 2104 (quoting Transcript at 10, Clinton v. City of New
York, 118 S. Ct. 2091 (No. 97-1374), available in 1998 WL 210557, 10).
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"entirely inoperative as to the appellees. ''lss In addition, the Court
distinguished between the President's power to cancel provisions and
his power to decline to spend appropriated funds pursuant to con-
gressional delegation. 4
The critical difference between this statute [Line Item Veto Act]
and all of its predecessors, however, is that unlike any of them, this
Act gives the President the unilateral power to change the text of
duly enacted statutes. None of the Act's predecessors could even
arguably have been construed to authorize such a change.125
The Court also dismissed the final plank of the Government's ar-
gument-an argument which relied upon the Field v. Clark deci-
sion."'2 6 The Field case involved importers who mounted a constitu-
tional challenge to a section of the Tariff Act of 1890 that authorized
the President to "suspend" the Act's provisions if he determined that
other nations were imposing "'reciprocally unequal and unreason-
able"' tariffs on certain commodities. The Government empha-
sized that a number of statutes cited in Field had given the President
the power effectively to nullify laws.12  The Government argued that
the Line Item Veto Act's cancellations consisted of similar discretion-
ary grants of authority and that in essence the authority to cancel
provisions consisted of the power to "decline to spend" certain
funds.' 2'
The Court, however, distinguished between the facts of Field and
the facts of City of New York in three ways. First, the Court reasoned
that the use of the suspension power in Field was contingent upon
conditions not in existence at the time of the Tariff Act's passage.13
Second, the Tariff Act stated if the President made a determination
123. See id.
124. See id. at 2107.
125. Id.
126. 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
127. Since this case did not directly implicate the Presentment Clause, it is not discussed in
Part II. See id. at 680.
128. See City of New York, 118 S. Ct. at 2106 (discussing a series of nineteenth-century laws
cited in Feld that delegated to the President the power to suspend or cancel statutory law). A
number of statutes were cited in Field to support the President's power to nullify laws. SeeAct of
May 31, 1830, ch. 219, § 2, 4 Stat. 425; Act of May 24, 1828, ch. 111, § 4, 4 Stat. 308 (stating that
upon his determination, the President may terminate duties against Prussia); Act of Mar. 6,
1866, ch. 12, § 2, 14 Stat. 4 (permitting the President to"declare the provisions of this act to be
inoperative" and granting him the power to lift import restrictions on foreign cattle and hides
upon a demonstration that such importation would not imperil American cattle); Act ofJan. 7,
1824, ch. 4, § 4, 4 Stat. 3 (providing that upon a finding by the President, he may"suspend[]
and discontinue[]" duties on tonnage and imposts on foreign vessels); Act of Mar. 3, 1815, ch.
77, 3 Stat. 224 (providing that duties"are hereby repealed" and that "[s]uch repeal... [shall]
take effect... whenever the President makes the necessary determination").
129. See City of New York, 118 S. Ct. at 2105.
130. See id.
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that the contingency had arisen, he was required to act.'' Third, the
Court reasoned that with the Tariff Act, the President was acting in
accord with the wishes of Congress, while with enhanced rescission
power he was acting against it.
2. The Court's dicta concerning foreign affairs power
The Court then made a fourth and crucial distinction between the
Field case and the City of New York case. The Court declared that the
statutes cited in Field were inapplicable to the City of New York case be-
cause they had involved the President's foreign affairs power and had
provided contingent instructions to the President. Citing United
States v. Curtiss-Wright, 13 the Court stated that,
[t]he cited statutes [in Field] all relate to foreign trade, and this
Court has recognized that in the foreign affairs arena, the Presi-
dent has "a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory re-
striction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone
involved. Moreover, he, not Congress, has the better opportunity
of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries.".
The Court further noted that "in the judgment of the legislative
branch of the government, it is often desirable, if not essential for the
protection of the interests of our people,... to invest the President
with large discretion in matters arising out of the execution of stat-
utes relating to trade and commerce with other nations."'' 5
The Court thus reaffirmed the distinction that exists between the
President's powers in national security and his powers in domestic af-
fairs and reflected the error made by the Clinton Administration in
not defending the Act through the President's national security
power. While dwelling on the Court's dicta may at first seem an un-
fair exercise involving the benefit of hindsight, such a distinction
should have come as no surprise to the Clinton Administration. In-
deed, as Michael McCurry indicated, the White House itself was con-
131. See id.
132. See id. at 2106. As will be discussed below, the Court's reasoning on this third point
was misplaced. See infra notes 176-79 and accompanying text.
133. 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). See infra Part IV.A.2.a (discussing the importance of Curtiss-
Wright).
134. See City of New York, 118 S. Ct. at 2106 (citation omitted).
135. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 691 (1892). The Court also added:
More important, when enacting the statutes discussed in Fied, Congress itself made
the decision to suspend or repeal the particular provisions at issue upon the occur-
rence of particular events subsequent to enactment, and it left only the determination
of whether such events occurred up to the President. The Line Item Veto Act author-
izes the President himself to effect the repeal of laws, for his own policy reasons, with-
out observing the procedures set out in Article I, § 7.
City of New York, 118 S. Ct. at 2106.
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sidering cancellations based solely on the President's national secu-
rity power.'3 As will be discussed below, the Supreme Court's dicta
distinguishing between the President's domestic and national secu-
rity power reflects not only existing national security case law, but
also the two century-old practice of national security-related im-
poundment.
IV. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY OF NATIONAL SECURrIY RESCISSION
To elaborate on the City of New York decision's dicta, the best hope
for the President's retention of enhanced rescission authority would
have been through exercise of his prerogatives in the realm of na-
tional security.'37 The Supreme Court has held on numerous occa-
sions that the Constitution affords the President the widest latitude in
this area; latitude so wide that it encompasses both the unilateral
promulgation and repeal of laws.1ss Moreover, through long-standing
custom, the President has used his powers within the national secu-
rity sphere to reduce spending within this area.'3 9 Thus, from na-
tional security case law and from past practice, it appears likely that
the Court would have acknowledged National Security Rescission.
The President's national security power stems from three express
grants of constitutional authority. Principal among these grants is
the President's role as Commander in Chief. 40 The President also
draws additional national security power from his prerogatives in for-
eign affairs,' 4' derived from both the Vesting Clause and the
Treaty/Appointments Clause.42  The former clause provides that
"[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States,""3 the latter that the President "shall have Power, by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate to make Treaties, provided two
thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by
and with the Advise and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambas-
136. See supra note 22 (quoting Mike McCurry's statement about White House considera-
tion of canceling provisions within the President's power as Commander in Chief).
137. See RESOLVED: THAT THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF POWER OF THE UNITED STATES
PRESIDENT SHOULD BE SUBSTANTIALLY CURTAILED, H.R. Doc. No. 103-17 (1993) (providing a
bibliography discussing the President's far-ranging national security powers).
138. See infra Part 1V.A.1 (discussing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer and presidential
power in national security).
139. See infra Part IV.B (examining the long history of national security-related impound-
ment).
140. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 ("The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army
and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States.").
141. The distinction between the Commander in Chief power and foreign affairs power is
that the former encompasses military power, the latter, diplomatic power.
142. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cls. 1, 2.
143. U.S. CONsr. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
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sadors, other public Ministers and Consuls."" Hence, by denying
the President the power to reduce national security-related spending,
the courts would have likely been intruding upon the President's
constitutional prerogatives and concomitantly the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers.
The Constitution, of course, also grants Congress significant na-
tional security powers of its own, including the power both to finance
and to declare war. 14  Yet, at the same time, the Court has acknowl-
edged that in national security affairs Congress may, indeed must,
delegate extraordinary amounts of power to the Executive.4 6 Chief
Justice Hughes remarked,
It is... to be observed that the power exercised by the President in
time of war is greatly augmented outside of his functions as Com-
mander-in-Chief through legislation of Congress increasing his
administrative authority.... We thus... find.., a vast increase of
administrative authority through legislative action springing from
the necessities of war.1
4
Thus, although congressional ability to delegate authority to the
executive branch in the domestic arena has proved to be impres-
sive, 4 1 in national security matters, such delegations take on breath-
taking proportions.149
As will be discussed below, the near invulnerability that surrounds
144. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
145. Congress shall have the power:
To declare War... [t]o raise and support Armies... [and] [tlo provide and maintain
a Navy; [t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces; [t]o provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union,
suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; [t]o provide for organizing, arming and
disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in
the service of the United States ... [and] [t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers
vested by th [e] Constitution ....
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-18.
146. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)
("[C] ongressional legislation ... must often accord to the President a degree of discretion and
freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone
involved.").
147. JAMES G. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 39 (1964) (quoting
ChiefJustice Hughes).
148. Only two cases have ever been struck down on nondelegation grounds. See Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935) (holding that the"Live Poultry Code"
represented an unconstitutional delegation of authority to the President); Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433 (1935) (holding that section 9(c) of the National Industrial Re-
covery Act violated the nondelegation doctrine).
149. See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320 (holding that "in the maintenance of our interna-
tional relations... congressional legislation ... must often accord to the President a degree of
discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domes-
tic affairs alone involved"); LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGNAFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 111 (1972)
(observing that congressional authority to delegate in foreign affairs is virtually without limit).
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unilateral actions taken by the President in the realm of national se-
curity may extend far enough to protect cancellations within this
area. When the President's actions are bolstered by a congressional
delegation, the constitutionality of these cancellations appears as-
sured. As a result, relevant case law, when coupled with the long-
accepted practice of national security-related impoundment, would
have pointed toward the existence of National Security Rescission.
A. The Case Law on Presidential Power Supports the Existence of National
Security Rescission Power
1. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer and the constitutional
framework for exercises of presidential power
The foremost case in delineating presidential power is Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sauyer.15° In Youngstown, the Supreme Court ruled
on the constitutionality of President Truman's seizure of privately
owned steel mills during the Korean War.' Despite the fact that
President Truman acted to avert an industry-wide strike, which he be-
lieved would hamper the war effort,'52 the Court held that the seizure
was an unconstitutional usurpation of legislative power because the
President exceeded his authority under the Taft-Hartley Act.5"
In his concurrence, Justice Jackson outlined the contours of
presidential authority. He described three different scenarios in
which the President exercises power, contending that "[p] residential
powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction
or conjunction with those of Congress."'' 5 Justice Jackson's model,
which has been accepted in subsequent decisions," 6 provides a useful
150. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
151. See id. at 582. President Truman actually ordered the Secretary of Commerce, Charles
Sawyer, to seize the steel mills. See id. at 583.
152. See id.
153. Neither the statute nor the legislative history demonstrated congressional intent to
grant the President the power to act unilaterally in this regard. Seeid. at 585-86.
154. See id. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring). Over time, Justice Jackson's concurrencehas
become the controlling authority for the case. For a discussion of the prominence of Justice
Jackson's opinion, see Thomas E. Baker, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, in OXFORD
COMPANION, supra note 106, at 951.
155. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). But see REDISH, supra note
106, at 121-23 (rejecting Justice Jackson's "cumulative effects" test and instead calls for a
.pragmatic formalist" model of Separation of Power).
156. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669 (1981) (endorsing Justice Jackson's
model with minor caveat that "executive action... falls, not neatly in one of three pigeonholes,
but rather at some point along a spectrum running from explicit congressional authorization
to explicit congressional prohibition"). For yet another categorization of presidential power,
seeAbner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV.
123, 190-93 (1994) (discussing five categories of presidential power).
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framework for inquiry into the constitutionality of National Security
Rescission.
The first scenario arises when the President acts in concert with an
express or implied grant of authority from Congress. 57 Here, Justice
Jackson contended, presidential power is "at its maximum. '' This
concentration of power includes "all that [the President] possesses in
his own right plus all the power that Congress can delegate."'5 9 If the
President's actions are unconstitutional in this situation, "it usually
means that the Federal Government as an undivided whole lacks
power." 6 Executive action in this manner, Jackson stated, "would be
supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of
judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest
heavily upon any who might attack it."'6' The jurisprudence sur-
rounding the nondelegation doctrine finds such exercises of presi-
dential power virtually unassailable, thus reinforcing Justice Jackson's
reasoning. 
62
The second scenario arises when the President takes action in an
area where Congress has neither granted nor denied him authority.
Presidential actions in this situation, Justice Jackson reasoned, were
the most constitutionally ambiguous. "[T] here is a zone of twilight
in which the President and Congress may have concurrent authority,
or in which its distribution is uncertain."'6 3 In such circumstances,
Justice Jackson concluded that practical considerations would likely
outweigh any legal theories in determining the legitimacy of the
President's actions. ' Many presidential actions in national security
affairs fall into this crepuscular category. They include many Execu-
tive Agreements,65 the unilateral abrogation of treaties, I6 and many
national security-related impoundments.6 7
The third situation occurs when the President acts in opposition to
the express or implied wishes of Congress. Here the President's
power is weakest, because the President is relying "only upon his own
157. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. 579,635 (Jackson,J., concurring).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 636-37.
161. Id. at 637.
162. Only two cases in Supreme Court history have overturned statutes as excessive delega-
tions. See supra note 148.
163. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson,J., concurring).
164. See id.
165. See infra Part IV.A.4 (discussing the President's ability to act unilaterally in national
security area).
166. See id. (discussing the President's power to repeal treaties unilaterally).
167. See infra note 206 (commenting on the deference owed to the President's impound-
ment of national security-related funds).
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constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress
over the matter."' 6' Justice Jackson concluded that President Tru-
man, by ignoring the legislative intent of the Taft-Hartley Act, acted
within this third category, and hence, exceeded his authority.'6
While defining the limits of presidential powers, Justice Jackson
was careful, however, not to hamper the President's authority as
Commander in Chief.' He did not want to "circumscribe, much less
to contract, the lawful role of the President as Commander-in-
Chief.' 7' Instead, Justice Jackson wanted "to indulge the widest...
interpretation to sustain [the President's] exclusive function to
command the instruments of national force ... when turned against
the outside world for the security of our society.
' 71
At the same time, he acknowledged Congress' responsibility for
making appropriations for national security. Justice Jackson added:
The Constitution expressly placed in Congress power "to raise and
support armies"and "to provide and maintain a Navy." This cer-
tainly lays upon Congress primary responsibility for supplying the
armed forces. Congress alone controls the raising of revenues and
their appropriation may determine in what manner and by what
means they shall be spent for military and naval procurement.
Thus, according to Justice Jackson's determination-that Congress
"may determine in what manner and by what means" military spend-
ing may be carried out-it would certainly seem that Congress could
delegate such authority to the President. Such a conclusion would
have been in keeping with the view of Alexander Hamilton who
stated:
The actual conduct of foreign negotiations, the preparatory plans
of finance, the application and disbursement of the public monies,
in conformity to the general appropriations of the legislature, the
arrangement of the army and navy, the direction of the operation
of war; these and other matters [fall within the purview of the ex-
'71ecutive branch].
The President's exercise of cancellation power pursuant to the
Line Item Veto Act, therefore, raises the question: Where along the
Youngstown continuum does executive action lie? If it is within the
168. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson,J., concurring).
169. See id. at 586-87 (discussing the lack of constitutional support for the President's ac-
tions).
170. See id. at 645 (stating that the Youngstown decision should not be used to limit the
proper actions of the President as Commander in Chief).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 643.
174. THE FEDERALIST No. 72, at 366 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills ed., 1982).
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first category, the President's actions are at their height and pre-
sumed to be valid; if within the second category, the action is consti-
tutionally suspect; and if within the third category, the presidential
exercise of power is difficult to uphold.
Following Justice Jackson's Youngstown model, a president exercis-
ing enhanced rescission power would appear to be acting within the
first category, because Congress expressly granted the President such
power through the Line Item Veto Act. According to Justice Jack-
son's formula, the Line Item Veto Act would have been presump-
tively constitutional.' 75 Although federal legislation is frequently
struck down as unconstitutional, such legislation almost exclusively
involves domestic legislation within Justice Jackson's first scenario.
As will be discussed in Part IV.B, and displayed in Figure 1, an impor-
tant difference exists in Justice Jackson's model when the action in-
volves national security power.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court found that the President's exer-
cise of enhanced rescission authority was against the will of Con-
gress, 78 which would have placed such action within Justice Jackson's
third category. By canceling congressionally approved spending pro-
visions, the Court held the President was contravening the intent of
the legislature by not spending the funds that Congress appropri-
ated. 17 7  The Supreme Court's logic rings hollow, however, since
Congress devised the Line Item Veto Act specifically as a mechanism
to grant the President such power.'78 The Act was formulated to su-
persede and control Congress' immediate appetite for spending.'7
Therefore, the Court's opinion in this respect is unpersuasive.
By applyingJustice Jackson's constitutional calculus'" and by acting
pursuant to an express grant of authority from Congress, the Presi-
dent should indeed have had the power to cancel national security-
175. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 636-37 (noting that presidential action pursuant to congres-
sional mandate is only unconstitutional if the entire government lacks the authority to act).
176. SeeClinton v. City of NewYork, 118 S. Ct. 2091, 2106 (1998).
177. See id.
178. SeeH.R. REP. No. 104-11, pt. 2, at 8 (1995) (stating that the purpose of the enhanced
rescission is to "check congressional raids on the Treasury"); S. REP. No. 104-13, at 2 (1995)
(stating that "[t]he purpose of enhanced rescission is to confront the serious problem of pork
barrel spending").
179. See H.R. REP. No. 104-11, pt. 2, at 7 (discussing the Line Item Veto Act in context of
efforts to control congressional spending). Even if the Supreme Court were correct that the
President was acting against the will of Congress, the President's cancellations would still be
roughly on par with the national security-related impoundment that occurred before the ICA.
See Part IV.B.
180. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 636-37 (creating a tripartite model for presidential power
with the highest presumption of constitutionality assigned to instances where Congress and the
President act in tandem).
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related spending provisions. As the next section illustrates,' 8 when
the President acts in concert with Congress in the field of national
security affairs, he calls forth not only his own considerable authority
in that field, but adds to that the full authority of Congress. The total
that results from this process of addition would likely have been con-
stitutionally irresistible.
2. The Line Item Veto Act underJusticeJackson's first scenario: The
President, acting pursuant to a congressional authorization in national
security affairs, has virtually unlimited discretion
a. United States v. Curtiss-Wright and its progeny
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that legisla-
tion affecting national security must give the President more discre-
tion than he receives in domestic affairs. The seminal case in this re-
gard is United States v. Curtiss-Wright."' In this case, a corporation was
181. See infra Part IV.A.2 (discussing case law upholding the extraordinary nature of con-
gressional delegations to the President in national security affairs).
182. 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (concluding that the President must have greater freedom to
operate in the area of national security). Although criticized as bad history and as overly
sweeping in its holding, see Harold G. Maier, Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., in OXFORD COMPANION,
supra note 106, at 212 (discussing scholarly refutation of Justice Sutherland's "springing sover-
eignty" analysis which undergirds the opinion), and for the fact that the many of the more re-
lied-upon parts of the opinion consist of mere dicta, see 1971 Hearings, supra note 17, at 248-49
(quoting Professor Arthur Miller who criticized over-reliance on the opinion since much of the
opinion comprised dicta), Curtiss-Wright is very much the law of the land. See infra (describing
subsequent cases relying upon Curtiss-Wright).
Its reasoning has been reaffirmed on numerous occasions and in terms no less sweeping. In
Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948), the constitutionality of the Renegotiation Act was
challenged. See id. at 742. The Act, passed during World War II, was designed to allow the War
Department to renegotiate contracts it made with private individuals to prevent incidents of
profiteering. See id. at 746 (discussing the Act's attempts to recover excessive profits).
The purpose of this delegation was similar to the current delegation in the Line Item Veto
Act; both granted the Executive the power to reduce government outlays. In Lichter, the Court
upheld this broad delegation of authority to the Executive using terms reminiscent of Curtiss-
Wright
A constitutional power implies a power of delegation of authority under it sufficient to
effect its purposes. This power is especially significant in connection with constitutional
war powers under which the exercise of broad discretion as to methods to be em-
ployed may be essential to an effective use of its war powers by Congress.
Id. at 778-79 (emphasis added).
Almost twenty years later, the Supreme Court again affirmed the broad approach to delega-
tion established in Curtiss-Wright In Zemel v. Rusk, the Court upheld the Secretary of State's
refusal to validate passports for travel to Cuba under the Passport Act of 1926. See 381 U.S. 1, 4
(1965). The petitioner challenged the Passport Act for being indefinite in scope. See id. at 6.
The Court, however, disagreed: "Congress---in giving the Executive authority over matters of
foreign affairs-must of necessity paint with a brush broader than that it customarily wields in
domestic areas." Id. at 17.
More recent cases involving the President's national security powers and congressional dele-
gations have only reinforced the Curtiss-Wright holding. See Sale v. Haitian Centers Council,
Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993) (citing Curtiss-Wnight and stating: "Acts of Congress normally do
not have extraterritorial application unless such an intent is clearly manifested. That presump-
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indicted for violating a congressionally authorized presidential em-
bargo imposed on the Chaco Region of South America. 83 The com-
pany contended that the congressional delegation to the Executive
through joint resolution was excessive, amounting to an unfettered
grant of discretion to the President. 84 The Court resoundingly re-
jected that argument.
In a 7-1 decision' 5 announced by Justice Sutherland, the Court
held unambiguously that the executive branch is supreme in the
realm of national security.8 6 The Court posited that the President
must be sufficiently free from congressional constraint to conduct
successfully his duties in this area. "[I] n the maintenance of our in-
ternational relations.., congressional legislation... must often ac-
cord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statu-
tory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs
alone involved.'
8 7
The Court also distinguished between the different bases for exer-
cises of presidential power in foreign and domestic affairs. "[T]he
federal power over external affairs in origin and essential character
[is] different from that over internal affairs. ' " The Court main-
tained that, the President is sui generis in national security affairs, stat-
ing that "[i] n this vast external realm... the President alone has the
power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation." ""'
Justice Sutherland buttressed his opinion by quoting the words of
then-Congressman John Marshall, himself no great friend of execu-
tion has special force when we are construing treaty and statutory provisions that may involve
foreign and military affairs for which the President has unique responsibility.");see also Regan v.
Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 243 (1984) (explaining that the Court will give traditional deference to the
President's decisions to restrict international travel); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307-08 (1981)
(discussing the executive branch's powerful interest in protecting the secrecy of foreign intelli-
gence operations).
183. See Haig, 453 U.S. at 304.
184. See id. at 315.
185. The fact that the decision was nearly unanimous was not lost upon William H.
Rehnquist when he served as Assistant Attorney General. In an exchange with Professor Arthur
S. Miller before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, Rehnquist de-
fended the legitimacy of the Curtiss-Wright opinion with reference to the near unanimity of the
opinion and to the prominence of the justices in the majority. See 1971 Hearings, supra note 17,
at 249. He bolstered his argument by stating thatJustices Brandeis and Cardozojoined in the
opinion. See id. He could just as easily have added ChiefJustice Evans. Justice McReynolds was
the lone dissenter in the case. See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 333 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
Justice Stone did not participate due to illness. See 299 U.S. at iii.
186. See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320 (discussing the superior access to information avail-
able to the President concerning relations with other nations).
187. Id.
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tive power.'" In a speech delivered less than a year before his eleva-
tion to Chief Justice, Marshall stated:.. "The President is the sole or-
gan of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative
with foreign nations.',
92
Finally, the Court stated in dictum that in national security affairs,
the President's power allowed him to act even without congressional
authorization,"" or within Justice Jackson's so-called "zone of twi-
light."'194 The Court concluded therefore that the President's power
in international affairs did not depend upon Congressional action
for its validity.95
The Curtiss-Wright case reflects the deference'9 the Court has uni-
formly granted the Executive in the field of national security. Fur-
thermore, consistent with Justice Jackson's framework,9 the Court's
190. See ROssrrER, supra note 26, at 26 (discussing Marshall's skepticism toward executive
power).
191. Marshall became ChiefJustice on March 5, 1801. See OXFORD COMPANION, supra note
106, at 524.
192. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319 (quoting speech made on March 7, 1800, byJohn Mar-
shall in the U.S. House of Representatives).
The seminal writing on presidential supremacy in national security affairs came from the
pen of Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton in 1793. Writing under the nom de plume
"Pacificus," Hamilton defended President Washington's proclamation of neutrality in the war
between Great Britain and France. He argued that the President was the "organ of intercourse
between the Nation and foreign Nations." ALEXANDER HAMILTON, PAcIFIcUS No. 1 (June 29,
1793), reprinted in 15 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 33, 36-40, 41-42 (H. Syrett ed.,
1969). Although his opinion was countered in kind by James Madison, who wrote under the
pseudonym "Helvidius," Hamilton's reasoning was accepted at the time, see FORREST
MCDONALD, ALEXANDER HAMILTON: A BIOGRAPHY 279 (1982), and has carried the day since,
see I W. GOLDSMITH, THE GROWTH OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 411-12 (1974).
Among commentators before the Constitution there was little ambiguity about what branch
of government should be in charge of national security. Locke, Montesquieu, and Blackstone
were unanimous in declaring that national security was the prerogative of the Executive. See
JOHN NORTON MOORE ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAw 749 (1990). Federalist Nos. 70 and 72
foreshadow Hamilton's reasoning in Pacificus. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 355
(Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills ed., 1982) (stating that"[e] nergy in the executive is a lead-
ing character in the definition of good government. It is essential to the protection of the
community against foreign attacks. ").
193. See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319-20.
194. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
195. See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320 (finding that act of Congress is not required for the
President to act in the national security area).
196. As outlined in Youngstown, when the two political branches work together, the Court
grants them much deference. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). In-
deed, the Court has held that much of the field of national security is encompassed by the
"Political Question Doctrine." See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (stating that for the
Court to review a matter, there must not be "a textually demonstrable constitutional commit-
ment of the issue to a coordinate political department"); see also Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v.
Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (refusing to review a case where an Ex-
ecutive Order was issued involving United States citizens and foreign air transportation). In
Waterman Steamship Corp., the Court held that "the very nature of executive decisions as to for-
eign policy is political, notjudicial." Id.
197. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-39 (Jackson,J., concurring).
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSnIYLAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1273
deference was derived in part from the express congressional
authorization of executive action198 -thus placing the President's ac-
tion within Justice Jackson's first category. Considering the Court's
general skepticism at that time toward congressional delegations of
power, the Curtiss-Wright holding is all the more striking.1
The same circumstances would have likely converged in the con-
text of a National Security Rescission: The President, with the ex-
plicit support of Congress, wielded his national security power to re-
duce national security-related spending. Moreover, in one sense
National Security Rescission would have been even more supportable
than President Roosevelt's actions in Curtiss-Wight, because the
President's cancellations through the Line Item Veto Act would have
been executed pursuant to a statutory grant of power, whereas in
Curtiss-Wright, President Roosevelt's actions were authorized only by a
congressional joint resolution.
Curtiss-Wright's distinction between external and internal affairs re-
flects the difference that exists between national security and domes-
tic lawmaking. The Court in Curtiss-Wright declared that differences
between external and internal powers "are different, both in respect
of their origin and their nature.,,200 This was the same conclusion
drawn by the nation's first Chief Justice, John Jay. He determined
that the law of domestic and national security affairs "w[ere] dis-
tinct. 20 1 ChiefJustice Jay reasoned that "the laws of the United States
admit of being classed under three heads of descriptions. 1st. All
treaties made under the authority of the United States. 2d. The laws
of nations. 3dly. The constitution, and statutes of the United
States.,212  Many commentators have agreed with Chief Justice Jay,
supporting the idea of a "dualist" legal system where domestic and
international law each operate independently within their discrete
198. See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 325 (considering the joint resolution as a valid congres-
sional delegation).
199. SeeNoWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 106, § 6.2, at 206 (noting the contemporary Court's
hostility to congressional delegations of power in the domestic arena). Just the year before, the
Court had struck down two acts as unconstitutional delegations of congressional powers-the
only two struck down on these grounds in Supreme Court history. Seesupra note 149.
200. 299 U.S. at 315; see also id. at 321 (discussing the "marked difference between foreign
affairs and domestic affairs").
201. Trial of Gideon Henfield (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (charge to the grand jury by CJ.Jay),re-
printed in FRANCIS WHARTON, STATE TRIALS OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE ADMINI-
STRATIONS OF WASHINGTON AND ADAMS 49, 52-53 (1849) [hereinafter Henfield Trial]. As the
first Chief Justice and as an important figure in the Ratification Debate, Jay's words are given
additional deference. See, e.g., Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57 (1884)
(stating that "[t]he construction upon the Constitution ... by men who were contemporary
with its formation ... is of itself entitled to very great weight").
202. See Henfield Trial, supra note 201, at 52-53.
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spheres.!"
AcceptingJustice Jackson's tripartite, Youngstown framework 204 and
also the holding of Curtiss-Wright-that presidential actions involving
national security are to be given more deference than those involving
domestic affairs-one is led to the conclusion that two separate strains
of presidential power exist, both of which have the Jacksonian tripar-
tite structure.20" The first strain, as represented by the National Secu-
rity Vector in Figure 1, involves national security power and displays a
higher probability that presidential action will be constitutional. The
second vector involves domestic affairs and generally involves a lower
probability that presidential action will be constitutional. National
Security Rescission, which would have involved a President acting
pursuant to congressional authorization, likely would have lain on
the National Security Vector and thus had a higher probability of
constitutionality than would a domestic cancellation.
203. SeeSTEPHEN DYCUSETAL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 181 (1997) (discussing the"dualist"
approach to domestic and national security law); MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 83-84 (1993) ("rhe prevalent theoretical approach to the relationship
between international and municipal law is ... [the dualist model] ... [which] views any na-
tional legal system and the international legal system as separate and discrete entities, each hav-
ing the power to settle the effect any rule of law might have within it.");Jonathan Turley,Dual-
istic Values in the Age of International Legisprudence, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 185, 185 (1993) (describing
"conceptual division between national (or municipal) law and the law of nations (or interna-
tional law)"). These commentators have of course collapsed ChiefJustice Jay's first and second
categories into a single "international law" category.
204. Many commentators reject the framework. See supra notes 155-56 (providing alternate
models of presidential power). It has also been suggested thatJustice Jackson's model does not
fully apply in the context of national security. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1004-05
(1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (stating that the Goldwater case is different from Youngstown
in that the former was "entirely external" to the United States and fell within the foreign affairs
category); HENKIN, supra note 149, at 341 n. 1 (arguing that"Youngstown has not been consid-
ered a foreign affairs case" since a majority ofjustices did not consider it as such);cf. Dames &
Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668 (1981) (endorsing Justice Jackson's model in a case involv-
ing presidential foreign affairs power).
JusticeJackson in his opinion, however, did not limit his model solely to presidential actions
within domestic affairs. SeeYoungstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)
("We may well begin by a somewhat over-simplified grouping of practical situations in which a
President may doubt, or others may challenge, his powers, and by distinguishing roughly the
legal consequences of this factor of relativity."). In fact, when discussing his first scenario,
where the President acts in accord with the will of Congress, Justice Jackson explicitly included a
discussion of the national security case law. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-36 n.2 (stating that
"[i] t is in this class [the first scenario] that we find the broadest recent statements of presiden-
tial power [ Curtiss-Wright]"). In addition to Justice Jackson's inclusion of national security af-
fairs within his model, prominent commentators have done the same. See, e.g., HAROLD
HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION, SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-
CONTRA AFFAIR 108 (1990) (stating that Justice Jackson's "concurrence - . . powerfully reaf-
firmed the National Security Constitution").
205. For an alternate analysis of the interplay between Youngstown and Curtiss-Wright, see
Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-
Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1306 (1988) (arguing that federal courts in recent years have
"all but dismantle[d] the Youngstown vision" in favor of an approach supported by Curtiss-
Wright).
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Figure 1
A Probabilistic Model of the President's Constitutional Power Based on
Justice Jackson's Youngstown Framework












x Third Scenario Second Scenario First Scenario
Axis Against the will Absent Congressional Pursuant to Congressional
of Congress action approval
LEGEND
x axis: Presidential actions vis-&-vis Congress according to Justice Jackson's tripartite,
Youngstown framework
y axis: Likelihood of presidential actions passing constitutional muster
I. President's actions pursuant to treaty obligations
2. President's actions pursuant to national security legislation
3. President's actions pursuant to joint resolution (see Curtiss-Wright)
4. President's actions pursuant to Line Item Veto Act as applied to national security
related spending (National Security Rescission)
5. President's actions pursuant to unilateral executive agreement (see Pink)
6. President's actions pursuant to Line Item Veto Act in domestic arena
7. President's actions pursuant to unilateral action based solely on his inherent
powers (see Youngstown)
This model displays the greater likelihood of constitutionality that accompanies
presidential actions within the realm of national security. When the President acts as
Commander in Chief or as Chief Diplomat, his actions fall along the National Security
Vector and thus reflect his greater constitutional authority in this area. When the
President does not act pursuant to his national security prerogatives, his actions fall
along the Domestic Vector and the President's constitutional authority is diminished.
The Line Item Veto Act, as applied to national security spending (National Security
Rescission), would have likely fallen on the National Security Vector and enjoyed a
greater probability of being upheld by the courts.
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b. The Curtiss-Wright holding may extend to include national
security spending
Many commentators have suggested that the President's power in
the national security realm may have legitimized national security-
related impoundment that occurred before passage of the ICA.206 As
206. Numerous authorities in the field have made the distinction between national security-
related impoundment and domestic impoundment. In perhaps the definitive book on the ex-
tent of the President's military power, The Supreme Court and the Commander in Chief Professor
Longaker observed:
Prior to the 1970s there was a fragile but real distinction between impoundment of
appropriations for weapons systems and impoundment of other funds.... There was
some force in the argument that the President's power as commander in chief gave
him a special responsibility to utilize or not utilize funds based on his strategic esti-
mates and to control the special pleading of the services and the cluster of interest
groups around them.
CLINTON ROSSITER & RICHARD P. LONGAKER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN
CHIEF 163-64 (expanded ed., 1976); see alsoJAMES P. PFIFFNER, THE PRESIDENT, THE BUDGET,
AND CONGRESS: IMPOUNDMENT AND THE 1974 BUDGET AcT 70 (1979) ("The problem of im-
poundment in the area of national security and defense is... generally recognized to be a spe-
cial case and will be treated as such.").
Two White House counsels concurred with this constitutional distinction. In a letter to a
member of Congress dated August 12, 1955, and later cited in a memorandum to President
Kennedy, the Special Counsel to President Eisenhower wrote:
It is true that in the past Presidents have declined to spend funds.., but I have not
found any instance of this that did not relate to funds appropriated for the national
defense.... These national defense precedents, however, cannot, in my opinion, be
used as precedents for withholding funds appropriated for a non-defense purpose.
Memorandum to the President: Authority to Reduce Expenditures, Bureau of the Budget
(Oct. 1, 1961), cited in 1971 Hearings, supra note 17, at 339.
The Coutnsel to President Kennedy agreed with the opinion of his predecessor. "Previous
Presidents, in their roles as Commander-in-Chief, have 'impounded' Defense appropriations.
Similar action in the civilian area is not customary and of doubtful legal basis." 1973 Hearings,
supra note 31, at 333.
President Nixon's Deputy Attorney General Joseph Sneed reached the same conclusion.
"The President has substantial authority to control spending in the areas of defense and for-
eign relations...." Id. at 368. Citing Curtiss-Wright, Sneed continued:
[I]t is clear that any [congressional mandate that funds be spent] is subject to at least
two important qualifications. The President has substantial authority to control
spending in the areas of national defense and foreign relations. Such authority flows
from the President's constitutional role as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
and from his relatively broad constitutional authority in foreign affairs. In those areas,
congressional directives may intrude impermissibly into matters reserved by the Con-
stitution to the President. It is noteworthy that Congress has never successfully chal-
lenged an impounding action in the foreign relations and national defense fields.
Id. (citations omitted).
Senator Edward Kennedy has also affirmed this distinction:
A reading of the Constitution does suggest one area where it can reasonably be ar-
gued that Presidential power-in this case power to impound funds-may flow di-
rectly from that document and not be dependent upon statutory authorities. That is
the power of the President which can be implied from his constitutional role in for-
eign affairs and his designation as Commander in Chief. History indeed abounds with
examples of impoundments by President's in these areas.
Id. at 333; cf. Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 522, 611 (1838) (stating that in the per-
formance of "purely ministerial" acts "[t]o contend, that the obligation imposed on the Presi-
dent to see the laws faithfully executed, implies a power to forbid their execution, is a novel
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Assistant Attorney General William H. Rehnquist wrote a well-known
memorandum where he concluded that although the President did
not have a general constitutional power to impound funds,0 7 he
likely did possess such a prerogative in national security affairs. Cit-
ing Curtiss-Wright, the future ChiefJustice stated:
Of course, if a Congressional directive to spend were to interfere
with the President's authority in an area confided by the Constitu-
tion to his substantive direction and control, such as his authority
as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and his authority over
foreign affairs... a situation would be presented very different
208from the one before us.
During the hearing, Rehnquist vigorously defended this distinction
in exchanges with Senators and other witnesses.2 It would surely
seem that if national security-related impoundments were treated as
constitutionally more viable than other impoundments, national se-
curity-related cancellations should be treated no differently.
3. The Line Item Veto Act underJustice Jackson's second scenario: The
President's national security power is viable absent congressional
approval
The Supreme Court has followed Curtiss-Wright's dictum that the
construction of the Constitution, and entirely inadmissible").
207. See Memorandum From Assistant Attorney General William H. Rehnquist to President
Nixon Re: Presidential Authority to Impound Funds Appropriated for Assistance to Federally
Impacted Schools (Dec. 1, 1969), cited in 1971 Hearings, supra note 17, at 282-83. Rehnquist
stated:
With respect to the suggestion that the President has a constitutional power to decline
to spend appropriated funds, we must conclude that existence of such a broad power
is supported by neither reason nor precedent.... It is in our view extremely difficult
to formulate a constitutional theory to justify refusal by the President to comply with a
Congressional directive to spend.
Id.
208. Id. at 283-84 (citation omitted). Because he emphasized he was volunteering his own
opinions and not speaking on behalf of the Justice Department or the President, Rehnquist's
candor gives his comments added weight. See id. at 235 (testimony of William H. Rehnquist).
Other commentators have concurred with Rehnquist, contending that Congress' power to ap-
propriate funds may not interfere with the President's prerogatives in national security. See
EDWARD CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS: 1787-1957, at 403 (4th rev. ed. 1957).
Undoubtedly the Congress may refuse to appropriate and undoubtedly the Congress
may say that an appropriation is for a specific purpose. In that respect the President
would undoubtedly be bound by it. But the Congress could not, through the power
of appropriation, in my judgment, infringe upon the right of the President to com-
mand whatever army he might find.... (i]f the Army is in existence, if the Navy is in
existence, if it is subject to command, [the President] may send it where he will in the
discharge of his duty ....
Id.
209. See 1971 Hearings, supra note 17, at 243-53 (providing a lively debate between
Rehnquist and Professor Winter on one hand, and Senator Ervin, Senator Gurney, Professor
Bickel and Professor Miller on the other).
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President may act in the national security arena absent congressional
approval,"" thus legitimizing actions that shade into Justice Jackson's
second category, the "zone of twilight. 21' In Dames & Moore v.
Regan,212 the petitioner challenged the President's authority to nullify
attachments and liens on Iranian assets and to suspend court claims
concerning such assets. 2 3 The action, which occurred in the wake of
the Iranian Hostage Crisis, 14 was taken pursuant to an Executive
Agreement made between the United States and Iran.15
While the Court held that the President had acted pursuant to the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act to nullify the attach-
ments, 211 it could find no such legislative authority for the President's
21actions suspending the claims pending in American courts.17 The
Court held that a failure by Congress specifically to delegate such
authority to the President did not mean that Congress disapproved of
the action21 The Court declared, that "[a]t least this is so where
there is no contrary indication of legislative intent and when, as here,
there is a history of congressional acquiescence in conduct of the sort
engaged in by the President.,
21
The Court emphasized the importance of informal accommoda-
tion between the two political branches in the conduct of national
security:
[W] here, as here, the settlement of claims has been determined to
be a necessary incident to the resolution of a major foreign policy
dispute... [and] we can conclude that Congress acquiesced in the
President's action, we are not prepared to say that the President
lacks the power to settle such claims.no
The Court's reasoning, that foreign policy decisions are best left to
the discretion of the President and Congress to work out amongst
themselves, has long been echoed by constitutional scholars. For ex-
ample, Professor Louis Koenig has written that, "the brevity and in-
exactness of constitutional language has left the allocation of
210. Se, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (stating that the
President's powers in international relations "do[] not require as a basis ... an act of Con-
gress").
211. SeeYoungstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (describing the power
of the President when he acts absent congressional action).




216. See id. at 675.
217. Se, id. at 585-86.
218. See id. at 678.
219. Id. at 678-79.
220. Id. at 688.
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[national security] power largely to political accommodation be-
tween the President and Congress.''2
Consequently, the Court in Dames & Moore upheld the President's
actions absent congressional approval, effectively placing it within
Justice Jackson's second category. From Supreme Court precedent,
it therefore follows that the President, whether acting with or without
congressional approval, has exceptional discretion in national secu-
rity affairs.22 In fact, as will be discussed further, when acting absent
congressional authority, the President's national security power at
times extends both to positive lawmaking and to unilateral repeal of
existing law. 3 Such presidential power in national security thus
would appear to carve out an exception to Chadha's 4 and City of New
York's 25 seemingly airtight holdings. Put simply, national security
lawmaking has different lawmaking requirements. 2 6 As a result, if
the Chadha and City of New York decisions do not apply solely to do-
mestic spending bills, 27 then they at least apply in a different manner
to national security spending, thus paving the way for recognition of
National Security Rescission.
4. The Line Item Veto Act underJustice Jackson's third scenario: The
President's national security power may allow him to act against the will
of Congress
a. The President's power in national security includes the power of
positive lawmaking
The Dames & Moore decision reflects the legal acceptance given to
Executive Agreements and other forms of unilateral national security
lawmaking.228 Despite Justice Black's statement in Youngstown that
221. Louis W. KOENIG, THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE 42 (1964), quoted in John H. Stassen, Separa-
tion of Powers and the Uncommon Defense: The Case Against Impounding of Weapons System Appropria-
tions, 57 GEO. LJ. 1159, 1186 n.133 (1969); see also ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THEIMPERIAL
PRESIDENCY 237 (1973) (contending that "[p]residential impoundment... was controlled by
the give-and-take of the political process").
222. Executive actions, even when violating individual rights, have been upheld by the Su-
preme Court. See infra note 394 (providing cases where the courts have upheld violations of
individual rights in light of national security concerns).
223. See infra Part IV.B.
224. I.N.S.v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,956-57 (1983).
225. Clinton v. City ofNewYork, 118 S. Ct. 2091, 2095 (1998).
226. For example, national security lawmaking requirements often exclude the House of
Representatives. For example, treaties that require a two thirds vote by the Senate can obligate
the United States to spend funds despite the lack of House participation. See MOORE ET AL.,
supra note 192, at 795-96.
227. See HaroldJ. Krent, Delegation and its Discontents, Power Without Responsibility by David
Schoenbrod, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 710, 736 (1994) (book review) ("The Article I checks of bicam-
eralism and presentment apply only to rule-making by Congress itself.").
228. Presidential lawmaking takes many forms. The phenomenon includes inter alia Na-
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"our Constitution... refutes the idea that [the President] is to be a
lawmaker,"' the fact is that the President is far from bereft of law-
making power.'
tional Security Decision Directives and Presidential Decision Directives. See DYCUS ET AL., supra
note 203, at 48. Although typically carried out pursuant to statutory authorization, a handful of
non-routine Executive Orders have been promulgated without congressional authorization. See
id. See infra Part IV.A4.b (discussing the President's power to repeal treaties).
229. Youngstown Sheet &Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,587 (1952).
230. See THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 328 (John Jay) (Garry Wills ed., 1982) ("All constitu-
tional acts of power, whether in the executive or in the judicial department, have as much legal
validity and obligation as if they proceeded from the legislature."); United States v. Pink, 315
U.S. 203, 230 (1942) (citing Jay's remarks approvingly); HENKIN, supra note 149, at 56 (citing
President Truman's declaration of the right of the United States to exploit the natural re-
sources of the nation's continental shelf and President Washington's proclamation of neutrality
as examples of presidential actions that have had significant domestic legal repercussions);
Greene, supra note 156, at 183-84 (discussing how numerous presidential actions involve law-
making since they involve policy choices as do statutes); Philip B. Kurland, The Rise and Fall of
the Doctrine' of Separation of Powers, 85 MICH. L. REv. 592, 603 (1986) (stating that "it soon be-
comes apparent that it is necessary to government that sometimes the executive and sometimes
the judiciary has to create rules"); Christine E. Burgess, Note, When May a President Refuse to En-
force the Law?, 72 TEx. L. REV. 631, 651 (1994) (asserting that all three branches of government
"both make and interpret the law"); cf Krent, supra note 227, at 736 (commenting that the Ex-
ecutive is likely provided with "at least interstitial rule-making authority.... Judgments as to
what, when, and how to enforce the laws reflect significant public policy which unquestionably
influences future private conduct as well as the public fisc"); id. at 736-37 ("The Department of
Justice, by issuing merger guidelines.., shapes private conduct."); id. at 743 (articulating the
concept of "nonexclusivity of constitutional powers").
The Constitution
[i]nstead of allocating functions [prescribes a] relational arrangement among the
branches.... [I]n vesting "legislative powers" in Congress, the Constitution plausibly
refers to the power to initiate policy by passing laws .... [thereby not granting] Con-
gress the exclusive function of rule-making, but merely the authority to start the ball
rolling by passing a law.
Id. (citations omitted).
Presidential rule-making began with the First Congress. See id. at 738. The body authorized
military pensions to be provided "under such regulations as the President of the United States
may direct." See id. It also empowered executive officials to license "any proper person" to
trade with Indian Tribes under "such rules and regulations as the President shall prescribe."
See id.
One of the most famous examples of unilateral executive action was the Louisiana Purchase
in 1803. See MICHAEL P. RICCARDs, 1 THE FEROCIOUS ENGINE OF DEMOCRACY 63-64 (1995).
PresidentJefferson instructed his Secretary of State, James Madison, to negotiate and purchase
the territory. See id. The acquisition had enormous legal repercussions in both domestic and
international law. For instance, the Purchase had a major impact upon the structure of Ameri-
can government by more than doubling the nation's territory, paving the way for American
settlement of the Middle West and West and allowing the incorporation of scores of new states
into the Union. Likewise, by redefining American boundaries with Spain, Britain and Mexico,
the Purchase significantly altered international law as it affected the United States.
There has been no more dramatic exercise of presidential lawmaking power than the Eman-
cipation Proclamation issued by President Lincoln. See Michael H. LeRoy, Presidential Regula-
tion of Private Emrployment: Constitutionality of Executive Order 12,954 Debarment of Contractors who
Hire Permanent Striker Replacements, 37 B.C. L. REV. 300 (1996) (stating that when"[s]tripped to
its essentials," President Lincoln unilaterally "legislated slavery out of existence" in the areas
held by Confederate states). Not only did President Lincoln unilaterally make law, he in effect
unilaterally amended the Constitution since the document at that time had provisions that ad-
dressed the slavery issue. See id.4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (providing language acknowledg-
ing slavery) amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
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Courts have held that the President may conclude Executive
Agreements, which have the force of law, either with or without con-
gressional approval.23' The major case in this area is United States v.
Pink.2"2 The case involved a dispute over the validity of the 1933 Lit-
vinov Assignment, whereby President Roosevelt recognized the
U.S.S.R.23 The Court held invalid the state of New York's refusal to
recognize the Soviet Government and failure to enforce the Assign-
ment. The Court cited Curtiss-Wright's acknowledgment of the
President as the "sole organ" in national security. s5 It held that "[a]
treaty is a 'Law of the Land' under the supremacy clause... of the
Constitution. Such international compacts and agreements as the
Litvinov Assignment have a similar dignity."2 Thus, unilateral presi-
dential actions take precedence over contrary state law.
Some legal analysts argue that an executive agreement's legal su-
During World War II, President Roosevelt unilaterally created a host of executive agencies.
The legal basis for many such agencies consisted solely of his power as Commander in Chief.
See CORWIN, supra note 208, at 243. Included among these agencies was the National War La-
bor Board ("NWLB") which addressed labor disputes during the war. Professor Corwin stated:
"If any power can be said to be legislative in essence, it is surely [the creation of the NWLB]."
Id. at 245.
President Roosevelt's executive orders replaced several statutory regimes for regulating pri-
vate employment. See LeRoy, supra, at 241. Without any statutory authority, President Roose-
velt also established a minimum wartime workweek of forty-eight hours. See id. Meanwhile, the
power to issue regulations to enforce the order was delegated to the Chairman of the War
Manpower Commission by the President. See id. (citing Exec. Order. No. 9301, 8 Fed. Reg.
1825 (1943)). President Roosevelt also promulgated an executive order authorizing the Secre-
tary of the Navy to seize and operate General Cable Company's plant in NewJersey. See Exec.
Order No. 9220, 7 Fed. Reg. 6413 (1942). This action also occurred without citing any legisla-
tive authorization. See id.
There are other examples of unilateral presidential lawmaking. SeeAlexis Simendinger, The
Paper Wars, NAT'LJ., July 25, 1998, 1733 (citing President Nixon's levy of a 10% surcharge on
imports, and the imposition of a fee on imported oil by both President Ford and President Car-
ter via proclamation); cf. Theodore Olson, Presidential Lawmaking Powers: Vetoes, Line Item Vetoes,
Signing Statements, Executive Orders, and Delegations of Rulemaking Authority, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 543,
545-48 (1990) (listing 15 ways the President participates in the lawmaking process).
231. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 106, § 6.9, at 221 (discussing executive agreements
and acts of Congress).
That is not to say that by using his national security power to make and unmake laws the
President is basing his actions upon "Lockean prerogative." SeeJOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE
OF GOVERNMENT 198 (1993) (describing the power of the Executive"to act according to discre-
tion, for the public good, without the prescription of the law, and sometimes even against it, is
that which is called prerogative"); cf ARTHUR S. MILLER, PRESIDENTIAL POWER 200-28 (1977)
(discussing extra-constitutional power of the President justified by raison d'etat). Likewise, nei-
ther are such powers in the national security arena justified by the Rooseveltian "Stewardship"
model of presidential power. See THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 389 (1913)
(asserting that the President has power"to do anything that the needs of the Nation demanded
unless such action was forbidden by the Constitution or by the laws").
232. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
233. See id. at 211.
234. See id. at 230.
235. See id. at 229.
236. Id. at 230.
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periority over state laws may extend even to primacy over contrary
federal law. ProfessorsJohn Nowak and Ronald Rotunda contend that
the President's issuance of an Executive Agreement, if promulgated
pursuant to his national security powers, should prevail over existing
federal statutes.H7 They argue that "an executive agreement should
prevail over earlier Congressional enactments if the President is, in
fact, entering into an agreement pursuant to his exclusive presiden-
tial authority in the field of foreign relations."2' Their conclusion
could be interpreted as the President acting against the will of Con-
gress, thereby validating foreign policy actions taken by the President
within Justice Jackson's third category.
If this is indeed the case, then the President's creation of positive
law would involve the unilateral repeal of legislation enacted through
the Presentment Clause. As a result, while the President is limited by
the Presentment Clause to either approval or disapproval of purely
domestic legislation, this may not hold true concerning matters of
national security.
b. The President's power in national security includes the power of
repealing existing law
The effect of much Supreme Court precedent on the President's
unilateral national security power has been to legitimize the
"coordinate construction" 9 given the Constitution by the political
branches. The Court's refusal to decide Goldwater v. Carte40 on the
merits allowed the President to abrogate an existing treaty.24' In
237. SeeNOWAK& ROTUNDA, supra note 106, § 6.9, at 227.
238. Id.
239. See FISHER, supra note 1, at 231 (stating that the doctrine of"coordinate construction"
reflects the political branches' "authority and competence to engage in constitutional interpre-
tation, not only before the courts decide but afterwards as well").
240. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
241. Prior to President Carter's renunciation of the treaty with Taiwan, Presidents had ab-
rogated at least four treaties without congressional approval. See DYcus ET AL., supra note 203,
at 193 (discussing categorization of treaty termination and positing that the President actually
may have unilaterally abrogated as many as 13 treaties). Many commentators conclude that the
questions such as unilateral treaty abrogation have already been resolved through the doctrine
of coordinate construction. SeeFISHER, supra note 1, at 5-6 (contending that when courts refuse
to rule on the merits of a case, the interpretation given the Constitution by the two political
branches is the controlling interpretation).
Whether or not a President can amend a treaty without the "advice and consent" of the Sen-
ate is difficult to determine. The Reagan Administration, however, concluded that the Goldwa-
ter holding allowed the President to do just that. Much to the chagrin of the Senate, President
Reagan unilaterally reinterpreted the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with the U.S.S.R. See id. at
194 (discussing Reagan Administration's unilateral decision to reinterpret the ABM treaty to
allow for the development and testing of the Strategic Defense Initiative). The Supreme Court
arguably has upheld presidential reinterpretation of a treaty. See United States v. Alvarez-
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Goldwater, several Senators sued for declaratory and injunctive relief
against President Carter, who was planning to end the nation's mu-
tual defense treaty with Taiwan. The Court held that the case was
nonjusticiable because it involved the "authority of the President in
the conduct of our country's foreign relations. 2 42 This was because
the Court reasoned, "the effect of this action, as far as we can tell is
entirely external to the United States, and [falls] within the category
of foreign affairs.
2 43
In effect, the decision gave the President a free hand to terminate
existing treaties which had required not merely a majority vote in the
Senate, as normal legislation would demand, but a supermajority of
two thirds. Because treaties define legal relationships between the
peoples of different nations and are recognized as the "law of the
land"--essentially on par with that of statutes 2---the President is in
effect unilaterally redefining the law. The President, therefore, has
the power to unilaterally change the law despite prior congressional
action to the contrary: an action that likely falls within Justice Jack-
son's third category.
In order to navigate between the Chadha and City of New York hold-
ings, which conclude that the President cannot unilaterally repeal
law,245 and the national security case law stemming from Curtiss-
Wright, which indicates that indeed he can, 46 the Chadha and City of
New York holdings may have to be construed as referring only to do-
mestic spending legislation.247 Such a conclusion would seem to af-
firm the existence of National Security Rescission since such a meas-
Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 664 (1992) (upholding Bush administration's reinterpretation of ex-
tradition treaty to permit kidnapping of foreign national for trial).
242. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1002 (Rehnquist,J., concurring).
243. Id. at 1004-05.
244. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) (Marshall, C.J.) ("Our Constitu-
tion declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is consequently, to be regarded in courts of
justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, wherever it operates of itself, without the aid of
any legislative provision.").
245. See I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956-57 (1983); Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S.
Ct. 2091, 2095 (1998).
246. See Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 703-04 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (concluding that the
President may abrogate treaties absent congressional approval and stating that"[i]n the area of
foreign relations.., the constitutional commitment of powers to the President is notably com-
prehensive.... [and that] the powers conferred upon the President by Article II are general-
ized in a manner that bespeaks no such limitation upon foreign affairs power"), vacated, 444
U.S. 996 (1979). Although the lower court case was remanded to consider the Political Ques-
tion doctrine, the fact that the case was not decided on the merits, allowed it to retain persua-
sive authority. See, e.g., County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 646 n.10 (1978) (stating
that cases vacated for lack of standing retain persuasive authority within the jurisdiction until
the issue has been decided on the merits).
247. See Dycus ET AL., supra note 203, at 192 (discussing the incongruity between national
security lawmaking and the Chadha holding).
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ure likely empowers the President effectively to repeal statutory law.
It could be persuasively argued, however, that because appropria-
tions bills must meet the strictures of Presentment as defined in
Chadha and reaffirmed by Byrd and City of New York, then any altera-
tion of a spending bill is proper only when those changes are them-
selves satisfied through Presentment. For two reasons, however, such
a contention is arguable at best.
First, it should be noted that despite the allure of such a proposi-
tion, no such procedural symmetry exists with regard to treaty abro-
gation.248 As discussed above, in Goldwater, the Court essentially up-
held the unilateral repeal of a treaty by the President.2 9 The Court
reached its conclusion despite the fact that two thirds of the Senate
are required for a treaty to become law. Essentially, the Court allowed
national security law to be repealed without the law being presented
to the Senate for its approval.m
Second, a comparable withholding of funds has occurred
throughout the nation's history in the form of national security-
related impoundment. As shown below, the long history of im-
poundment provides the nexus between the expansive holdings on
presidential national security power and the President exercising Na-
tional Security Rescission power.
Past practice is especially important in national security where little
case law exists2s and where there exists an overlap of constitutional
authority.25' Then-Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist, during the
aforementioned Senate hearing, confirmed that, in the absence of
248. See Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 997 (allowing abrogation to stand by refusing to reach the
merits of the case).
249. See id. (allowing the President's action to stand by considering the matter a Political
Question).
250. This lack of symmetry also exists with respect to the appointment and dismissal of ex-
ecutive branch officials. These officials include such presidential appointments as cabinet sec-
retaries and ambassadors. While the appointments require the "advice and consent" of the
Senate, removal of such officials has no such requirement. See Randall H. Nelson, The Termina-
tion of Treaties and Executive Agreements by the United States: Theory and Practice, 42 MINN. L. REV.
879, 883 (1958) (discussing the case law on the subject and comparing the lack of symmetry in
the removal power to that of treaty abrogation).
251. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 519, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (remarking that "[a] judge, like an executive adviser, may be surprised at the pov-
erty of really useful and unambiguous authority applicable to concrete problems of executive
power as they actually present themselves").
252. See CORWIN, supra note 208, at 171 (stating that "the Constitution considered only for
its affirmative grants of powers capable of affecting the issue, is an invitation to struggle for the
privilege of directing American foreign policy"); id. at 127 (stating that "there are ... fields in
which.., congressional power and presidential prerogative merge into each other. One such
field is that of foreign relations .... another is that of expenditure"); cf NEUSTADT, supra note
106, at 29 (stating that the Constitutional Convention"created a government of separated insti-
tutions sharingpower").
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case law, the past practice of the executive and legislative branches
within the area of national security spending were controlling. "I
think you pretty well have to go to the history [of impoundment] and
the congressional and executive precedents, there just being no very
helpful cases .... 25'
B. Historical Practice Illustrates that the President's National Security Power
Extends to Effecting Spending Reductions
1. Custom adds a "gloss" of legitimacy to long-standing executive actions
The Supreme Court has consistently held that custom is highly
relevant in determining whether the interplay between the two po-
litical branches passes constitutional muster.24 Custom in this man-
253. See 1971 Hearings, supra note 17, at 233 (testimony of William H. Rehnquist);EDwARD
S. CORWIN, ESSAYS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 263 (Robert G. McCloskey ed., 1957) (stating that
"when two departments both operate upon the same subject matter .... [T]he question is what
does the pertinent historical record show with regard to presidential action in the field of congres-
sional power?").
254. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 66 (1981) (stating that interpretation of the Con-
stitution by other branches is often controlling); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686
(1981) (stating "long and continued practice raises presumption of congressional consent");
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974) ("In the performance of assigned constitu-
tional duties each branch of the Government must initially interpret the Constitution, and the
interpretation of its powers by any branch is due great respect from the others."); The Pocket
Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 689 (1929) ("Long settled and established practice is a consideration
of great weight in a proper interpretation of constitutional provisions of this character [veto
power]."); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 119, 136 (1926) (acknowledging the importance
of "acquiescence which was promptly accorded... [and] universally recognized"); BANKS &
RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 32, at 115 (stating that"custom is evidence of the political branches'
joint interpretation of the President's constitutional or statutory authority"); Louis FISHER,
PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: POWER AND POLICY 36 (1972) (quoting President Taft as stating
"[s]o strong is the influence of custom that it seems almost to amend the Constitution");cf
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969) ("The relevancy of prior [practices] is limited
largely to the insight they afford in correctly ascertaining the draftsmen's intent. Obviously,
therefore the precedential value of these cases tends to increase in proportion to their proxim-
ity to the Convention in 1787."); id. at 546-47 (stating that simply because "an unconstitutional
action has been taken before surely does not render that same action any less unconstitutional
at a later date"). But see I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (ruling legislative veto un-
constitutional despite 50 years of practice); AbnerJ. Mikva & Michael F. Hertz, Impoundment of
Funds-the Courts, the Congress and the President: a Constitutional Triangle, 69 Nw. U. L. REV. 335,
345 (1974) (arguing that congressional acquiescence to impoundment in past grants it no le-
gitimacy).
Although it is generally accepted that the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the constitu-
tional interpretation, see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (stating that
"[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is"),
all three branches necessarily engage in such interpretation. See FISHER, supra note 1, at 233
(describing how the political branches are the exclusive interpreters of constitutional "political
questions" and how executive-legislative customs are generally accepted by the courts). See gen-
eraiy id. at 231-74 (providing a thorough discussion of "coordinate construction").
For commentary challenging the judicial monopoly on constitutional construction, see
TRIBE, supra note 17, at 34. Presidents Jefferson and Jackson believed that no law could "go
into force unless all three branches agree that it is constitutional." Frank H. Easterbrook,Presi-
dential rview, 40 CASEW. RES. L. REv. 905, 910 (1990).
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ner reflects the coordinate construction given the Constitution by the
two branches. Justice Frankfurter, in his concurrence in Young-
stown,255 described the role of custom as "a systematic, unbroken, ex-
ecutive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and
never before questioned... may be treated as a gloss on 'executive
power' vested in the President."2 Such a conclusion has a long
257progeny. For example, the Court in Mistretta v. United StatesY
quoted Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in declaring that
"'traditional ways of conducting government ... give meaning' to the
Constitution."259 Consequently, long-standing congressional defer-
ence to the President concerning the impoundment of national se-
curity-related funds has added a gloss of legitimacy to the practice.2 60
As stated above, because enhanced rescission prevents funds from
being expended, it is a subset of impoundment.26' When exercised
within a national security context, enhanced rescission, is actually
more constitutionally sound than pre-ICA impoundment.262 Whereas
national security-related impoundment usually occurred without
formal congressional approval,2 or in some cases with at least some
measure of informal congressional disapproval, 26 enhanced rescis-
255. 343 U.S. 579,593 (1952).
256. Id. at 611 (FrankfurterJ., concurring).
257. See supra note 254 (providing long history of case law confirming the importance of
traditional interpretations of powers between the two branches).
For a trenchant critique of interpreting congressional acquiescence to Executive action, see
Johnson v. Santa Clara, 480 U.S. 616, 672 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (concluding that con-
gressional inaction may result from any number of reasons: "(1) approval of the status quo, as
opposed to (2) inability to agree upon how to alter the status quo, (3) unawareness of the status
quo, (4) indifference to the status quo, or even (5) political cowardice").
258. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
259. Id. at 401.
260. The discussion below does not discuss the foreign affairs statutes cited in Field and in
City of New York. Since Parts III.B.2 and 3 address these statutes as they relate to National Secu-
rity Rescission, Part IV.B.1 will not discuss them further.
261. See supra note 32 (providing definition of impoundment in relation to enhanced re-
scission).
262. "Pre-ICA impoundment" refers to presidential impoundment occurring before the
practice was restricted by the Impoundment Control Act of 1974. Although almost all notable
pre-ICA impoundments involved ajustification on national security grounds, there are notable
instances where funds were impounded by the President based predominantly on anotherjusti-
fication. See FISHER, supra note 37, at 176-77 (describing President Nixon's use of non-
mandatory statutory language as a justification for impoundment); infra note 280 (discussing
pre-ICA impoundment that was notjustified on national security grounds).
263. See Byrd v. Raines, 956 F. Supp. 25, 29 (D.D.C.),vacated, 117 S. Ct. 2312, 2322 (1997)
(discussing history of impoundments and rescission).
264. See infra note 294 and accompanying text (providing examples of the disapproval con-
gressional committees have displayed toward presidential impoundment). Moreover, the very
fact that Congress passed the spending bills in the first place indicated that body's intent to
have the funds spent. As a result, nearly all non-statutory impoundment before 1974 would
appear to fall within Justice Jackson's third category. See Figure No. 1, supra p. 1316. It could
be argued, however, that because Congress did not respond to these impoundments by reen-
acting the original spending bills, then Congress was acquiescing to the President's actions and,
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sion power is specifically granted to the President by Congress
through the Line Item Veto Act.2 Thus, as opposed to national se-
curity-related impoundment, which would have likely occurred
within Justice Jackson's latter two categories, National Security Re-
scission power squarely fits within his first scenario. That such can-
cellations are carried out pursuant to the President's national secu-
rity powers and lie along the National Security Vector would appear
to render them all but inviolate.2w As a result, because the presiden-
tial practice of impounding national security-related funds has been
legitimized through long standing practice, the lesser power of Na-
tional Security Rescission should have been all the more constitu-
tional. 67
2. The historical practice of presidential national security-related
impoundment has the "gloss" of legitimacy
In the past, the majority of presidential impoundments have oc-
curred in the field of national security or been justified as such.2  In
either case, the two branches have typically resolved conflict of this
sort through political accommodation rather than adjudication. Pro-
fessor Arthur Schlesinger summed up pre-ICA impoundment well,
observing that historically it "held a minor status in law and cus-
tom.
269
therefore, the President was acting withinJustice Jackson's second scenario.
265. See S. REP. No. 104-13, at 2 (19 95);supra notes 175-79 (discussing the President acting
pursuant to enhanced rescission as falling within JusticeJackson's first category).
266. See Figure No. 1, supra p. 1316. Examples of national security-related impoundment
also fall along the National Security Vector under either Scenario 2 or 3. See supra note 264 for
additional discussion about national security impoundment in relation to Justice Jackson's
categorization of presidential action.
267. While enhanced rescission may appear at first blush to be the greater power, upon
closer examination pre-ICA impoundment proves to be more formidable. With enhanced re-
scission, the President was empowered to reshape laws in a formal sense by irrevocably render-
ing statutory provisions legally invalid. In so doing, the President was bound to his decision.
His action could only be overturned by passage of another separate statute. On the other
hand, a President exercising non-statutory impoundment could effectively reshape laws to his
liking and then change his mind at a later date. Moreover, unlike enhanced rescission, which
created a process where Congress could overturn presidential action, impoundment was akin
to an absolute veto since Congress could not overturn such an action. Finally, enhanced rescis-
sion is an all-or-nothing proposition. The President could cancel all of the funds involved in a
provision or he could cancel none. With pre-statutory impoundment the President could re-
duce spending to any level he wanted.
Ultimately, the law in this regard elevates form over function. Whereas, the formal, statuto-
rily delegated power of enhanced rescission has been struck down, the informal, undelegated,
and more powerful vehicle of pre-statutory impoundment appears to have constitutional le-
gitimacy. SeeByrd 956 F. Supp. at 29.
268. See Mikva & Hertz, supra note 254, at 336 (noting that presidential impoundments in
the past received little objection due to their military nature).
269. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 221, at 235. Even Judge Thomas Jackson in Byrd acknowl-
edged the different types of presidential impoundment. See Byrd, 956 F. Supp. at 29. In par-
THE LINE ITEM VETO ACT
Although President Washington was granted great leeway in allo-
cating monies in 1789,270 1790,271 and 1791,27 President Jefferson ap-
pears to be the first President to have actually impounded funds. In
his first message to Congress in 1802, Jefferson announced that he
would refuse to spend the money Congress had appropriated to
build several fortifications. 3 Jefferson deemed them wasteful and
apparently not essential to national security, so he unilaterally acted
to "suspend and slacken the expenditures., 274  During that year, Jef-
ferson, without congressional authorization, refused to spend the ap-
propriated funds and Congress never reappropriated them.275  The
following year, Jefferson deferred 76 spending funds on fifteen gun-
ticular, he recognized the distinction between the past practice of national security-
impoundment for foreign policy reasons and for less valid political reasons:
[Presidents] have managed to exert their will by impounding... funds. In some in-
stances, Presidents have refused to spend money on measures that have conflicted
with their foreign policy objectives, or that would advance an unconstitutional pur-
pose. Most of the time, however, President's simply preferred not to spend the money
for the purposes for which Congress has allocated it.
Id. Judge Jackson's language, therefore, distinguished between foreign and domestic im-
poundments while hinting at the latter's legitimacy.
270. See Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 23, § 1, 1 Stat. 95 (providing "lump sums" for among
other things the civil list, the department of war and pensions for invalids).
271. SeeAct of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 4, § 1, 1 Stat. 104 (providing"lump sums" for among other
things the civil list, the department of war and pensions for invalids).
272. See Act of Feb. 11, 1791, ch. 6, 1 Stat. 190 (providing "lump sums" for among other
things the civil list, the department of war and pensions for invalids).
273. See McDonald, supra note 17, at 6 (discussingJefferson's use of impoundment).
274. Id.
275. See id. Although he did not attend the Constitutional Convention, Jefferson was obvi-
ously a contemporary of the Framers. Despite serving as a Minister to France during the Con-
vention, he was far from inactive in the debate over the Ratification of the Constitution. See
JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 176, 197 (1996) (discussing Madison's interaction with
Jefferson during the ratification of the Constitution).
The Supreme Court has held consistently that the construction given the Constitution by the
Framers and their contemporaries, and subsequently followed, is highly persuasive in deter-
mining an act's constitutionality. In Burrow-Gies Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, the Supreme Court
held that "[t]he construction placed upon the Constitution... by the men who were contem-
porary with its formation ... is of itself entitled to very great weight, and when it is remembered
that the rights thus established have not been disputed during a period of nearly a century, it is
almost conclusive." 111 U.S. 53, 57 (1884); see alsoJ.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States,
276 U.S. 394, 412 (1928) (declaring through Chief Justice Taft that"contemporaneous legisla-
tive exposition of the Constitution when the founders of our Government and the framers of
our Government were actively participating in public affairs.., fixes the construction to be
given to its provisions"); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 621 (1842) (concluding
that "contemporaneous expositions of the Constitution," by the Framers bolster long acquies-
cence in construction).
Because President Jefferson was an influential contemporary of the actual Framers, his im-
poundments should be granted the Framer's "gloss." See supra Part IV.B.1 (discussing the im-
portant role played by tradition in presidential-congressional relations). Even after the Im-
poundment Control Act, the President's impoundment powers were not stripped from him.
See infra notes 333-34 (discussing continued presidential impoundment after the ICA).
276. The term "defer" is used in generally the same sense as it is in the ICA. See 2 U.S.C.
§ 682(1) (defining deferral as "withholding or delaying the obligation or expenditure of
budget authority... provided for projects or activities"). Since President Jefferson eventually
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boats. 7 Although Congress had appropriated $50,000 for their con-
struction Jefferson withheld the funds in light of changed national
security circumstances.2
280After a period of relative dormancy, non-statutory impoundment
was resurrected in the months before the nation's entry into World
War II. InJanuary 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt announced
he would decline to spend funds for public works since he felt they
would detract from the war effort.281 Over the next three years, Roo-
sevelt impounded nearly $500 million in public works spending.282
As with President Jefferson's actions, President Roosevelt's im-
poundment of funds did not begin when the United States was offi-
cially at war, nor did his actions have significant statutory justifica-
tion.8 Unlike his predecessor's impoundments, however, the actions
taken by President Roosevelt went far beyond strict national security-
related spending. He impounded funds for such domestic projects as
the construction of roads, harbors and dams.8 4
spent the money for the warships, "defer" is the proper term.
277. See Comment, Impoundment of Funds, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1505, 1508 n.7 (1973) (giving
the history of President Jefferson's refusal to spend appropriated money and the Nixon Ad-
ministration's misplaced reliance on this precedent) [hereinafter Impoundment of Funds].
278. See Act of Feb. 28, 1803, ch. 11, § 3, 2 Stat. 206 (legislating that the President is
.authorized and empowered" to build "a number not exceeding fifteen gunboats").
279. The Louisiana Purchase had recently given the United States both sides of the Missis-
sippi. See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 14 (1803). President Jefferson stated that "[t]he favorable and
peaceable turn of affairs on the Mississippi rendered immediate execution of that law unneces-
sary...." See id. This fact reduced the likelihood of war with Spain, see McDonald, supra note
12, at 5, which in Jefferson's view, obviated the immediate need for the vessels. See S. REP. NO.
104-9, at 3 (1995) (stating thatJefferson withheld the money because he considered the vessels'
use unnecessary). Following apparent congressional acquiescence to his action, the next year
he announced to Congress: "The act of Congress of February 28, 1803, for building and em-
ploying a number of gunboats, is now in a course of execution to the extent there provided
for." SCHLESINGER, supra note 221, at 235.
280. There were limited examples of impoundment between the early nineteenth century
and the 1940's. After President Jefferson's impoundments the next President to impound
funds appears to have been James Buchanan. He punished representatives from Illinois by
withholding funds from their districts which were earmarked for post offices and public build-
ings. See FISHER, supra note 17, at 91.
In 1876, President Grant impounded harbor funds in a river and harbor bill that he thought
did not serve the good of the country. See Krasnow, supra note 16, at 599. During the Great
Depression, Presidents Hoover and Roosevelt were granted far-ranging budgetary authority
which could be construed as impoundment power. SeeFISHER, supra note 37, at 40.
281. See Louis Fisher, The Politics of Impounded Funds, 15 ADM. SCI. Q. 361, 364 (1970). See
generally Impoundment of Funds, supra note 277, at 1508 n.7 (discussing the various rationales for
presidential impoundment). It could be argued that these impoundments by President Roose-
velt were made for broad political and economic motives unrelated to national security. See id.
at 1509 n.14.
282. See Fisher, supra note 281, at 365 (providing additional detail on presidential im-
poundment of military spending).
283. See 1971 Hearings, supra note 17, at 378 (submission of ProfessorJ.D. Williams, entitled
The Impounding of Funds by the Bureau of the Budget).
284. See id. (describing particular impoundments of funds for specific public works proj-
ects). Despite President Roosevelt's justification for the impoundments based on the war ef-
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Following World War II, President Truman and Congress sparred
over military spending. The major source of discord was the size of
the Air Force.ss While Congress generally sided with Pentagon offi-
cials, believing that the nation's defense capabilities should be in-
creased, the administration opposed such measures. s In 1948, Con-
gress increased the President's Air Force budget by $822 million,
287
yet the spending was made contingent on the President's finding that
the sum was necessary to national defense.s President Truman did
not deem the spending to be imperative and he refused to spend the
appropriated funds.2
Congress proved less pliant the next year. While President Tru-
man's budget requested funding sufficient for the maintenance of a
forty-eight group Air Force, the House believed a fifty-eight group to
be necessary.2° An impasse in conference occurred when the Senate
agreed with the President and proved reluctant to provide for the ten
extra groupsY.' An informal understanding between the President
and Congress resolved the deadlock and the bill granted the Secre-
tary of Defense the discretion to spend the extra funds if he wished. 2 '
President Truman signed the bill only after announcing that he had
placed the additional Air Force funds on reserve.29 These funds to-
taled $735 million and were never spent."
In 1949, Truman also impounded funds for construction of the
fort, members of Congress quickly grew frustrated with his actions. In 1943, Senators Carl
Hayden and Kenneth McKellar attempted to insert mandatory spending language into a sec-
tion of the Rural Post Roads Act. See id. at 387-91 (reporting the legislative process the Senate
used to enact impoundment language). Once the bill reached conference, however, the
House members persuaded the Senate to drop the language. See Fisher, supra note 280, at 365.
McKellar met with the same lack of success when he tried a similar tactic later that year. See id.
Ultimately, Congress, as it had with President Jefferson, acquiesced to the impoundments. See
id.
285. SeeAbascal & Kramer, supra note 4, at 1611.
286. See id.






293. Se id. at 367.
294. See id. The House Appropriations Committee considered Truman's action as an af-
front to their authority. See Department of Defense Appropriations for 1951: Hearings on H.R. 1292
Before the Comm. on Appropriations, 81st Cong. 52-55 (1950), cited in Stassen, supra note 221, at
1185-86 n.133 (reporting the dialogue between Congress and Secretary of Defense Johnson
regarding the power of impoundment by the President). President Truman's Secretary of De-
fense, Louis Johnson was forced to defend the impoundment before a hearing of the House
Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense. See id. Without statutoryjustification, he was forced
to contend that such an action was based on the "inherent authority vested in the Commander
in Chief and the President." Id. at 1186.
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aircraft carrier, the U.S.S. United States2 5 The initial estimate for the
carrier's construction was $189 million, however, others ranged as
high as $500 million.f6 For economic reasons and to quell interserv-
ice rivalry, Truman canceled construction of the carrier. 2 7  He
agreed, alternatively, to approve construction of a more modest car-
rierf 8
President Eisenhower carried on the Executive tradition of with-
holding funds for weapons systems he thought unnecessary. In 1956,
he impounded $46.4 million targeted for Marine Corps personnel
strength.m That same year, the Department of Defense refused to
spend appropriated funds for the construction of twenty superfort
bombers."' Two years later, it was the Army's turn to feel the pinch
of impoundment. The service sought $6 billion dollars to fund the
Nike-Zeus antimissile system.l The Army found opposition, how-
ever, in the Secretary of Defense, who concluded that more research
was necessary before production should begin.32 Congress, however,
thought otherwise and the following year appropriated $137 million
for the initial Nike-Zeus procurement."" Eisenhower in turn coun-
tered congressional action by impounding the funds pending results
from further tests.m In January, 1960, Eisenhower finally defused the
conflict by announcing that the funds would be released for contin-
ued development but not for production.305
295. See Fisher, supra note 281, at 367.
296. See id.
297. See id., at 368.
298. See id. Two other lesser known impoundments occurred during the Truman presi-
dency. In 1950, the Department of Defense canceled the aircraft carrier Forrestal after funds
had already been appropriated. See Hearings on the National Military Establishment Bill for 1950
Before The Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 81st Cong. 328 (1949) (testimony of Secretary of the
Air Force). In addition, at the end of the Korean War, President Truman impounded funds
earmarked for the construction of veterans hospitals. See 1971 Hearings, supra note 17, at 237
(statement of Sen. Ervin).
299. See 1971 Hearings, supra note 17, at 301 (memorandum of Mary Louise Ramsey, Im-
poundment by the Executive Department of Funds Which Congress has Authorized it to Spend or Obligate).
300. See 1973 Hearings, supra note 31, at 98 (statement of Elmer Staats, Comptroller General
of the United States).
301. SeeFisher, supra note 281, at 368.
302. See id.
303. See id. at 368-69.
304. See id. at 369.
305. See id. Like Truman, Eisenhower also impounded funds for veterans. See 1971 Hear-
ings, supra note 17, at 339 (statement of Sen. Ervin) (referring to Memorandum to the President:
Authority to Reduce Expenditures). In 1959, President Eisenhower signed a bill providing addi-
tional funds for housing loans for veterans. See id. An additional $100 million in funds for di-
rect loans was added by Congress to the program. See id. The President noted that such loans
were to be restricted to areas where private capital was not available, emphasizing that the Vet-
erans Administration would "exercise maximum caution" in making such loans until an accu-
rate determination of available private capital could be made. See id.
During that same year, Eisenhower impounded $37 million for increased Army moderiza-
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President Kennedy followed the actions of his predecessors and
became embroiled in an impoundment controversy of his own. In
1961, the Kennedy Administration requested $200 million for the B-
70 strategic bombers  (later named the RS-70 weapon system) 3
7
Nevertheless, Congress went ahead and appropriated $380 million
for the plane." Believing that intercontinental ballistic missile tech-
nology eliminated the need for new bombers, Kennedy refused to
spend the additional $180 million.
Kennedy's refusal drew the ire of the powerful House Armed Serv-
ices Committee Chairman Carl Vinson. In 1962, Vinson's committee
drafted statutory language for fiscal 1963 which stated that "the Sec-
retary of the Air Force, as an official of the executive branch, is di-
rected, ordered, mandated, and required to utilize... $491 mil-
lion... 'for an RS-70 weapon system 10-a full $320 million above
the Administrations request."' The Committee's use of the term
"directed" caused much unease within the executive branch.1 2 Presi-
dent Kennedy responded in a letter that "the full powers and discre-
tions [sic] essential to the faithful execution of [my] responsibilities
as President and Commander in Chief' dictated that such language
was unacceptable. 33
After the President's letter was sent, tension between the two
branches was eased by a conciliatory meeting between the President
and the Chairman.1 4 President Kennedy expressed to Vinson his
view that the word "authorized" was unsuitable for an appropriations
bill and requested its elimination.1 5 Vinson, who was also facing po-
tion, $11 million in speeding work on Regulus submarines, $48 million for an increase in the
Hound Dog missile program, $90 million for an increase in the Minuteman program, $55.6
million in additional KC-135 tankers, and $140 million for additional strategic airlift aircraft.
See 1971 Hearings, supra note 17, at 301 (memorandum of Mary Louise Ramsey, Impoundment by
the Executive Department of Funds Which Congress has Authorized it to Spend or Obligate). The next
year he impounded $43.1 million for maintaining Marine Corps strength at 200,000, $35 mil-
lion in advance procurement for nuclear-powered car, and $12.2 million for National Guard
construction. See id. For fiscal year 1961, Eisenhower impounded $97 million for additional
fighter aircraft for air defense, and $4 million for Army Reserve construction. Seeid.
306. See Fisher, supra note 281, at 369.
307. See Gerald W. Davis, Congressional Power to Require Defense Expenditures, 33 FORDHAM L.
REV. 39, 39 (1964).
308. See Fisher, supra note 281, at 369.
309. See id.; see also L. Gordon Crovitz, Introduction to PORK BARRELS AND PRINCIPLES, supra
note 12, at x (explaining how past presidents have used absolute veto over spending provi-
sions).
310. H.R. 9751, 87th Cong. (1962), cited in Davis, supra note 307, at 40.
311. See Fisher, Funds Impounded by the President, supra note 32, at 128.
312. See id.
313. See id.
314. See Stassen, supra note 221, at 1166 (discussing the resolution of the conflict between
the President and the Chairman over the bill's statutory language).
315. See Fisher, Funds Impounded by the President, supra note 32, at 128-29.
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litical pressure from the House Appropriations Committee, agreed to
the President's request.
36
Like his predecessors, President Johnson impounded funds allot-
ted for weapons systems, but he expanded the use impoundment to
include domestic funds.1 7 In 1965, the Navy requested that a third
nuclear-powered guided missile ship, a DLGN, be constructed."1 8 Al-
though the Department of Defense declined the request, Congress
nonetheless authorized $150.5 million to build the frigate.3 9 The
Department of Defense, at the behest of the President, took advan-
tage of weak language in the authorizing statutes" and refused to re-
lease the necessary funds for the Navy to begin construction.3 Only
after more than three years and significant strife between Congress
and the President did PresidentJohnson finally acquiesce and release
the funds to build the shipssss
PresidentJohnson's recasting of the impoundment would be taken
even further by his successor.ss Unlike previous Presidents, who used
impoundment outside of the defense arena sparingly, President
Nixon took the modest prerogative and pulled it far from its moor-
ings. His administration asserted a constitutional power to impound
any funds and the administration attempted to terminate programs
through such action. 4 For instance, in 1973 alone, Nixon attempted
to impound some $12 billion in appropriated funds.325 Included in
316. SeeStassen, supra note 221, at 1166-67 (describing political situation at the time of the
conflict); cf HENKIN, supra note 149, at 113 (discussing limits of congressional power to regu-
late executive activity through appropriations and stating that Presidents have disregarded rid-
ers with instructions for American delegations sent to international conferences).
317. In 1966, theJohnson Administration reduced the available obligations for the highway
trust fund and other programs for housing and urban development, health, education and wel-
fare, agriculture and the interior. See 1973 Hearings, supra note 31, at 98 (testimony of Elmer B.
Staats, Comptroller General of the United States).
318. SeeStassen, supra note 221, at 1169.
319. See id. at 1170.
320. See H.R. REP. No. 89-1679, at 2 (1966), in BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 32, at 81
(stating that the authorizing statute required that"the contract for the construction of the ...
frigate ... shall be entered into as soon as practicable unless the President fully advises the
Congress that its construction is not in the national interest").
321. SeeStassen, supra note 221, at 1170.
322. See id. at 1169-76.
323. As President Roosevelt had done before him, President Johnson also impounded
funds outside what generally would be thought of as the national security arena. In 1966,John-
son impounded $5.3 billion to reduce inflation prompted by military spending in Vietnam.
The funds were earmarked for highways, housing, education, agriculture, health, and welfare.
See Stephen Glazier, The Line-Item Veto: Provided in the Constitution and Traditionally Applied, in
PoRK BARRELS AND PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, at 13. During the Johnson Administration, the
color of impoundment began to change and assume a more expansive nature. See Stanton,
supra note 32, at 27 (1974).
324. See FISHER, supra note 37, at 176-77 (describing unprecedented scope of Nixon's im-
poundments in denying spending to programs).
325. See Crovitz, supra note 309, at x.
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these funds were $6 billion of an $11 billion sewage treatment bill
which Congress had passed over his veto. 6  His actions prompted
several lawsuits s2' and ultimately the enactment of the ICA32 8 in
1974.'2
In virtually every instance of pre-ICA impoundment, the President
withheld funds based at least in part on his national security powers.
Even one as generally apprehensive about Executive aggrandizement
as Professor Schlesinger asserted: "It could be contended... that
military impoundment-Jefferson's in 1803, Roosevelt's in 1941 and
thereafter, Truman's in 1949, Kennedy's refusal in 1961 ... even ar-
guably Johnson's in 1967-fell within the legitimate powers of the
Commander in Chief."3ss In response to the President's actions,
Congress usually acquiesced, albeit grudgingly, to his actions. Such
acquiescence, as the case law demonstrates, has added a "gloss" to
executive power.
Others have argued that the gloss encasing presidential impound-
ment was removed by the passage of the ICA since the act broke the
continuity of the practice. 32 This argument, however, is not as con-
vincing as it may appear at first blush. The ICA, did not end presi-
dential impoundment power, it merely brought it within statutory
326. See id.
327. See, e.g., City of New York v. Train, 494 F.2d 1033, 1039-50 (D.C. Cir. 1974), affd, 420
U.S. 35 (1975) (holding on statutory grounds that executive branch must release full allotment
of funds).
328. Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 1974 U.S.C.CAN. (88 Stat.)
326 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 1512 (c) (2) (1994)).
329. See FISHER, supra note 37, at 177.
330. SCHLESINGER, supra note 221, at 236. Dr. Fisher has hinted at agreement with Profes-
sor Schlesinger's conclusion. See FISHER, supra note 254, at 127 ("In the area of defense pro-
curement, in particular, the President could deny that Congress has the power to deprive him
of his judgment and discretion in the administration of programs and in the management of
funds."); supra note 206 (providing examples distinguishing between national security and
other forms of pre-ICA impoundment); cf. Davis, supra note 307, at 60 (concluding that Con-
gress has the power to require expenditure of funds for defense purposes, but that it does not
have power over "unyielding" presidential opposition); Sally Weinraub, The Impoundment Ques-
ion-An Overview, 40 BROOK. L. REv. 342, 360 (1973) (stating that"[a] conflict between Con-
gress and the President on the issue of impoundments in the realm of foreign affairs would be
difficult to resolve"). But seeStassen, supra note 221, at 1186 (arguing that because impounding
is an effort to control the national economy, the President does not have the constitutional
authority to disregard congressional will and impound funds for defense systems).
Assuming arguendo that impoundment based on the President's Commander in Chief pow-
ers is unconstitutional, the argument that the Line Item Veto Act would have granted the
President such power would not be diminished since with National Security Rescission, the
President is acting pursuant to congressional approval. See supra notes 175-79 (arguing that
National Security Rescission falls withinJusticeJackson's first category).
331. SeeYoungstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) (stating that the long-standing practice, which has not been challenged by Con-
gress, constitutes a "gloss" on the executive power afforded by the Constitution).
332. See BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 32, at 97 (contending that unilateral im-
poundment by the President was curtailed after the ICA).
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bounds. To be sure, impoundment was circumscribed, but it was not
terminated. The name of the act should provide some indication of
this. The legislation was entitled the "Impoundment Control Act,"
not the "Impoundment Repeal Act." '333 Moreover, since the ICA,
Presidents have actually impounded more funds than before.s4 Fi-
nally, the Line Item Veto Act amended the ICA and formally granted
the President additional statutory impoundment powers in the form
of enhanced rescission authority. To the extent that the ICA cur-
tailed impoundment power, it was largely re-granted, albeit imper-
fectly, in the form of the Line Item Veto Act, thus restoring the gloss
to its previous luster. As a result, the practice of impounding funds
for national security reasons remains coated by a gloss of legiti-
335macy.
This section has argued that since Curtiss-Wright,36 the Court has
consistently ruled that the President may exercise Olympian powers
in the national security realm. As demonstrated in Figure 1, the
President's national security power, which is distinct from his domes-
tic powers, carries with it a greater likelihood of constitutionality. In-
cluded in this national security power is the unilateral ability both to
enact and repeal law.33 7 Accordingly, the combination of the Curtiss-
Wright case law coupled with past practice of national security-related
impoundment amounts to the equivalent of the President exercising
National Security Rescission. Under the Line Item Veto Act, the
President would have been exercising such power with the explicit
approval of Congress, bolstering further the argument in favor ofju-
dicial recognition of National Security Rescission.
333. For instance, in 1990, President Bush, in accordance with ICA, announced the im-
poundment of $200 million for the Navy V-22 Osprey helicopter. See BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN,
supra note 32, at 84. Congress responded under the Act by pressuring the Department of De-
fense to spend the funds. See id. President Bush's action, though ultimately unsuccessful,
nonetheless reflects impoundment's continued role in defense spending.
334. See FISHER, supra note 37, at 200 (observing that number of policy impoundments ac-
tually increased under President Ford); cf. Louis FISHER, THE POLrrICS OF SHARED POWER 86
(1981) (describing the phenomenon of "quasi-impoundments," which occur when programs
are purposely delayed due to the slow processing of applications, the frequent change of
agency regulations, the rejection of applications for minor, technical shortcomings and other
subtle forms of administrative obstruction).
335. The President's customary power of impounding funds also refutes another challenge
to the legitimacy of national security-related impoundments: the argument that national secu-
rity-related impoundments, and by extension, the National Security Rescission, could only be
exercised during wartime. Such an argument is easily dismissed. As discussed above, none of
the presidential impoundments of national security-related funds began while the nation was
officially at war. While the President's powers are at their zenith during wartime, even during
times of peace his national security powers have proved nothing short of formidable.
336. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
337. See supra Part IV.A.4 (discussing the President's unilateral power to enact and repeal
law within the national security realm).
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V. ARGUMENTS AGAINST NATIONAL SECURIY RESCISSION
A. The Four Arguments that the President's National Security Power Would
Not Have Extended to Reducing National Security-Related Spending Are
Unpersuasive
1. Decisions involving the expenditure offunds are not within the scope of
the President's national security power
It could be argued that decisions involving the expenditure of
funds lie outside the parameters of the President's national security
power. Some have argued, for example, that the Framers intended
the Commander in Chief's power to involve only substantive military
matters." Under this view, the President's power would be limited
strictly within these confines and he would have no responsibility for
national security-related spending.
Such an interpretation of presidential powers falls short of the
mark for three main reasons. First, such an interpretation runs di-
rectly counter to both precedents" and practice. °  As the Curtiss-
Wright line of cases has demonstrated, the President's national secu-
rity power extends far beyond military details to include other
weighty duties such as the nation's diplomacy.34' Furthermore, as dis-
cussed below, 2 presidents from the time of Jefferson have refused to
338. See THE FEDERALIST No. 69, supra note 12, at 350 (Hamilton) (stating that the Presi-
dent's Commander in Chief powers "amount to nothing more than the supreme command
and direction of the military and naval forces, as first General and Admiral of the Confeder-
acy"). While at first this passage may appear damning, the author, Alexander Hamilton was not
a little disingenuous in his assessment of the President's powers. As the tenor of No. 69 betrays,
at the time he was vigorously advocating adoption of the Constitution. In so doing, he was try-
ing to allay fears of military dictatorship. See id. As such, Hamilton's true views on executive
power were not fully displayed during the Ratification Debate. See, e.g. FORREST MCDONALD,
THEAMERICAN PRESIDENCY: ANINTELLECTUAL HISTORY 207 (1994) (stating that concerning the
Presidency, Hamilton "had more in mind [regarding executive power] than he set down on
paper in 1788 .... (H]e viewed executive authority as being extensive.").
In another view, the words of the Framers actually reaffirm that the President should have
significant discretion over national security spending. While the Framers were concerned
about military dictatorship, they realized that the Commander in Chief needed discretion.
From their experience with the Continental Congress during the Revolutionary War, and un-
der the Articles of Confederation, the Framers were wary of leaving discretion in the hands of
Congress. Thus, they purposely changed the constitutional language from "make war" to
"declare war." See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 318-19 (Max Farrand
ed., 1937); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 72, supra note 174, at 366 (Hamilton) (stating that
"administration of government.., is limited to executive details, and falls... within the prov-
ince of the executive department").
339. See supra Part IVA (discussing the expansive holdings in national security case law).
340. See supra Part IV.B (discussing history of presidential impoundment in national secu-
rity realm).
341. See, e.g., United Statesv. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936) (stating that
President is the "sole organ" of American diplomacy).
342. See supra Part IV.B.
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spend national security-related funds, thus granting such refusals a
degree of legitimacy. 3
Second, in order to maintain control over his constitutional pre-
rogatives, the President must have some discretion over how certain
appropriated funds are spent. The expenditure of funds can never
be divorced from political functions because meaningful action can
never be taken without it. Alexander Hamilton recognized this fact
when he stated, "[mioney is with propriety considered as the vital
principle of the body politic; as that which sustains its life and mo-
tion, and enables it to perform its most essential functions." This is
as true in national security as it is in domestic policy. Thus, a persua-
sive argument could be made that to the extent the President is pro-
tecting his "essential function" as the "sole organ" of national secu-
rity, 45 even Congress may not interfere with his discretion to
withhold such funds.346
Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion in Public Citizen v. United
States Department ofJustice,47 appeared to support just such a conten-
tion. He wrote that Congress by statute cannot prevent the President
"from accomplishing [his] constitutionally assigned functions" unless
the degree of congressional intrusion on the President's powers is
"'justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the
constitutional authority of Congress. '' 3 48  He continued by stating
that "where the Constitution by explicit text commits the power at is-
sue to the exclusive control of the President, we have refused to tol-
erate any intrusion by the legislative branch.
49
In a similar vein, William Rehnquist, again while serving as Assis-
tant Attorney General, suggested that there existed substantive areas
related to expenditure where Congress dare not intrude.3H He vol-
343. See supra note 253 and accompanying text (discussing importance of custom in rela-
tions between the political branches).
344. THE FEDERALIST No. 30, at 143 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills ed., 1982).
345. See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320.
346. SeeJ. Gregory Sidak, The President's Power of the Purse, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1162, 1183-84
(1989) (arguing that the President has an inherent right to fulfill his constitutional obligations
irrespective of congressional appropriation).
347. 491 U.S. 440 (1989).
348. Id. at 485.
349. Id. at 485.
350. See 1971 Hearings, supra note 17, at 246 (testimony of William H. Rehnquist, Assistant
Attorney General); see also Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 906 (1991) (Scalia, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in judgment) (stating that if Congress passes laws that invade
the executive domain, the President might have the power "to disregard them when they are
unconstitutional"); Easterbrook, supra note 254, at 905-06 (arguing that President should not
enforce patently unconstitutional laws). Even Senator Byrd has agreed that there are limits to
congressional appropriations power. See Byrd, supra note 15, at 311 ("Congress cannot, for ex-
ample, deny the President sufficient money to carry out his Article II duties (by, for example,
stipulating that no money be expended by the Executive on receiving foreign ambassadors, in
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unteered a hypothetical involving a congressional appropriation re-
quiring American troops to wear blue uniforms against the wishes of
contravention of section 3)."); see also RAOUL BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL
MYTH 309 (1974) (asserting that "the presidential oath to protect and defend the Constitution
posits both a right and a duty to protect his own constitutional functions from congressional
impairment"); FISHER, supra note 1, at 238 (citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Mrs.John
Adams (July 22, 1804), in 11 THE WRITINGS OF THOMASJEFMERSON 42, 43-44 (Albert E. Bergh
ed., 1905)) (discussing President Jefferson's belief that if enacted laws were unconstitutional
the President had a "duty to arrest its execution").
The Counsel to AndrewJohnson during the impeachment proceedings stated:
If a law be declared by the Supreme Court unconstitutional he should not execute it.
If the law be upon its very face in flat contradiction to plain express provisions of the
Constitution, as if a law should forbid the President to grant a pardon in any case, or if
a law should declare that he should not be Commander-in-Chief, or if a law should
declare that he should take no part in the making of a treaty, I say the President... is
bound to execute no such legislation ....
CORWIN, supra note 208, at 65. But see DaCosta v. Nixon, 55 F.R.D. 145, 146 (1972) ("No execu-
tive statement denying efficacy to the legislation could have either validity or effect.").
In the past, while ostensibly defending their constitutional prerogatives, presidents have in
effect exercised "line item" veto power over non-spending bills. This has been done largely
through presidential signing statements. SeeJudith A. Best, Budgetary Breakdown and the Vitiation
of the Veto, in THE FETTERED PRESIDENCY, 119, 123-25 (L. Gordon Crovitz & Jeremy A. Rabkin
eds., 1989) (comparing President Reagan's exercise of a signing statement to President Roose-
velt's use of "quasi-line item veto" power); Crovitz, supra note 17, at 43, 44 (contending that
President Bush effectively exercised line item veto power through his statement upon signing
the Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act of 1990). Beginning
with AndrewJackson in 1830, several presidents have signed bills and subsequently restricted
the breadth of the statute. See Christopher N. May, Presidential Defiance of "Unconstitutional"
Laws: Reviving the Royal Prerogative, 21 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 865, 945 (1994). The House of
Representatives concluded thatJackson's statement amounted to an item veto. See id. at 945-46.
In 1842, President Tyler provided the House of Representatives with a statement of his views on
a bill. See FISHER, supra note 17, at 90. A House select committee disagreed vigorously with
what they termed to be a "defacement of the public records and archives." See id. at 91.
InJune 1860, Congress appropriated $500,000 to finish an Army Corps of Engineers project.
See May, supra, at 949. The measure stated that the funds were 'to be expended according to
the plans and estimates of Captain Meigs and under his superintendence." President Bucha-
nan signed the bill but stated he would treat the provision requiring Captain Meigs' supervision
as only an expression of congressional "preference" and not as "intending to deprive the Presi-
dent of the power to order [Meigs] to any other army duty for the performance of which he
might consider him better adapted." See id. at 950. President Buchanan flouted the will of
Congress by temporarily reassigning Captain Meigs. See id. at 951.
In signing a merchant marine bill in 1920, President Wilson ignored one section of the bill
he found unconstitutional. See FISHER, supra note 17, at 92. Following the advice of the State
Department he reasoned that the offending section would have caused a breach of American
treaty responsibilities. See id. President Nixon likewise signed a military authorization bill in
1971, but he stated that the Mansfield Amendment accompanying it was"without binding force
or effect." See id. The next year a federal court took exception to his position. See DaCosta, 55
F.R.D. at 146 ("No executive statement denying efficacy to the legislation could have either va-
lidity or effect.").
In 1979, Congress attempted to require the establishment of consular relations under cir-
cumstances with which President Carter disagreed. See FISHER, supra note 334, at 25. After
signing the bill, Carter turned the mandate into a "recommendation." See id.; see also May, su-
pra, at 974 (stating that Presidents Ford, Carter and Reagan all at one point failed to comply
with § 4(a) (1) of the War Powers Resolution); Kristy L. Carroll, Comment, Whose Statute is it
Anyway?: Why and How Courts Should Use Presidential Signing Statements When Interpreting Federal
Statutes, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 475, 489 n.83 (1997) (providing highlights of debate over Presi-
dent's power to disregard unconstitutional laws).
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the President. Under such circumstances, Rehnquist argued that the
President could refuse to spend the appropriated funds since they
unduly intrude upon the President's prerogatives as Commander in
Chief.
15'
Third, while the Constitution indicates that public funds may not
be drawn to exceed appropriated limits, it is silent concerning the
discretion to spend less. Article I simply reads that "[n] o Money shall
be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations
made by Law. 3 52 Thus, while the ceiling of appropriations is une-
quivocal, the floor is not. Rehnquist during his 1971 Senate testi-
mony stated that "[y] ou do not have the same categorical direction at
all in the Constitution as to whether the President must spend where
Congress has appropriated. That is much more doubtful."33
A constitutional ceiling is placed on expenditure because the con-
cern of the Framers centered not around the Executive failing to
meet appropriated spending limits, but exceeding them. This con-
cern was inherited from England, where Parliament obtained exclu-
sive domain over appropriations only after a protracted struggle with
the King.s  Yet, despite the clear intent of the Framers that appro-
priations should not be made without legal sanction, the President
frequently makes financial commitments without prior statutory ap-
proval.355 This tradition has carried on despite the Framers' pro-
found unease at commitments being made unilaterally by the Execu-
3516tive. It would appear that this accepted practice is potentially more
dangerous than failing to meet appropriated ceilings. Nonetheless,
the unilateral obligation of funds by the President has gained some317
currency. Therefore, if the more serious practice of unilateral ex-
ecutive expenditure has been given some credence, the less serious
practice of impoundment would certainly appear no less legitimate.
351. See 1971 Hearings, supra note 17, at 246. It would further reinforce the argument that
in certain circumstances if a President is forced to preserve his national security prerogatives
from congressional encroachment he may legitimately act within Justice Jackson's third cate-
gory on the National Security Vector. See Figure No. 1, supra p. 1316.
352. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 9, cl. 7.
353. 1971 Hearings, supra note 17, at 243.
354. See BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 32, at 13-16 (describing struggle between the
Stuart Kings and the English Parliament from 1603-49).
355. As of 1988, Presidents had sent troops or arms abroad 199 times. See Symposium, Na-
tional Security and the Constitution: The Roles of Congress, the President and the Courts, 43 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 17, 24 (1988). On 137 of these occasions (69% of the time) this was done without con-
gressional appropriation. See id. For a thorough discussion of the executive branch unilaterally
incurring budget obligations, see FISHER, supra note 37, at 229-56.
356. See BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 32, at 30-32 (discussing concern during the
Ratification Debate over powers of the purse and sword uniting in the hands of the Executive).
357. See Symposium, supra note 355, at 24 (asserting a broad interpretation of the scope of
presidential authority).
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Due to the foregoing three reasons, the argument that the Presi-
dent's national security power does not extend to discretion over
spending funds cannot withstand scrutiny. Relevant case law, the
opinions of distinguished commentators, and past practice, coupled
with the necessity of the President maintaining some control over his
constitutional prerogatives, plus the practice of the Executive making
commitments without prior appropriation, all militate against the no-
tion that the President cannot exercise National Security Rescission
power.
2. Decisions involving the expenditure offunds may not be delegated to the
President
The argument could also be advanced that, notwithstanding the
clear distinction made in Curtiss-Wright and its progeny between ex-
ercises of presidential power in foreign and domestic contexts,ss5 the
Line Item Veto Act may not delegate such a power to the President.
The argument is that the spending power is inherently a legislative
function and that decisions involving the "Power of the Purse," even
if in the national security field, cannot be delegated by Congress to
the President. This argument is refuted on two counts. First, the
nondelegation doctrine, which governs congressional delegations to
the President, is a virtual nullity.359 Second, past practice indicates
that Congress has long delegated far-ranging spending discretion to
the President.
When Congress delegates authority to the President, all it need do
is provide "intelligible principle [s] " to the Executive branch. In-
structions as amorphous as supporting the "public interest" have
been upheld by the Supreme Court in the past.6' Despite attempts to
resurrect this somnolent doctrine,m2 the nondelegation doctrine has
lain dormant for over sixty years. 36 In the case of the Line Item Veto
Act, because the President was given three guidelines from Con-
358. SeUnited States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (stating that
"federal power over external affairs... [is] different from that over internal affairs").
359. See supra note 148 (citing only two cases to be struck down on nondelegation grounds).
360. SeeJ.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (upholding a
congressional delegation to the President to assess duties).
361. See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943)
(upholding a delegation to the Federal Communications Commission to grant licenses based
only on the "public interest, convenience or necessity").
362. SeeAmicus Brief of MarciA. Hamilton and David Schoenbrod in support of Appellees,
at 2, Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091 (1998) (No. 97-1374), available in 1998 WL
283211.
363. See City of New York, 118 S. Ct. at 2126 (BreyerJ., dissenting) (stating that only two cases
have ever been struck down on nondelegation grounds).
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gress,; ' this standard appeared to have been met.
Furthermore, since the dawn of the Republic, Congress has dele-
gated immense spending discretion to the President. The first ap-
propriations bills were all "lump-sum appropriations" with "sum not
exceeding" language as the only stipulation.0 In such bills, Congress
merely granted the President a sum of funds and provided him with
total discretion as to its allocation. For example, the first appropria-
tion bill passed by the First Congress appropriated funds for four
general categories of expenditure: $216,000 for the civil list,
$137,000 for the War Department, $190,000 for the discharge of war-
rants issued by the previous Board of Treasury, and $96,000 for vet-
erans' pensions. Such spending discretion is not only venerable,
but it has received the imprimatur of the Supreme Court. "That
Congress has wide discretion in the matter of prescribing details of
expenditures for which it appropriates must, of course, be plain.
Appropriations and other acts of Congress are replete with instances
of general appropriations of large amounts, to be allotted and ex-
pended as directed by designated government agencies. 
'
6
For the above two reasons, Congress can indeed delegate discre-
tion over spending to the Executive. The contention that decisions
involving the expenditure of funds may not be extended to the
President is, therefore, untenable.
3. Presidential cancellations of national security-related spending are
indistinguishable from domestic spending, potentially leading to "Trojan-
horse" rescission
An argument could be made that because national security-related
spending has far-reaching domestic ramifications, the difference be-
tween the two areas is sufficiently blurred as to make them indistin-
guishable. Because of this ambiguity, the risk would be run that the
definition of national security could be expanded insatiably by future
presidents to include virtually any appropriated spending. The
President could expand his cancellation powers through the "Trojan
Horse" of National Security Rescission to include other purely do-
mestic areas of spending-essentially gaining rescission power
through indirect means. In supporting this argument, the example
364. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
365. See FISHER, supra note 37, at 60.
366. Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 23, § 1, 1 Stat. 95. The second and third appropriations bills
followed the same pattern of broad discretion. SeeAct of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 4, § 1, 1 Stat. 104
(providing "lump sums" for among other things the civil list, the Department of War and pen-
sions for invalids); Act of Feb. 11, 1791, ch. 6, 1 Stat. 190 (same).
367. Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 321-22 (1937).
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of President Roosevelt could be offered. By using a liberal interpre-
tation of his Commander in Chief powers, President Roosevelt im-
pounded domestic spending involving the construction of roads,
harbors and dams.m
The statutory construction given National Security Rescission,
however, would limit the President's rescission authority to the four
national security-related spending bills.3 The spending provisions
within these bills are statutorily defined as relating to certain topics
and, therefore, are legally distinct from other areas of federal spend-
ing" ° Even if a spending bill were packaged with other bills into
omnibus legislation, the various appropriations bills are still discrete
within their own boundaries. Such statutory provisions could not be
disregarded lightly.
4. The distinction between national security spending and domestic
spending is artificial, because national security spending has far-
reaching domestic ramifications
Finally, still others could argue that the construction of weapons
systems and other national security-related construction occurs far
from any theater of war. The construction takes place throughout
the United States in sites that lie within congressional districts and
that provide jobs for citizens. This argument, however, like its
predecessors, while initially appealing, collapses underneath its own
weight. Simply put, the geography of the national security spending
is irrelevant. Parallel practices demonstrate that the President's
Commander in Chief powers are not limited to beyond the water's
edge, but often have application within the nation's borders.
For example, Congress has delegated to the President the power to
close military bases. The Supreme Court refused to review such a
delegation, effectively upholding the delegation."" The responsibility
for closing military bases is not far removed from the cancellation of
weapons systems. Both actions have a major impact upon local
communities, however, the responsibility for both actions are the
President's national security powers pursuant to a congressional
delegation.5 7 Other similar examples of national security power be-
368. See supra notes 280-84 and accompanying text (describing President Roosevelt's im-
poundment during World War II).
369. See supra note 7.
370. See, e.g., H.RL CONF. REP. No. 105-45, at 41 (1997) (defining purpose of bill as appro-
priation of funds for military functions of Department of Defense).
371. See Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 476 (1994) (holding that presidential decision on
military base closure recommendations was not reviewable and that the President may
.approv[e] or disapprov[e] the recommendations for whatever reason he sees fit").
372. See id. at 464-65.
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ing exercised within the borders of the United States would include
the executive branch's jurisdiction over military justice and na-
tional security secrets. 7 4
Moreover, the President is Commander in Chief of the armed
forces at home and abroad. Presidents have used this power in do-
mestic contexts to suppress rebellion,"5 enforce the laws,3 76 and main-
tain the peace. 7 7 Therefore, despite protestations to the contrary,38
the President's national security powers serve important functions
within the United States as well as abroad. The previous examples
thus would tend to refute the notion that a delegation to reduce na-
tional security-related spending within the United States is somehow
beyond the scope of presidential power.
After consideration of four of the major arguments against Na-
tional Security Rescission, the argument in its favor is only rein-
forced.
B. A Constitutional Dilemma
Assuming arguendo, that the President's decision to withhold na-
tional security-related spending should follow the requirements of
Presentment as strictly interpreted by Chadha79 and upheld in City of
New York,' 8" and there is strong argument to be made that it does
not,381 the Constitution still favors the existence of National Security
Rescission. Ultimately, if the Supreme Court concluded that the
withholding of national-security-related spending must be carried out
through the Presentment Clause, it would have faced a constitutional
373. See, e.g., Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355, 367 (1971) (upholding conviction un-
der the Uniform Code of MilitaryJustice for a rape occurring on a NewJersey military base).
374. SeeExec. Order No. 10,104(f), 15 C.F.R. 597 (1950) (involving a presidential definition
of "defense installations" to include certain "commercial establishment[s]").
375. For example, President Washington used troops to put down the so-called "Whiskey
Rebellion." See SIDNEY M. MILKIS & MICHAEL NELSON, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY: ORIGINS &
DEVELOPMENT 84-86 (2d ed. 1994). Similarly, President Lincoln used troops to put down the
Southern rebellion during the Civil War. See id. at 156-64.
376. For example, President Eisenhower called up federal airborne troops to enforce a
court order desegregating Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas. See 2 MICHAEL
RICCARDS, THE FEROCIOUS ENGINE OF DEMOCRACY 250 (1995).
377. For example, President Johnson used airborne troops to keep the peace during the
urban riots of the 1960's. W. Craig Bledsoe et al., Chief Executive, in CONGRESSIONAL QUAR-
TERLY, POWERS OFTHE PRESIDENCY 70 (2d ed. 1997).
378. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 632 (1952) (Douglas,
J., concurring) (stating that "our history and tradition rebel at the thought that the grant of
military power carries with it authority over civilian affairs").
379. SeeI.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,956-57 (1983).
380. SeeClinton v. City of NewYork, 118 S. Ct. 2091, 2095 (1998).
381. See supra Part IVA (contending that the Presentment Clause may not apply to national
security lawmaking); City of New York, 118 S. Ct. at 2106 (discussing ability of Congress to dele-
gate authority to the President to repeal laws within the field of foreign affairs).
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quandary. The Line Item Veto Act, as seen through the prism of na-
tional security, could have been in violation of the Presentment
Clause on one hand. Yet, on the other, the President's national secu-
rity power and the limits of congressional delegable authority would
have demanded great deference. 2
To further complicate matters, both constitutional clauses involved
have been interpreted broadly by the Supreme Court: the Present-
ment Clause in Chadha,"s and the President's national security pow-
ers coupled with a congressional delegation in Curtiss-Wright.s 4 To
overcome this impasse, the Court would have likely applied a balanc-
ing test.s" Application of this test would have been in accord with
Supreme Court precedent and would have likely confirmed the exis-
tence of National Security Rescission.
1. A balancing test would have likely been applied
In cases involving a conflict between constitutional powers of gov-
ernmental branches, the Court, if unable to decide the case on other
grounds, has traditionally applied a balancing test.6 In United States
v. Nixon,-"' for example, the Court was faced with a conflict between
the executive branch and the Judiciary. In this conflict, President
Nixon claimed "executive privilege" over subpoenaed tapes and pa-
pers.' The President's claims of privilege were based on his ability
to perform his executive duties, and were thus pitted against the Ju-
diciary's need to preserve the integrity of the criminal justice sys-
tem. 9 The Court reasoned that the balance it struck between these
382. Such an equation implicitly factors in the delegation question. Instead of presenting
the constitutional equation as (presidential national security powers + delegated congressional
power) - (Presentment requirements + unconstitutional amount delegated congressional
power) constitutional solution, this formulation simply incorporates the net amount of con-
gressionally delegable power.
383. See supra Part IIA (discussing expansive holding of Chadha).
384. See supra Part IVA2.a (discussing broad holding in Curtiss-Wright).
385. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 695-96 (1988) (weighing the extent to which the
independent counsel reduces executive powers and concluding that the Act gives the President
sufficient control and ability to carry out his constitutional duties); Nixon v. Administrator of
Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (indicating that in assessing whether an act of Congress
upsets the balance of powers, the Court must analyze degree to which the Act prevents Presi-
dent from carrying out his constitutional functions).
386. See supra note 385 and accompanying text (providing examples of cases in which the
Supreme Court weighed the extent to which an act interferes with presidential constitutional
powers). It is likely that this balancing test demonstrates why Justice Jackson's formula would
not justify merely any exercise of enhanced rescission authority. Only through his national se-
curity powers may a president overcome the requirements of Presentment.
387. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
388. See id. at 703.
389. See id. at 707 (stating that "legitimate needs of the judicial process may outweigh the
presidential privilege"); id. at 711-12 (concluding that, in this case, the need for fair adjudica-
tion of a criminal proceeding outweighed presidential need for confidentiality).
1998] 1345
THE AMERICAN UNIvERsrIY LAw REVIEw [Vol. 47:1273
competing considerations must "preserve[] the essential functions of
each branch."' " Accordingly, it held that relatively severe interfer-
ence with the Judiciary involving the criminal justice system out-
weighed the relatively mild interference with the President's per-
formance of his duties since the privileged information could be
revealed in camera."'
While, the Nixon case pitted the executive branch against the judi-
cial branch, in the case of National Security Rescission, the two po-
litical branches had acted in concert, making the arguments against
national security-related cancellations all the more formidable."2
a. Weighing the Constitution's national security powers against the
requirements of the Presentment Clause
Any balancing test must begin with the assumption that national
security is the most important governmental interest. As the Court
stated in Haig v. Agee, "[i]t is 'obvious and unarguable' that no gov-
ernmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Na-
tion." '393 Without a secure nation, none of the Constitution's political
guarantees is assured. Consequently, national security has demanded
deference from a host of constitutional clauses.* As has been dem-
onstrated, when the President and Congress act in accord in this
area, their power is virtually without limit.95
Furthermore, in no field is the importance of granting discretion
390. Id.
391. See id. at 712-13.
392. See id.
393. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981).
394. Other constitutional provisions defer to national security concerns, even ones involv-
ing individual rights. Included are some of the most basic constitutional rights: Freedom of
Speech, see Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 839-40 (1976) (holding no general right exists for ci-
vilians to make speeches or distribute materials on military bases); Freedom of Worship, see
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 504 (1986) (holding that the First Amendment does not
prohibit the Air Force from restricting the wearing of religious headgear); Freedom of the
Press, seeAbrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 623-24 (1919) (sustaining convictions for viola-
tions of the Espionage Act) and United States v. Progressive Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 997 (W.D.
Wis. 1978), reconsideration denied, 486 F. Supp. 5, 6 (W.D. Wis.),dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir.
1979) (enjoining a newspaper from publishing technical material on the hydrogen bomb); the
Fourth Amendment prohibition against warrantless searches, see United States v. Ramsey, 431
U.S. 606 (1977) (upholding border searches absent warrant and probable cause) and United
States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 321-22 (1972) (fashioning"foreign intelli-
gence exception" to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement); and Freedom of Move-
ment, see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223-24 (1944) (upholding conviction for
violation of World War II military order excluding all Japanese Americans from designated ar-
eas on the West Coast) and Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 105 (1943) (upholding
curfew orders in West Coast areas).
395. See supra Part WA (discussing great deference given to the political branches in na-
tional security); Clinton v. City of NewYork, 118 S. Ct. 2091, 2106 (1998) (discussing examples
of legislation affecting foreign affairs in which Congress delegated to the President the power
effectively to repeal statutory law).
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to the political branches more vital than in national security. It
would seem logical that the power to alter national security spending
bills as needed would be included in such discretion. For as Alexan-
der Hamilton stated in Federalist No. 30, money allows the branches
"to perform [their] most essential functions."96 If the President, as
the "sole organ" of national security,397 cannot receive a delegation
from Congress to effect national security-related spending reduc-
tions, his freedom of action has been greatly hampered. 98 In particu-
lar, if the President is inhibited in his role as Commander in Chief,
or as Chief Diplomat, then these all-important functions will not be
fulfilled-constitutionally, there is no other branch that can pick up
the "slack." As a result, since the political branches are charged with
the Republic's national security to the virtual exclusion of the Judici-
ary, not granting them deference could place a significant obstacle in
the way of the prompt execution of the nation's aims. Thus, there
exists an immense burden for the interests of Presentment to over-
come.. Although it is granted that the integrity of the lawmaking
process is difficult to overstate, the exigencies of national security
would likely have tipped the scales in favor of legitimizing National
Security Rescission.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
The Supreme Court did not consider the legitimacy of national se-
curity-related cancellations because the City of New York case did not
involve an exercise of national security power 4 ° Nevertheless, in
dicta, it did allude to the potential for such a prerogative.4 1 Had the
suit been based on a national security-related cancellation, the Su-
preme Court might well have ruled differently than it did. The re-
quirements of the Presentment Clause and the political branches' na-
tional security powers can only be appropriately preserved by
fashioning a narrow construction of the statute so that it would apply
only to national security spending provisions-National Security Re-
396. THE FEDERALIST No. 30, supra note 344, at 143 (Hamilton).
397. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (stating that Presi-
dent is the "sole organ" of the Federal Government in international relations).
398. SeeTHE FEDERALIST No. 30, supra note 344, at 143 (Hamilton) (discussing the central
importance of funding to the performance of governmental duties).
399. Some would argue that in an area as important as national security it is all the more
necessary for the requirements of Presentment to be strictly followed. As demonstrated above,
see Part IV.A, however, national security law is frequently made and unmade outside the con-
fines of Presentment. See supra note 394 (discussing how national security exacts deference
from numerous constitutional clauses).
400. See City of New York, 118 S. Ct. at 2095 (involving a domestic spending cancellation).
401. See id. at 2106.
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scission. In this manner, domestic legislation would be strictly held
to the requirements of Presentment, while the distinct field of na-
tional security law would comply with precedent allowing for presi-
dential cancellation.
Such an interpretation of the Line Item Veto Act would have fol-
lowed three familiar canons of statutory interpretation. First, such an
interpretation would have comported with the canon of construing
statutes to avoid constitutional problems.0 2 By interpreting the Line
Item Veto Act to encompass only National Security Rescission, the
Court would have allowed the statute to avoid constitutional infir-
mity. Sutherland's Statutes and Statutory Construction states that a "court
should construe legislative enactments to avoid constitutional diffi-
culties if possible." °0 Sutherland declares that "[w] hen possible, statu-
tory provisions should be construed in such a way as to avoid uncon-
stitutionality rather than simply void them on the basis of an
interpretation which renders them constitutionally infirm. 4 4
Moreover, such an alternate construction need only be
"reasonable. ''40 5 In fact, courts have held that even "a strained con-
struction is not only permissible, but desirable, if it is the only con-
struction that will save constitutionality."
4 6
Second, the Line Item Veto Act, as applied to national security-
related spending, might also have benefited from the canon granting
national security-related legislation a generous construction.4 0 7 "It is
imperative that legislation providing for national defense and the
conduct of war should be interpreted in ways that are most conducive
to the achievement of its important objectives." 4°8 Thus, to the extent
that the Line Item Veto Act would have been used in the national se-
curity context, it would have likely been constructed liberally.
Third, such an interpretation would have followed the presump-
tion against diminishing the President's traditional powers. 409  As
402. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LEGISLATION 675, 686-87 (2d ed.
1995). This canon has had such esteemed advocates asJustices Brandeis, Justice Cardozo, and
Justice Frankfurter. See id. at 686.
403" See NORMAN SINGER, SUTHERLAND'S STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.11,
48-49 n.4 (5th ed. 1992).
404. See id. § 45.11, at 49 n.7 (quoting American Fed'n of Labor & Congress of Indus. Orgs.
v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc)).
405" See id. § 45.11, at 49 & n.15 (citing State v. Fischer, 443 A.2d 249 (N.J. Super. 1982)).
406- See id at 49 n.16 (quoting In re Gifford, 688 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1982) and citing eight
other federal cases).
407. See id. § 71.09, at 289 (discussing importance of generously construing statutes relating
to national defense).
408. Id.
409. See ESKRIDGE & FRIcKEv, supra note 402, at 655 (citing Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280
(1981)).
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demonstrated above, ° one of the President's more venerable powers
has been national security-related impoundment. Because presiden-
tial impoundment is one of the President's traditional powers, it
would have likely fallen within this third canon. As a result, only by
acknowledging National Security Rescission would a court have re-
mained true to the President's traditional powers of national security-
related impoundment.
To effect such a construction, the Administration should have can-
celed a measure from one of the four national security-related bills:
the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, the Military Con-
struction Appropriations Act, the Foreign Operations, Export Financ-
ing and Related Programs Appropriations Act and the Departments
of Commerce, Justice, and State and Related Agencies Appropria-
tions Act." By canceling national security spending provisions within
these bills, the canons of statutory construction would have pointed
toward recognition of National Security Rescission.
Were Congress to muster the political will, it could even pass a Na-
410. See supra Part IV.B.
411. Only the spending provisions affecting national security in these bills would be eligible
for cancellation. The Department ofJustice, for instance, would not be subject to cancellation
simply because it is paired with the State Department for purposes of appropriation bills. For
examples of provisions the President could have canceled, see Departments of Commerce, Jus-
tice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
119, 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. (111 Stat.) 2440, 2499 (appropriating $14,549,000 for necessary ex-
penses for an international fisheries commissions); id. (appropriating a grant of $8,000,000 for
the Asia Foundation); id. at 2502 (appropriating a grant of $12,000,000 for Center for Cultural
and Technical Interchange Between East and West in the State of Hawaii); id. at 2502
(appropriating a grant of $1,500,000 to the Florida education institution, known as the
North/South Center); Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appro-
priations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-118, 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. (111 Stat.) 2386, 2398
(appropriating $15,000,000 for a scholarship, bicommunal projects and other measures aimed
at the reunification of Cyprus); id. at 2398 (appropriating $5,000,000 for the Western Hemi-
sphere International Law Enforcement Academy); Department of Defense Appropriations Act
of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-56, 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. (111 Stat.) 1203, 1216 (appropriating
$4,000,000 for the development of coal-derived jet fuel technologies); id. at 1219
(appropriating $2,000,000 for the National Security Education Trust Fund); id. at 1242
(appropriating $13,000,000 for the Department of the Navy to Intrepid Sea-Air-Space Founda-
tion for the refurbishment of the former U.S.S. Intrepid (CV 11)); Military Construction Ap-
propriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-45, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-247, at 25 (1997)
(appropriating $9,900,000 for an atmospheric Air Dryer Facility at Arnold Air Force Base in
Tennessee).
In making these selections the author focused on the legal considerations involved in a chal-
lenge, the substantive merit of the provision, and the political realities faced by the Clinton
Administration. The author concentrated on provisions that fell explicitly within the Presi-
dent's fiscal domain. All the provisions fell under the statutory heading, "Funds Appropriated
to the President." Moreover, all fell within what traditionally has been considered the Presi-
dent's role as Commander in Chief or Chief Diplomat.
Apart from the provisions that actually made it into law, the White House could have been
proactive regarding a test case by negotiating in advance with advocates of the Line Item Veto
Act in Congress. In this manner, a "dummy" provision could have been inserted into the bill
with the intention of it being canceled by the President for purposes of a "test case."
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tional Security Line Item Veto Act which could well pass constitu-
tional muster. The Court's dicta in City of New York left the door ajar
for such an act.4 2 Such a bill would still empower the President to
"trim the fat" of approximately one sixth of the federal budget,41s
while at the same time allowing him to augment his political power
but this time on a more modest scale. Considering, however, the
measure's unpopularity in Congress following the President's cancel-
lations, " the emergence of a budget surplus, the weakened political
state of the incumbent President, and a lack of Republican enthusi-
asm for reducing defense spending, it seems highly unlikely that
Congress would grant the President such a modified version of en-
hanced rescission power.
CONCLUSION
The public discourse concerning the constitutionality of the Line
Item Veto Act was marked in large part by a lack of nuanced public
debate.1  Commentators framed the legal question simply as
whether or not the prerogative was constitutional.4 6 Such a limited
scope of debate may have satisfied partisan concerns, but it failed to
appreciate the complexity arising from the Act's application. In so
doing, the recent discourse surrounding the line item veto over-
looked the varying levels of presidential authority, which fluctuate
according to the action or inaction of Congress,1 7 and according to
the nature of presidential action, whether it be domestic or national
security-related.4 8 It is this very lack of appreciation for the varying
412. See Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct. 2096, 2106 (1998) (distinguishing the Line
Item Veto Act from prior acts that allowed the President effectively to cancel provisions that
involved foreign affairs); cf infra note 419 (discussing the likelihood that a line item veto bill
with statutory language that used "decline to spend" or "withhold funds" language instead of
the term "cancel" would be upheld).
413. See Byrd, supra note 15, at 315.
414. See supra note 98 (describing congressional reaction to the Act's implementation).
415. See, e.g., William Welch, Line Item Veto: a Long Time in the Works, USA TODAY, at A6
(quoting Senator Byrd terming the Act "a colossal mistake" and a "malformed monstrosity").
416. See id.
417. SeeYoungstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 636-38 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (explaining the varying levels of presidential authority).
418. See Figure No. 1, supra p. 1316; supra Part IVA (discussing differences between na-
tional security lawmaking and domestic lawmaking).
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degrees of presidential authority that lies at the heart of the Clinton
Administration's failure to administer enhanced rescission power in
the manner most conducive to its preservation. As a result, the line
item veto is gone, if not forever, at least for the foreseeable future. 9
419. In the wake of City of New York other modified line item veto proposals were discussed.
See Jan Crawford Greenburg, Court Voids Line-Item Veto Power: Lawmakers say They'll try Again,
CHlI. TRIB.,June 26, 1998, at 1 (discussing the attempts of Representatives Solomon and Goss to
write an acceptable line item veto bill); Helen Dewar & Joan Biskupic, Line Item Veto Struck
Down; Backers Pushfor Alternativ4 WASH. PoSTJune 26, 1998, at Al (discussing plans in the Sen-
ate led by Senators Coats and McCain to draft a new line item bill). Their efforts may prove to
be in vain due to the lack of necessary political momentum for a new line item veto proposal.
See Byrd, supra note 15, at 323-24 (commenting that the Congressional Budget Office forecasts
a budgetary surplus for fiscal year 1998 of $8 billion and surpluses through 2003).
If the political momentum were to pick up again, perhaps even a new general line item veto
act could be formulated to pass constitutional muster. To be viable, such a statute would have
to use terminology such as "decline to spend" or "withhold funds" in place of the word
.cancel." See City of New York, 118 S. Ct. at 2118 (ScaliaJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("Had the Line Item Veto Act authorized the President to 'decline to spend' any item of
spending ... there is not the slightest doubt that authorization would have been constitu-
tional."); cf. id. at 2108 (stating that "[i]f there is to be a new procedure in which the President
will play a different role in determining the final text of what may 'become a law,' such change
must come not by legislation but through the amendment procedures set forth in Article V of
the Constitution").
Certainly, a line item veto amendment to the Constitution was and is the optimal method of
granting the Executive such power. See, e.g., CORWIN, supra note 208, at 284 (contending that
item veto requires constitutional amendment). Even three years ago with the prevailing politi-
cal winds at its back, line item veto amendments failed in both houses of Congress. See H.RJ.
Res. 4, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R.J. Res. 6, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R.J. Res. 17, 104th Cong.
(1995); SJ. Res. 2, 104th Cong. (1995); SJ. Res. 14, 104th Cong. (1995); SJ. Res. 15, 104th
Cong. (1995); S.J. Res. 16, 104th Cong. (1995).
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